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ABSTRACT 
 
SENSATION REBUILT: 
CARNAL ONTOLOGY IN LEVINAS AND MERLEAU-PONTY 
 
 
 
By 
Tom Sparrow 
May 2010 
 
Dissertation supervised by Fred Evans 
 The phenomenological approaches to embodiment presented by Levinas and 
Merleau-Ponty cannot provide an adequate account of bodily identity because their 
methodological commitments forbid them from admitting the central role that sensation 
plays in the constitution of experience. This neglect is symptomatic of their tradition’s 
suspicion toward sensation as an explanatory concept, a suspicion stemming from Kant’s 
critique of empiricist metaphysics and Husserl’s critique of psychologism and 
objectivism. By contrast, I suggest that only with a robust theory of sensation can the 
integrity of the body and its relations be fully captured. I therefore develop—contra Kant 
and Husserl’s idealism—a realist conception of sensation that is at once materialist and 
phenomenological. 
 The phenomenologists distort the nature of intercorporeal relations and their most 
v 
significant insights prove to be non-phenomenological. I find this useful for rebuilding 
the concept of sensation on materialist grounds. Merleau-Ponty grants too much control 
to the lived body, and thereby neglects its passive aspects. His view that relations 
between bodies are reversible is thus inadequate. Levinas endows the body with a 
substantial passivity, to the point that the susceptibility of the body becomes its defining 
feature. I defend a more balanced position that features the body’s plasticity—its capacity 
to give form to its environment while receiving form from that same environment. My 
theory synthesizes the phenomenologists with other historical figures, from Spinoza to 
Deleuze, as well as critical race, feminist, and embodied cognition theorists. To conclude, 
I suggest that only the plastic body adequately describes the subject’s aesthetic relations, 
and can therefore serve as the basis for an immanent ethics of embodiment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
THE SITE OF SENSATION AND NONDUALIST ONTOLOGY 
 
 
Like a clever thief hidden inside a house, breathing quietly, waiting until 
everyone’s asleep. I have looked deep inside myself, trying to detect something 
that might be there. But just as our consciousness is a maze, so too is our body. 
Everywhere you turn there’s darkness, and a blind spot. Everywhere you find 
silent hints, everywhere a surprise is waiting for you. 
– Murakami, What I Talk About When I Talk About Running 
 
 
PROBLEM AND METHOD 
Daily most of us experience our bodies as supported and resisted by the features of their 
environments. Occasionally we are given over to the realization that the spaces we move 
through possess the power to overwhelm or destroy our bodies. Certain bodily 
transformations never present themselves phenomenally, however: most obviously, the 
death of our bodies. As Epicurus says: “Death is nothing to us, for that which is dissolved 
is without sensation; and that which lacks sensation is nothing to us.”1 The present work 
is about the prospects and limits of phenomenology as a means of theorizing the identity 
of the body. In it I ask what constitutes the body’s integrity and of what the body is 
capable. This is accomplished through a critical engagement with the work of Merleau-
Ponty and Levinas, both of whom I see as offering directives beyond the body of 
phenomenology, specifically in their analyses of sensation. Since sensation is not often 
featured in phenomenological discussions, and because I see sensation as necessary for 
conceiving the activity and passivity of the body, I take it as my focus. The turn to 
sensation in Merleau-Ponty and Levinas marks a significant departure from the latent 
idealism of phenomenology. The revitalization of sensation has ontological and practical 
                                                     
1 Epicurus, “Principal Doctrines,” II, in The Extant Remains, trans. Cyril Bailey (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1926), 95. 
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consequences that are nascent in phenomenology, but which cannot be fully captured by 
phenomenological analyses. Therefore, I will attempt to move beyond Merleau-Ponty and 
Levinas in my treatment of the body, its identity, and its ethical significance. 
How we should conduct ourselves and treat other entities has always been an 
issue for moral philosophy. Apart from ethical questions, the problem of how we as 
individuals actually relate to other individuals, or how it is possible for one person to 
interact with, act upon, or know another individual raises altogether different questions. 
These questions are of an epistemological or ontological type and have manifested 
themselves traditionally as the problem of other minds or, more recently, the problem of 
intersubjectivity. Such problems underlie the perpetual discussion of corporeal difference 
and its ethico-political consequences in contemporary continental philosophy. The 
saliency of these specific problems, however, only really makes immediate sense in a 
dualist’s metaphysical framework. It is of course possible to see the ethical and 
ontological as articulated or collapsed into each other, as in Spinoza. 
Monists like Spinoza must first explain how individuals emerge as such. Only 
then can they trouble themselves about how individuals can and should interact. The 
dualist problem of how I come to know the mind of another person, when all I perceive is 
the behavior of that person, only arises if I actually believe that beyond his or her body 
lies an ontologically unique thing called a mind. This is of course the ontology of 
Descartes, but it is also the ontology of Kant, who sees personhood as constituted by the 
fusion of an extended human body with a nonextended rational ego. 
From a practical viewpoint dualist ontology is a brilliant way to safeguard the 
freedom and responsibility of the individual because it permits the body to be subject to 
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causal laws while at the same time placing the mind/soul/ego at an infinite remove from 
the physical world. So, for instance, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, which is not 
primarily a work in practical philosophy, makes a point of specifying the dual nature of 
the self in order to protect the freedom of the will from the determinations of causality.2 
The body suffers in the empirical realm while the ego enjoys its isolation in the 
transcendental sphere. The integrity (moral and structural) of the person transcends the 
corporeal world. Some consequences entailed in this distinction permit Kant to refer his 
ethical and political philosophy back to his epistemological, ontological, and aesthetic 
philosophy. These provide a firm ontological3 foundation for his critique of practical 
reason and metaphysics of morals. By entwining the practical and ontological, Kant can 
assert in the Critique of Judgment that it is possible for aesthetic judgment of the 
dynamically sublime to “consider nature as a might that has no dominance over us” and  
consequently awaken “in our power of reason, a different and nonsensible standard” 
which derives from “the superiority [of the mind] over nature itself in its immensity.”4 
Since the Kantian subject sits outside of natural events, it is able to feel pleasure in the 
face of a terrifying spectacle and even exploit such a moment to reassert its intellectual 
power over the material effects of nature.5 The result is a certain feeling of powerlessness 
on the part of the subject that is generated by its sensible relation to the sublime. 
Ironically, this feeling gets translated into a moral sentiment that triggers a supersensible 
                                                     
2 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), Bxxvii-
Bxxvii. 
3 In this respect I am following Heidegger’s idiosyncratic interpretation of Kant’s first Critique as a work in 
“fundamental ontology,” that is, an exploration of the understanding as the pre-ontological condition which 
gives rise to a theory of being qua being (i.e., ontology). This interpretation is given in Martin Heidegger, 
Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, 5th ed., enlarged, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1997). 
4 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 260, 261. 
5 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 261-262. 
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command which “obligates absolutely”6 and evinces the moral superiority of humans 
over nature. The systematic link between aesthetics and morality is possible, for Kant, 
because the subject is essentially an intellectual being, not a corporeal being susceptible 
to the directives of the natural world. 
The strength of the dualist position on subjectivity is that it allows the 
metaphysical and practical realms to rationally reinforce each other while leaving the 
intellectual or spiritual world uncontaminated by concrete, physical events. Moreover, it 
opens an ethical space in which the sensible is subject to the judgments of the 
supersensible, while the sensible as such is afforded no practical value. The abilities and 
freedoms of the individual are in a strong sense immune to other individuals and the 
corporeal influences of the natural or social world. The embodied view of subjectivity 
that I will unpack in the work of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, among others, contests this 
dichotomy along with its ethical and political implications. In so doing it not only gives 
itself the task of accounting for the emergence of the subject, it also raises the difficulty 
of deriving a nonformal ethical imperative from the sensible realm without committing 
the naturalistic fallacy.7 My conclusion will argue that the formality of Kant’s view 
neglects the aesthetics of embodiment we find in Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, and that 
this neglect results from a difference of ontology. From the perspective of embodied 
subjectivity, we cannot maintain a basic distinction between our aesthetic and moral 
sensibilities, as though they belong to two distinct capacities or “faculties.” We cannot 
concur with Kant that our moral sensibility operates at a distance which cannot be 
                                                     
6 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 266-267. 
7 The naturalistic fallacy is committed when a person tries to derive an “ought” from an “is,” or when they 
deduce a moral claim from a natural (or ontological) fact. G.E. Moore identifies the naturalistic fallacy in 
Principia Ethica. 
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traversed by the directives of our corporeal life; or rather, that our affective life is 
ultimately in the service of our intellectual judgment. Instead, a material form of our 
moral sensibility and ethical imperatives must be submitted as a replacement for the 
Kantian model. 
Of course, the monist and materialist traditions, from Democritus to Hobbes, 
Spinoza, Marx and beyond have always contested the dualist’s ontology and resolved the 
intersubjective problem with different solutions. But at least since Hegel the dualist 
framework has been under attack from a perspective that can generally be called 
postdualism or nondualism. Hegel responded to Kant’s partitioning of the world into the 
noumenal and phenomenal by insisting on the superfluity of the noumenal. The 
Phenomenology of Spirit effectively demonstrates that the noumenal realm is unnecessary 
and cannot be legitimately garnered from the Kantian perspective. Yet it seems odd to 
apply the monist label to Hegel’s philosophy. Likewise, it is not necessarily materialist 
because it allows for the existence of forces (Spirit, Concept) that are neither physical in 
nature nor subject to causal laws. Bergson’s élan vital is an analogous force. Nietzsche, 
moreover, could also be considered a nondualist/nonmaterialist philosopher. He is too 
much of a psychoanalyst to be an eliminativist, and his philosophy of the body displays a 
complex understanding of both the quantitative and qualitative, physical and 
cosmological, as well as the aleatory dimensions of experience. And yet, he is more than 
willing to nearly reduce consciousness to a dynamism of forces.8 What is the 
metaphysical status of these immaterial elements or their counterparts in the 
phenomenological tradition, which worries more about overcoming dualism than it does 
                                                     
8 See, for example, Gilles Deleuze’s explication of the “Active and Reactive” in Nietzsche and Philosophy, 
trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 39-72. 
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about fending off charges of monism? If they are neither physical nor spiritual, where do 
we situate Hegel’s Spirit, Nietzsche’s force, or Bergson’s élan? A central challenge for 
postdualism is to overcome dualism without arresting motion, that is, without reducing 
animation to mechanism. 
It is problematic to situate Merleau-Ponty and Levinas into classical categories. 
For instance, why does Merleau-Ponty’s late notion of “the flesh” not result in a monist 
ontology, a monism of the flesh, or why does the identification of the self with the body 
not admit of a monism?9 Commentators prefer to cast what would otherwise be his 
monism as Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy of immanence; but it is necessary to see why this 
label fits him better than does “monist.” The primacy of perception thesis begins with 
things already individuated for perception and ostensibly sidesteps monism; yet, it does 
not see subject and object as distinct, but rather as internally related. Thus it avoids the 
standard dualism. On the other hand, there is a pervasive conceptual dualism in Merleau-
Ponty’s texts, which Renaud Barbaras has catalogued.10 The ontological situation is no 
less conflicted in Levinas. Why should we not consider Levinas’s elemental ontology in 
                                                     
9 Lawrence Hass, Merleau-Ponty’s Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008), 111, 
submits that we cannot regard Merleau-Ponty as a monist because there is always a distance between the 
behaving body and the self, as well as between the perceiver and the sensible. But Merleau-Ponty maintains 
that we are our bodies; this identification is one of the most innovative moments in his philosophy. 
Moreover, it is not enough to cite this distance, it must be also be explained. Otherwise, we preclude 
monism a priori. So what are we to make of this self?  There is either a new dualism or a new monism at 
play in Merleau-Ponty and it seems we are given a choice: either continue to speak of a mysterious self that 
operates “in” or “as” the body, or speak of the body as a thing that senses and perceives or a “subject-
object,” as Merleau-Ponty does in “The Philosopher and His Shadow,” in Signs, trans. Richard C. 
McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964), 166. The latter is the more radical choice, but 
preferable. It also puts the burden of accounting for the nonphysical subject on Merleau-Ponty’s readers. 
The language is what is difficult here, but it is better to attempt to speak of the body’s subjectivity as a 
sensing thing, rather than distinguish between the lived body and the physical body, which runs the risk of 
instituting a dualism or perpetuating a theological element in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy. 
10 See Renaud Barbaras, The Being of the Phenomenon: Merleau-Ponty’s Ontology, trans. Ted Toadvine 
and Leonard Lawlor (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004). Barbaras writes that Merleau-Ponty’s 
dualism manifests itself “clearly in the final analysis of the body in terms of sensing and sensed, touching 
and touched, subject of the world and part of the world. Such conceptual pairs are just so many displaced 
modalities of the duality of consciousness and object” (xxiv). 
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Totality and Infinity a monism, but then the question of the human Other (autrui) as a 
reformulation of the dualist problem of other minds? What makes these two thinkers 
nondualist and what resources do they offer us to build theories of subjectivity and 
intersubjectivity that genuinely challenge the Cartesian and Kantian legacies? I contend 
that it is their phenomenologically inflected ontology of the body.  At the same time, we 
also see Merleau-Ponty and Levinas reluctant to fully commit to the centrality of the 
body for fear that such a commitment would result in a fully immanent ontology that is 
inhospitable to the transcendence of the phenomenon, in Merleau-Ponty’s case, and the 
Other, in Levinas’s. 
Using Kant as a contrastive perspective, I will elaborate and defend a nondualist 
carnal ontology that I assemble from and against the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty 
and Levinas. Carnal ontology signifies here a view of the embodied subject as embedded 
in, immanent to, and continuous with its material environment and the other bodies that 
populate the world. This is not an endorsement of reductionism; to a large extent it is a 
phenomenological thesis, and I will use phenomenological evidence to support it 
throughout. I suggest, however, that we need to move beyond the phenomenological 
perspective in order to account for the elements of embodied subjectivity which 
phenomenology’s agent-centered methodology often remains blind to. This requires a 
careful articulation of the materiality of the body and its genesis, one which staves off 
reduction and ventures certain speculative remarks about the life of the body. In short, the 
phenomenology of the body requires a nonphenomenological supplement in order to 
provide a comprehensive picture of embodiment. I provide this supplement by attending 
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to the sensitive/sensory11 life of the body, by reworking the concept of sensation, and by 
enlisting a number of critics of phenomenology to build a picture of embodiment that 
remains nascent in both Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. 
Contemporary philosophy has seen a turn to the body that threatens the 
dominance of dualist ontologies and the practical philosophies they generate. This turn 
constitutes one of the most recent attempts to develop the nondualist project and 
complicate our picture of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and community. This is because 
the body is now largely regarded as the locus of all aspects of subjectivity; the mind is no 
longer conceived as independent from, and thus invulnerable to, the operations of the 
corporeal environment.12 When the subject is conceived as a body, as identical to its 
body, the problems as well as the solutions entailed in dualism begin to dissolve; the 
problem of how the mind interacts with the body disappears. But the nondualist 
framework also raises a number new questions, particularly about the nature of the 
subject and the workings of its mind, its will, and its practical freedom. We moreover see 
the epistemological problem of other minds morph into the ontological problems of 
alterity and individuation; intercorporeity rather than intersubjectivity more accurately 
describes the new problematic. Now, instead of asking how we know other beings, we are 
led to ask how it is possible for other beings to be other. What constitutes their difference 
                                                     
11 Throughout this essay I use the terms “sensory,” “sensitive,” “sensuous,” and “sensible” synonymously. I 
employ “sensual” only where there is a libidinal or erotic connotation. 
12 A notable exception in the phenomenological tradition to the claim that most philosophers of the body 
uphold a nondualist perspective is Michel Henry. Henry provides a helpful contrast in the context of 
affectivity and we will use Henry’s notion of “autoaffection” as a foil for later discussions of affection. 
Indeed, the problem of embodiment as the problem of incarnation is basically theological and calls for a 
dualistic solution, and Henry is certainly not the only philosopher who offers a theological phenomenology 
of incarnation. On this issue in general, see Natalie Depraz, “L’incarnation Phénoménologique, Un 
Problème Non-théologique?”, Tijdschrift voor Filosofie 55, no. 3 (1993): 496-518. 
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and how is it possible to interact with them? What is the nature of this interaction and is it 
possible to avoid violence as I engage the other? What makes an individual distinct? 
The ontological and ethical aspects of these questions cannot be regarded as 
separate in a nondualist framework. Because the subject is always already embedded in a 
practical environment and is in many, if not all, ways a product of that environment, what 
the subject does must be seen as identical to what the subject is. Ethics and ontology must 
be seen as maintaining an internal relation. The remarks that follows attempt to stake out 
a position on this new terrain and to situate this position in both a contemporary and 
historical context. 
 
THE PERMANENCE OF THE PROBLEM OF EMBODIMENT 
Evidence that the embodied subject is currently enjoying great success and will most 
likely continue to do so in the future can be gleaned from the proliferation of works in 
feminist philosophy, critical race theory, and environmental philosophy, to name just a 
few of the places where the body is at the center of analysis. The continuing interest in 
the work of Merleau-Ponty and the return of Spinoza in disparate disciplines from 
political philosophy to neuroscience, as well as recent attempts to retrieve the embodied 
dimension of Kant, Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger lend further credence to the claim that 
the body-subject is uprooting the Cartesian subject.13 This suggests that the narrative 
which is premised upon the forgetting or denigration of the body in the Western 
philosophical tradition has lost some of its timeliness. This is a promising, if modest, 
                                                     
13 For Hegel, see John Russon, The Self and Its Body in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2001); for Kant, see Angelica Nuzzo, Ideal Embodiment: Kant’s Theory of 
Sensibility (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008); for Husserl, see James Dodd, Idealism and 
Corporeity: An Essay on the Problem of the Body in Husserl’s Phenomenology (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1997); 
for Heidegger, see Frank Schalow, The Incarnality of Being: The Earth, Animals, and the Body in 
Heidegger’s Thought (Albany: SUNY Press, 2007). 
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victory over entrenched prejudices. Perhaps even more suggestive is the fact that the 
body has gained momentum in the philosophy of mind, particularly in studies of 
embodied cognition, a movement driven by thinkers like George Lakoff and Mark 
Johnson, Evan Thompson, Shaun Gallagher, Francisco Varela, Bernard Andrieu, Antonio 
Damasio, and Eugene Gendlin. This movement seeks to provide a nondualist, post-
Cartesian solution to the mind-body problem that not only takes seriously the progress of 
cognitive science, but which also honors the first-person or phenomenological 
perspective. 
As Lakoff and Johnson acknowledge in their Philosophy in the Flesh, the 
embodied cognition program owes a tremendous debt to the researches of pragmatism, 
especially the work of John Dewey, as well as the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty. 
“We want to honor the two greatest philosophers of the embodied mind,” write Lakoff 
and Johnson. “John Dewey, no less than Merleau-Ponty, saw that our bodily experience 
is the primal basis for everything we can mean, think, know, and communicate. He 
understood the full richness, complexity, and philosophical importance of bodily 
experience.”14 Although the challenge to Western dualism expounded in their coauthored 
text restricts its engagement with Dewey and Merleau-Ponty to introductory remarks, 
Johnson’s more recent book, The Meaning of the Body, delves further into the 
philosophical debt incurred by embodiment theorists working in cognitive science. 
                                                     
14 George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh: The Embodied Mind and its Challenge to 
Western Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1999), xi. Their attention to Dewey and Merleau-Ponty in this 
text is unfortunately restricted to the Acknowledgements section. It should be noted that their admiration 
for Dewey and Merleau-Ponty comes from the fact that both thinkers were practitioners of what Lakoff and 
Johnson call “empirically responsible philosophy,” which I interpret as meaning that it is their synthetic 
methodology—the attempt to wed first-person and third-person perspectives—that Lakoff and Johnson find 
laudable about the pragmatist and phenomenologist. 
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The increased visibility of the body in the study of consciousness and subjectivity 
does not necessarily entail the reduction of the mind to the brain, or consciousness to 
synaptic or neuronal activity, although this is one possible outcome.15 The fertile 
interrogation of the body has produced a variety of diverse approaches to embodiment, 
which in turn have yielded unforeseeable problems and possibilities for rethinking the 
constitution of the body, its relations with other bodies, and its place in the order of 
things, concepts, and meanings. Many approaches to the body can be called materialist, 
but we must be careful to not assume that this perspective always implies physicalism or 
positivism. As Johnson insists: “The brain is not the mind. The brain is one key part of 
the entire pattern of embodied organism-environment interaction that is the proper locus 
of mind and meaning.”16 This interaction is comprised of several essential dimensions: 
the biological, social, ecological, cultural, and phenomenological.17 Indeed, Johnson 
offers a naturalistic thesis that is difficult to construe as reductive: “Meaning,” he writes,  
is not just a matter of concepts and propositions, but also reaches down into the 
images, sensorimotor schemas, feelings, qualities, and emotions that constitute 
our meaningful encounter with our world. Any adequate account of meaning must 
be built around the aesthetic dimensions that give our experience its distinctive 
character and significance.18 
 
It would seem that a balanced union of the material and meaningful remains a live option 
for both analytic and continental philosophers. 
In my view, one of the most important efforts made by the embodied cognition 
folks is their attempt to undo the entrenched prejudice which holds that our qualitative, 
                                                     
15 Such is the conclusion drawn by the “eliminative materialism” of Paul and Patricia Churchland. See, for 
example, Patricia Smith Churchland, Neurophilosophy: Toward a Unified Science of the Mind-Brain 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989). 
16 Mark Johnson, The Meaning of the Body: Aesthetics of Human Understanding (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2007), 175. 
17 Johnson, The Meaning of the Body, 275-278. 
18 Johnson, The Meaning of the Body, xi-xii. 
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imaginative, affective, and aesthetic experiences are merely subjective. This prejudice, as 
I have already indicated, only holds up in an ontology that sees subject and object, body 
and world, as belonging to two distinct ontological realms. What contemporary cognitive 
science is showing, however, is that the subjective (mental) and objective (physical) 
worlds are actually continuous with each other.19 Such evidence has consequences for 
how we conceive the structure of subjectivity as well as the nature of individuality and 
relationality. It means that “there is no Cartesian dualistic person” and “there exists no 
Kantian radically autonomous person, with absolute freedom and a transcendent reason 
that correctly dictates what is and isn’t moral.”20 Given that this postdualist perspective 
undermines the basic distinction between internal psychic life and external corporeal life, 
theories of subjectivity are forced to acknowledge the essentially liminal nature of 
experience: all experience is the product of the body’s transactions with its environment 
and the other bodies that populate it. To quote Johnson again, 
meaningful form comes from the nature of our bodies and the patterns of 
interaction we have with our environment, and it is therefore shaped by our 
values, interests, and purposes as active agents. As Dewey insisted—and 
cognitive science confirms—thought is never wholly divorced from feeling, 
value, and the aesthetics of our embodied experience.21 
 
Merleau-Ponty likewise advocates a transactional view of embodiment that we will 
explore in Chapters 1 and 2. For now it is enough to note that the classical dualist 
position not only proves to be prejudicial, it literally becomes senseless since its terms 
have lost their reference. In order to foster the postdualist perspective, we have to unpack 
the carnal life of the body in its liminal aspects, that is, at its points of intersection with 
                                                     
19 Johnson points to Dewey’s “principle of continuity” as the guiding principle of his naturalistic theory in 
The Meaning of the Body, 10. 
20 Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the Flesh, 5. 
21 Johnson, The Meaning of the Body, 103. 
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other bodies, and to once again see the aesthetics of embodiment as integral to 
subjectivity. Aesthetics here denotes the sensory life of the body and sensation is 
regarded as the currency with which body-world transactions take place. 
At least since Heidegger, phenomenology has defended the nondualist thesis as it 
struggles against the prejudices of objectivism and dualism. Of course, there are countless 
nonphenomenological precursors to this general perspective: Parmenides and 
Anaximander, the Atomists, Hobbes and Spinoza, Marx and Nietzsche, the Pragmatists. 
And while the philosophers working on embodied cognition acknowledge and cite from 
some of these historical resources, the fruits of their labors are often attributed to the 
latest research in cognitive science, cognitive linguistics, or emotion theory. This not only 
obscures the history of the problem of embodiment, it also passes over a rich and 
conflicted body of literature which has much to contribute to the contemporary debate. 
Such methodological decisions tend to reinforce the view that phenomenology is only 
valuable as a supplement to the sciences of the mind, but that it lacks rigor or legitimacy 
when conducted on its own terms. Thus, Johnson admits that “phenomenology leads us 
to the primacy of movement, but it alone is not enough to prove the case. What is 
required additionally is empirical research from the cognitive sciences of the embodied 
mind.”22 While I do feel that phenomenology is best practiced synthetically, that is, in 
conjunction with the human and natural sciences, I think we need to be careful not to 
place it in the role of handmaiden or to underestimate its contribution to embodiment 
research.23 Thus, my aim here is to excavate the history of phenomenology in an attempt 
                                                     
22 Johnson, The Meaning of the Body, 27. 
23 Phenomenological philosophy is at its best when it is “empirically responsible,” as Lakoff and Johnson 
would say. By the same token, we should not assume that all good philosophy is empirically verifiable. Our 
philosophical critique, as Kant taught us in the first Critique, must always leave a bit of room for 
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to reveal the affinities and disparities between Levinas’s and Merleau-Ponty’s 
contributions to twentieth-century philosophy of the body and their relevance to 
contemporary research. Although, taken independently, I find their respective views to be 
incompatible as well as somewhat resistant to more recent theories of embodiment, I find 
both figures indispensable for developing a conception of embodiment which can 
reconcile the phenomenologists and nonphenomenologists. 
A promising possibility opened up by the corporeal turn in philosophy is the 
chance to rethink concepts which have hitherto been criticized out of theoretical 
discourse. One of these concepts is sensation. Sensation is a concept with a confused 
history and a shifting, equivocal identity.24 It is often conflated with or subsumed by 
perception. It is a concept which has been left behind because it belongs to an ontological 
and epistemological model that has been surpassed. The installation of the body at the 
center of our theories of subjectivity and the apparent collapse of the subject-object 
divide effected by Kant and post-Kantian idealism, however, has forced us to produce 
new ontologies and to attend to the new philosophical problems which result from this 
shift in perspective. Therefore, the question I am particularly concerned with is: What is 
the relation between our bodies and their sensory environment? Entailed in this question 
is a whole series of ontological considerations which bear on the nature and constitution 
of the body, the problem of corporeal individuation, the natural-artificial and human-
nonhuman distinctions, the ethics of intercorporeal interaction, the reality of violence and 
death, as well as the problem of how to conceive sensation vis-à-vis perception and 
                                                                                                                                                              
metaphysical speculation. This principle is even more pertinent given the finite perspective afforded us as 
embodied minds. 
24 To my mind, the only text which attempts a thorough philosophical history of the concept of sensation is 
D.W. Hamlyn’s Sensation and Perception: A History of the Philosophy of Perception (New York: 
Humanities Press, 1961). 
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cognition. If sensation understood in the context of dualism is doomed, what possibilities 
for revitalizing sensation exist in the postdualist landscape?  
Situated at the intersection of the philosophy and science of the body, the 
fecundity of theories of embodied cognition would be enough to warrant a closer 
inspection of the history of the problem of the body. At the same time, given the promise 
of such research it is important to catalogue the nuances of the philosophical history of 
the body, and to raise and respond to the metaphysical questions it poses to contemporary 
studies. 
 
THESIS 
Phenomenology provides numerous resources for addressing the problem of sensation 
and for thinking through its place in carnal ontology. Indeed, sensation constitutes the 
material basis of that ontology. The narrative I will tell is about how the return of the 
body has enabled the retrieval of sensation as a philosophically rich concept. Claiming 
Levinas and Merleau-Ponty as allies, I defend the thesis that sensation, since it 
immanently orients and integrates our bodies, is the basis of our intentional and 
intercorporeal world. This basis is for the most part preperceptual, preconceptual, and 
prepersonal. As a consequence of the immanent constitution of the body, the primary 
relation between body and world becomes methodologically problematic from the 
phenomenological perspective: without the distance afforded by perception, which opens 
up between perceiver and perceived, it becomes difficult for the phenomenon under 
consideration to be apprehended as a proper object of reflection. Sensation lacks the 
transcendence necessary for the phenomenological observer to figure it against a 
background; its contours are never entirely defined or apparent—sensations can transpire 
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as nonphenomenal (nonintentional) events. This notion contests Merleau-Ponty’s claim 
that “a figure on a background is the simplest sense-given [la donnée sensible] available 
to us….”25 Against this, I argue that sensations make sense (sens) or give direction (sens) 
to our bodies at a prehorizonal level. I attempt to unfold the sensuous relation and 
indicate the need for a synthetic (phenomenological/nonphenomenological) view of 
embodiment. Furthermore, I urge the need to develop an ethics that will cultivate our 
aesthetic environment in enabling and affirmative ways, that is, according to a standard 
of integrity that I specify in Chapter 4. 
 
KANT’S AESTHETICS AND CRITIQUE OF SENSIBILITY 
To contextualize my project, it is instructive to begin with Kant and Hegel. Kant carries 
out an analysis of the aesthetic capacity of the subject in the Critique of Pure Reason. 
Kant’s analysis marks a turning point in the history of the concept of sensation and 
exemplifies an attitude which still holds considerable influence today. To summarize 
Kant’s impact, it is fair to say that after him the legitimacy of sensation—as a unit of 
experience—becomes suspect; it is now fine to lay claim to perceptions, but sensations 
are relegated to an amorphous, unspeakable, and ultimately inaccessible region. Kant 
cannot afford to discard sensation completely, however. 
The Transcendental Aesthetic of the Critique of Pure Reason uncovers the a priori 
and empirical components of sensibility: it shows the pure forms of intuition, space and 
time, to be contributed by the subject and not objective in themselves, as on Newton’s 
model; it shows the material of our intuition, sensation, to be provided by the objects we 
intuit directly in the world. In his account of the subject-object relation, as well his 
                                                     
25 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 1962), 
4. 
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understanding of the subject as such, Kant is Cartesian in spirit, but he decisively 
advances beyond the Cartesian view by endowing the subject with the power to constitute 
the form of its world. Hegel deploys his own brand of phenomenology to criticize Kant’s 
residual dualism, but at the expense of the autonomy of objects and the sensations they 
produce. What is missing in all three of these views is the practical or embodied 
dimension of sensation. It seems that Descartes, Kant, and Hegel are concerned only with 
the epistemological or cognitive value of sensation, and thus minimize the philosophical 
consequences of the sensory encounter which takes place between the world and the body 
of the observer.26 Put otherwise, what they lack is a sense of the volatility of sensibility, 
its capacity to both enable and disable the subject. A brief look at Kant’s Transcendental 
Aesthetic can reveal this inadequacy and lead us to question the legitimacy of his claim 
that sensory content is given unsynthesized by objects and informed by the subject. It will 
also provide a bridge to the tacit idealism of Husserl’s phenomenology, against which 
both Merleau-Ponty and Levinas respond with quasi-realist criticism. 
The Copernican revolution effected by Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason has had a 
lasting influence on the history of philosophy. Its impact on modern and postmodern 
European philosophy, or the continental tradition, has been foundational. Indeed, it is not 
inaccurate to cite the critical philosophy of Kant as the origin of continental philosophy.27 
Given Kant’s general importance in this history and his influence on the 
phenomenological movement in particular, it is necessary to establish a few key points 
entailed in his view. I will focus exclusively here on his view of sensation and his theory 
                                                     
26 This claim is perhaps a bit unfair in the case of Descartes, who was certainly interested in the senses, but 
Descartes’ interest is more scientific or physicalist in texts like Treatise on Light, Optics, Treatise on Man, 
and Description of the Human Body. 
27 See Tom Rockmore, In Kant’s Wake: Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 
2006), especially Chapter 5, and Lee Braver, A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007). 
xxvii 
of sensibility since they are the terms that concern us immediately. This will enable us to 
draw a parallel between Kant and Husserl in order to connect the Kantian revolution, or 
what might also be called the institution of constructivist epistemology,28 to the 
institution of phenomenology. Specifically, I am interested in pointing out that subjects 
and objects retain their autonomous lives even after Kant has fused subject and object 
irrevocably together at the phenomenal level.29 Although I endorse this idea in one sense, 
Kant himself is not entitled to it. 
Kant’s revolutionary position, which holds that the objects of perception receive 
their form from—and so must conform to—our cognition, rather than our cognition to 
them,30 takes root in the first Critique’s Transcendental Aesthetic. Kant is concerned 
there not with a theory of the beautiful or a philosophy of art, but with the subject’s 
capacity to receive sensory input from the external world.31 Kant offers a theory of 
sensibility which is formulated at least in part as a response to classical empiricist 
accounts of sense experience, particularly those of the British empiricists. 
                                                     
28 This epistemological view, which sees the world of experience as in fundamental respects constructed by 
the mind of the observer, opposes the objectivist ontology of empiricism and the representational theory of 
knowledge it engenders. The world of the empiricist is populated by a multitude of discrete objects which 
exist in themselves and interact with each other according to causal laws. Humans come to know these 
objects, their properties, and their laws of interaction by observing their behavior. All of this information, 
claims the empiricist, is transmitted to our minds by sensations. David Hume, arguably Kant’s most 
provocative predecessor, formulates the empiricist view in the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding 
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 10. Hume holds that, corresponding to the discrete objects of the external 
world, the mind is constituted such that it receives discrete impressions from the world. These impressions 
are simple, disparate perceptual states that only get connected to one another after the fact. The classical 
empiricist’s perceptual world is not comprised of a “stream of consciousness” like the kind William James 
and Husserl speak about. Representationalist interpretations fail to adhere to Kant’s claim that we can never 
access the things in themselves to verify the accuracy of our representations. Thus, the constructivist 
reading is more persuasive than the representationalist, even if Kant calls the objects of perception 
representations (Vorstellungen). 
29 On the power, impact, and overcoming of this fusion, which is criticized under the name of 
“correlationism,” see Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, 
trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008). 
30 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Bxvi-xviii, B62. 
31 Sensibility, says Kant, is our capacity to be affected by objects; it is how objects are given to us. Kant, 
Critique of Pure Reason, A19/B33. 
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Kant is in agreement with the empiricists that cognition must begin with the 
experience of some object, but he contests the claim that all our knowledge is built up 
from what is given empirically, that is, from sensations. “There can be no doubt that all 
our cognition begins with experience,” writes Kant. “But,” he adds, “even though all our 
cognition starts with experience, that does not mean that all of it arises from 
experience.”32 He makes this claim to set up a refutation of empiricism, but also because 
he understands “experience” to be a composite phenomenon built up from impressions 
received by the intellect, which then applies concepts to produce experience. Ordinarily 
we believe experience to be externally given. But, says Kant, “long practice has made us 
attentive to [the cognitive element of all experience] and skilled in separating it from the 
basic material,” provided by sense impressions.33 Since experience is always more than 
the reception of sensory content, the given is never received in basic, raw form; that is, 
sensations are never received as such. How can Kant claim that they are given, then? Or 
rather, if sensations are always already worked up by the cognitive apparatus, what 
allows Kant to claim that anything like a pure, unsynthesized sensation exists at all? He 
requires the concept of sensation, or the sensory manifold, to account for the content of 
cognition, but beyond its basic architectonic value sensation plays no formative role in 
the constitution of experience or identity; nor does it hold sway over our capacity to 
constitute experience. 
The empiricist position, which Merleau-Ponty thoroughly criticizes and offers a 
non-Kantian alternative for in Phenomenology of Perception, maintains that our 
knowledge of the world arises out of our firsthand acquaintance with objects as they are 
                                                     
32 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B1. 
33 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B1-B2. 
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in themselves. Whereas Kant holds that there is an objective (noumenal) world in itself 
beyond the reach of (phenomenal) perception, and that this noumenal world is 
unknowable, Merleau-Ponty eschews the notion of an objective realm in favor of a 
dynamic theory of object identity. Merleau-Ponty follows Kant to a degree, but transfers 
the constitutive power of the subject to the body’s capacity for “practical synthesis”34 
rather than locating the synthetic act in the understanding or imagination. 
Kant’s epistemological treatment of sensation has a clear ontological significance. 
Sensation denotes the material to be processed by the understanding into experience. 
Kant writes: “The effect of an object on our capacity for [re]presentation, insofar as we 
are affected by the object, is sensation.”35 This material is provided to the subject from 
outside; it is given off by the objects which reside in the noumenal realm, the so-called 
things in themselves. But Kant’s epistemology cannot maintain this ontological divide 
between subject and object, let alone claim any causal interaction between them.36 His 
constructivism is precluded from making any reference to things in themselves, as things 
are only knowable via phenomenal experience understood in the composite sense 
(experience = sensations + concepts). This makes Kant’s account of the givenness of 
sensation either speculative (something the critical project aims to avoid) or a formal, 
“lifeless schema.”37 In either case, he removes the volatility of sensation by keeping it 
                                                     
34 “It is not through an intellectual synthesis which would freely posit the total object that I am led from 
what is given to what is not actually given; that I am given, together with the visible sides of the object, the 
nonvisible sides as well. It is, rather, a kind of practical synthesis.” Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “The Primacy 
of Perception,” in The Primacy of Perception and Other Essays on Phenomenological Psychology, the 
Philosophy of Art, History and Politics, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 
1964), 14. This account of practical synthesis is filled out as “operative intentionality” in Phenomenology 
of Perception. 
35 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, B34/A20. 
36 For Kant, causality is a category of the understanding and therefore applicable only to phenomena. He 
cannot claim that the noumenal realm has causal power (such as the power to cause sensations) because 
that would make causality an objective law, which is something Kant rejects. 
37 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 29. 
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always at a distance from the cognitive subject or transcendental ego. This is effectively 
what Samuel Todes argues in Body and World,38 wherein he defends the thesis that Kant 
“imaginizes” perception and the ego, and thereby overlooks the materiality of 
subjectivity. Todes responds to Kant with phenomenological evidence that is meant to 
show how the subject is not a disembodied, transcendental synthesizer of sensory content, 
but rather a product of that content itself. 
Todes argues for a pre-Kantian thesis, but from a post-Kantian/phenomenological, 
perspective. Knowledge must conform to objects, says Todes.39 This is a consequence of 
the fact that our perception is always practical first and conceptual or imaginative 
secondarily. “On our view,” writes Todes, “imagination presupposes practical perception 
because we must first become somebody by practical experience in the given world, 
before we can achieve self-expression and self-discovery by making a world of our 
own.”40 (Levinas extensively argues a similar point in his discussions of separation, 
habitation/dwelling, and enjoyment in Totality and Infinity.)41 Kant believes that he can 
ascertain a priori knowledge of the world, for example, the pure forms of intuition (space 
and time). But this knowledge cannot guarantee that some content exists outside of us 
awaiting to be given form. It is the practical field of perception that indicates that objects 
await our interaction, but even this lends no certainty about the reality of objects for 
Todes.42 What does offer this certainty is the phenomenological evidence of the 
perceptual field, which determines the existence of objects “by way of some effective 
                                                     
38 Samuel Todes, Body and World (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). 
39 Todes, Body and World, 159. 
40 Todes, Body and World, 174. 
41 These are sections where we see most clearly what I am calling Levinas’s material ontology. The 
relevant subsections of Totality and Infinity, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University 
Press, 1969), “Separation as Life,” “Enjoyment and Representation,” “I and Dependence,” and “The 
Dwelling” will be studied closely in chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
42 Todes, Body and World, 161. 
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response to that object, and culminates by determining it as circumstantially outside us. 
This response, however, determines not merely the perceptual object upon which it is 
directed, but also the percipient from which it issues.”43 Only the dialogical interaction 
that constantly occurs between subject and object, so central to Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of perception, can evince the materiality of these two terms. This 
dialogism lends subject and object their particular form and function. It is not the 
spontaneous synthesis of the ego which performs this feat, it is the responsiveness of the 
active body with all of its specific determinations: upright posture,44 front-back 
asymmetry,45 physical disability, gravitational attunement, etc. 
Todes raises a now common criticism of the Kantian subject when he claims that 
Kant “has no sense of how practice makes the practitioner.”46 For Kant, the world is but a 
reflection of our constitutive (imaginative, cognitive) capacities and we come to know 
ourselves only by first making this world. Against Kant, Todes and other contemporary 
proponents of embodiment insist that subjects are produced as they explore and interact 
bodily with their world.47 Now, it is possible to argue that Kant does not in fact 
completely absent the body from his account of subjectivity. Angelica Nuzzo, for 
instance, offers Kant’s aesthetic theory as evidence for the possibility of a nondualist, 
embodied view of human sensibility.48 She writes: “[Kant’s and Herder’s] general aim is 
to attribute to human sensibility a new central place in philosophy, thereby steering the 
philosophical focus from the metaphysics of a ‘disembodied soul’ to the inquiry into an 
                                                     
43 Todes, Body and World, 170. 
44 See Erwin Straus, “The Upright Posture,” Psychiatric Quarterly 26 (1952): 529-561. 
45 Todes, Body and World, 106, 118. 
46 Todes, Body and World, 173. 
47 Todes, Body and World, 174. 
48 Angelica Nuzzo, “Kant and Herder on Baumgarten’s Aesthetica,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 
44, no. 4 (October 2006): 577-597. 
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‘embodied mind’.” Kant’s modern view of sensibility is broad enough to encompass “the 
entire realm of the sensual: affections, intuition, sensation, feeling, and imagination.”49 
The innovative moment in Kant comes when he makes of the body a transcendental 
condition for aesthetics, a condition which is “formal” and “ideal,” but at the same time 
corporeal.50 We will see that Levinas is after something similar but less formal. For Kant, 
sensibility is the active reception of objects given and is “responsible for the fact that we 
are able to confront the reality of given objects.” But sensibility’s activity extends further, 
since it also produces representations of objects and does so immediately, unlike thought, 
which is always mediated by sensibility.51 Sensibility guarantees that sensations received 
are never without form; and since Kant distinguishes between intuition and sensation he 
can designate intuitions as objective while assigning sensations a 
representational/subjective role as the formal effect of objects on our sensibility. 
Nuzzo’s attempt to display the embodied element of Kantian cognition is 
emblematic of the broader concern with embodiment in contemporary philosophy. Like 
other recent attempts to retrieve the body, it testifies to the inadequacy of the now 
familiar narrative which tells of the Western philosophical tradition’s neglect of the body. 
This is why I hesitate to take sides against Nuzzo’s reading of Kant: it’s not a matter of 
either/or, where we are forced to acknowledge the body in Kant or lament its absence. It 
is a matter of degree and I believe that despite the embodied elements of Kantian 
cognition highlighted by Nuzzo, sensibility still remains subservient to the understanding 
in his philosophy. As a consequence, Kant provides an account which tames sensation by 
                                                     
49 Nuzzo, “Kant and Herder,” 578. 
50 See Charles Taylor, “The Validity of Transcendental Arguments,” in Philosophical Arguments 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), where Taylor argues for a continuity between the 
transcendental approaches of Kant and Merleau-Ponty. 
51 Nuzzo, “Kant and Herder,” 582. 
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making of it an epistemological placeholder.52 The question remains: How does the 
transcendental ego link up with the transcendental body? Looking to the first Critique, it 
would have to be through sensibility, since all judgment must pass through the senses. 
But we have already seen the problem with considering objects and sensations as given 
corporeally on the Kantian model. Kant distinguishes between intuition and sensation, 
qualifying the latter as empirical and the former as either pure or empirical.  Since we 
only ever intuit the appearances of objects, and thus apprehend objects only through an a 
priori formality which provides them with the space and time in which they reside, we are 
prevented from claiming that sensation actually comes from somewhere, let alone that it 
is given materially. The first Critique excludes sensation from the transcendental realm 
precisely because of its materiality.53 
It is the third Critique that ultimately makes room for the embodied dimension of 
sensibility through its analysis of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Nuzzo shows 
that this yields the condition under which it is possible for us to “feel ourselves a part of 
living (i.e., sensible) nature,” but I do not think it successfully “strengthens the 
connection between sensation and feeling,” even if Kant does allow for the possibility of 
a nonconceptual intuition.54 Alongside the first Critique, the recasting of sensibility in the 
Critique of Judgment does not resolve the problem of how to reconcile the formal role of 
sensation with the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Are we permitted to conclude that 
aesthetic pleasure, which is an embodied response to aesthetic phenomena, is brought 
about via sensibility? If it is illegitimate to claim that sensibility actually receives 
                                                     
52 As Nuzzo points out (“Kant and Herder,” 596), this is similar to Herder’s criticism of Kant. Herder 
preferred an historicism which sought “to grasp genetically and materially…the origins of historical human 
individuality” whereas “Kant’s transcendental inquiry into the human cognitive faculty is an investigation 
of the a priori sources and validity of our judgments,” 597. 
53 Nuzzo, “Kant and Herder,” 584. 
54 Nuzzo, “Kant and Herder,” 587. 
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material sensations, it is not clear how the corporeality of pleasure can link up with the 
corporeality of sensation in a nonformal way. Without this link the body cannot be 
brought to the center of experience. To allow such a connection, it seems necessary to 
forego the unity of the Kantian project and take sides with the third Critique against the 
first. 
Remaining neutral on this score, I simply want to maintain that Kant has 
effectively and influentially tamed sensation by keeping the body separate from the 
material content of cognition, that is, by upholding a subject-object dualism that insulates 
the constitution of the subject from the material effects of the object. Accordingly, 
sensation cannot be regarded as constitutive of the Kantian subject. 
The pacification of sensation is ramified in Hegel’s phenomenology. In the 
section of the Phenomenology of Spirit entitled “Sense-Certainty,” Hegel addresses the 
problem of the given by rejecting the existence of a noumenal realm that provides 
sensory input for cognition to process into workable knowledge. Hegel’s refusal to infer 
the existence of pure sensory content would seem to eliminate the objectivity of sensation 
altogether and situate it exclusively on the side of the subject. In a sense, the symbiosis of 
subject and object is no longer present in Hegel because the object has become a concept: 
the world becomes the phenomenal appearance of human conceptuality, so the sensory 
material of intuition qua material becomes superfluous. 
Hegel takes sensation to be a prejudicial concept, one which we use to explain the 
phenomena of experience without really comprehending the rationality of these 
phenomena. At the same time, he makes of experience only the appearance of 
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consciousness, given to itself phenomenally.55 The sensible world is a fable for Hegel and 
it is quickly sublated by perception, which is of a “higher” rational order, in his dialectic. 
What we believe to be the direct apprehension of a singular sensory object reveals itself 
to actually be comprehension of an object endowed with universal qualities: “So it is in 
fact the universal that is the true [content] of sense-certainty,” Hegel says.56 “I have this 
certainty through something else, viz. the thing; and it, similarly, is in sense-certainty 
through something else, viz. through the ‘I’.”57 In Hegel the mediation of the world by 
the mind becomes a total mediation, thus ensuring that the alterity and foreignness of the 
world can be recuperated by the dialectic.58 
Hegel’s discontent with the formalism of Kant’s analysis of our cognitive faculty 
leads him to “put flesh on Kant’s architectonic.”59 Hegel’s gripe with Kant is basically 
existentialist in character, in that he thinks Kant is trying to understand experience before 
actually experiencing something. This is why he begins the Phenomenology with sense 
experience; this move is equivalent to jumping right into the stream of consciousness and 
investigating its contours from the inside, rather than trying to deduce them beforehand. 
But it is also telling that he finds sense experience to be something that is already shot 
through with universals, and so neither formless nor immediate at all. Effectively, the 
stream of consciousness is shown to be given through perception and not sensation. Such 
                                                     
55 This is the consequence of overcoming the subject-object duality retained by Kant. The implications for 
Merleau-Ponty, along with Husserl, Heidegger, and others who reject the essential distinction of subject 
and object are apparent. See Tom Rockmore, Cognition: An Introduction to Hegel’s Phenomenology of 
Spirit (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 23, passim. 
56 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 60. Regarding the possibility of immediate acquaintance, Hegel also 
writes: “In apprehending [an object], we must refrain from trying to comprehend it,” 58. 
57 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 59. 
58 Cf. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 56-57: “In pressing forward to its true existence, consciousness will 
arrive at a point at which it gets rid of its semblance of being burdened with something alien, with what is 
only for it, and some sort of ‘other’, at a point where appearance becomes identical with essence, so that its 
exposition will coincide at just this point with the authentic Science of Spirit.” 
59 Irmgard Scherer, “The Problem of the A Priori in Sensibility: Revisiting Kant’s and Hegel’s Theories of 
the Senses,” The Review of Metaphysics, 52, no. 2 (December 1998), 362. 
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a tactic is standard not only for Hegel’s phenomenology, but also for Husserl and his 
followers. The difference is that Hegel does not allow for the transcendence of the object; 
the object is a concept, not a real thing in the world.60 Like Merleau-Ponty, Husserl seems 
to allow for a “transcendence in immanence” of the object.61 Just as in Kant, the form of 
the Hegelian object is the product of the conscious subject. But unlike Kant, this object 
has no other life than the one bestowed upon it by the I of the observer.62 
Hegel’s critique of Kant’s dualism is aimed at sensation as a source of knowledge, 
specifically as the source of our representations. This is a reformulation of the Cartesian 
criticism of empiricism, as demonstrated by the wax example in the Meditations, where 
Descartes showed that what we actually perceive in an object as it undergoes myriad 
qualitative changes is nothing sensible—which can only lead to skepticism—but an idea 
or representation. Hegel’s critique of sensation goes further than Descartes’ skepticism, 
however. It leads to the abandonment of the concept of sensation as such. Although 
necessary to recount the odyssey of Spirit, sensation is just a rudimentary form of 
experience that bears no certain knowledge and can easily be seen as simply prejudicial. 
Hegel’s perspective, which is recounted by Merleau-Ponty (PP Chapter 1), restricts the 
valence of sensation by considering it only for its capacity to yield certain 
                                                     
60 Husserl remains close to Hegel when he writes: “An object that has being in itself (an sich seiender) is 
never such as to be out of relation to consciousness and its Ego. The thing is thing of the world about me, 
even the thing that is not seen and the really possible thing, not experienced….” 60 Edmund Husserl, Ideas: 
General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson (New York: Collier, 1962), 134. 
Hereafter cited as Ideas I. 
61 On the one hand, like Merleau-Ponty, Husserl maintains that the object of consciousness evidently 
transcends consciousness by being given always perspectivally (§43 of Ideas I points out that even God 
could not perceive non-perspectivally). On the other hand, although he admits that objects are given to us 
“in one blow” (cf. Sixth Logical Investigation), Husserl says that we must build up the unity of objects 
“with increasing completeness through perceptual continua harmoniously developed, and through certain 
methodic thought-forms grounded in experience” (Ideas I, 138). This last remark seems to align Husserl 
with Hegel and against Kant, and to replace the actuality of the thing in itself with the intuition of an 
essential appearance. 
62 “Form is the Concept which, fully developed, is the I or pure self-consciousness.” Scherer, “The Problem 
of the A Priori in Sensibility,” 364. 
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representations. But sensation is much more than a means to certainty: it possesses a 
carnal quality that eludes the subject’s power of representation and, in fact, threatens our 
representational capacity. This dimension of sensation eludes Hegel’s phenomenology. 
The non-Hegelian phenomenologists uncover a different ontology of the subject 
of sensation. Levinas, for instance, is interested in reviving the affective aspect of 
embodiment and considers sensation as a kind of element that nourishes the body and 
disrupts any attempt to freeze it in a system. Hegel completely neglects this. Merleau-
Ponty is also not interested in operating within the old epistemological debates. He 
instead wants to construct a new framework for thinking the relation of body and world. 
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of sensation cannot be comprehended by the old 
model, even though I believe it is most powerful when articulated through this model. 
This is why I treat twentieth-century phenomenology—occasionally reinscribing it in 
older terms and divisions—as an extension of the history of philosophy and not as a 
movement that departs from ground hitherto uncharted by this history, which is a 
common way to regard the various “reductions” performed by the phenomenologist. 
Merleau-Ponty’s nondualist and nonrepresentationalist perspective offers something like 
a monism of the sensible as opposed to a subject-object dualism that finds sensation on 
either side of this ontological divide. It is necessary to rethink sensation as taking place 
between subject and object; this is at least partly made possible by stepping outside the 
ontology of Descartes and Hume, Kant and Hegel. However, it is likewise necessary to 
note the influence of the moderns on Husserl’s phenomenology and the 
phenomenological approaches that follow him. 
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What is at stake when breaking with the idealist model that culminates with Hegel 
is not only an embodied subject, but also a rehabilitation of the concept of sensation and 
an ethical theory that is predicated on the aesthetic life of the body. This ethical theory is 
situated not at the intellectual level, like the Kantian imperative, but at the intercorporeal 
level: at the site where bodies interact with other bodies, where bodily transactions, 
yields, absorptions, resistances, and collisions occur. Sensation is at the heart of all 
encounters, constituting and reconstituting the bodies involved. 
 
HUSSERL: HYLETIC DATA (IDEAS I) AND THE BODY (IDEAS II) 
Merleau-Ponty and Levinas challenge Husserl explicitly in their texts. A common target 
is his residual idealism, which harbors important remnants of both Kant and Hegel. Those 
who would defend Husserl against this charge always seem to be fighting an uphill battle. 
The call back to the things themselves has a Kantian ring to it, but it is actually for 
Husserl more of an Hegelian principle: return to the immediate objects of experience and 
proceed with reflection from there, without prejudging the matter at hand.63 Despite his 
allegiance to the phenomena as such, however, Husserl retains a basic dualism which 
aligns him with Kant. The famous bracketing of the natural world which initiates the 
phenomenological method remains neutral about the things themselves and focuses the 
phenomenologist’s attention solely on the given.64 This means that Husserl does not 
discard the thing in itself, like Hegel, but refuses to speak about it qua phenomenologist. 
                                                     
63 Edmund Husserl, Logical Investigations, trans. J.N. Findlay, Volume 2 (New York: Humanity Books, 
1970), Introduction, §7; Ideas I, §24 (“The Principle of All Principles”). 
64 As the “principle of all principles” says (Ideas I, 83): “every primordial dator Intuition is a source of 
authority (Rechstquelle) for knowledge…whatever presents itself in ‘intuition’ in primordial form (as it 
were in its bodily realisty), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only within the limits 
in which it then presents itself.” 
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Only natural scientists and ordinary folks believe themselves to be talking about things in 
themselves; such talk is suspended by the phenomenological reduction. 
The given for Husserl is not what comes from “outside,” but what is present to 
consciousness; this includes the sensory material which Kant sees as provided by the 
objects of the external world. So, on the one hand, Husserl tacitly retains the 
noumenon/phenomenon duality, but in a neutralized form, while at the same time 
situating the origin of the given in consciousness and thereby forming another tacit 
alliance with a more extreme idealism. This is the case in Ideas I, although the story is 
complicated by Husserl’s turn to the body in Ideas II. As for objects and their sensible 
features, Logical Investigations complicates the matter further by offering a version of 
the sensible that is at odds with the idealism of Ideas I. 
We saw how Kant’s relegation of the material of sensation to the noumenal realm, 
oddly enough, disqualified him from claiming its objectivity. Consequently, his dualism 
has the effect of immunizing the subject from the impact of sensations. Husserl’s 
idealism, at least in Ideas I, has a similar effect: he once again domesticates sensation and 
mitigates its material dimension by subjectivizing it.65 Like Kant and Hegel before him, 
he sees the subject as animating sensory content,66 whereas I would argue, with Merleau-
Ponty and Levinas, that it is sensory content that animates us. We might pose this point 
of contrast in terms of what could be called the principle of animation: against the view 
which holds that the principle of animation is ideal or mental I offer the view that the 
                                                     
65 In the analytic tradition, sensation is often seen as internal to the subject. Now, it is one thing to make 
sensation internal to the body and another thing to make it internal to consciousness. I take Husserl to be 
doing the latter, but not necessarily the former. In fact, he explicitly contests the view that sensations 
(Empfindungen) are internal to the body in Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology 
and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Andre Schuwer 
(Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1989). 
66 Husserl, Ideas I, 227. 
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principle of animation is given materially and therefore constitutes the subject as a 
corporeal event. Phenomenological idealism keeps the materiality of sensation at a 
distance and thus keeps it at a safe remove from the body; sensibility is conceived 
intellectually and the carnal aspect of experience is drastically compromised. 
It is not easy to figure the sensory/material or so-called “hyletic” layer in 
Husserl’s image of consciousness. As James Dodd has said, “it is perhaps the most 
volatile concept in [Husserl’sl] corpus.”67 Ideas I explains that the notion of a hyletic 
layer is meant to replace what he called “primary contents” in Logical Investigations. 
These primary contents Husserl describes as what “would be the contents of ‘external’ 
sensibility,” although he is quick to point out that this does not refer to “some 
metaphysical distinction of outward and inward.” At the level of phenomenological 
representation, then, these primary contents are the intuited ground upon which reflection 
is founded.68 They include all the sensory content given in concrete experience, such as 
color and texture as well as the “sensile impressions of pleasure, pain, tickling, etc.”69 
Primary contents no longer works as a concept in Ideas I and Husserl decides there to 
speak of hyle instead. In each case, Husserl is reconstituting what would otherwise be 
referred to as sensation: “sensation is hyle, that is, matter waiting to be charged with 
animating sense, awaiting an apprehension that will give it meaning.”70 The shift to the 
language of hyle helps him emphasize the fact that the “sensuous stuff” of consciousness 
is immanent to, not independent of, consciousness. 
                                                     
67 Dodd, 46. 
68 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Volume 2, 814, 815. 
69 Husserl, Ideas I, 226. 
70 Cf. Alia Al-Saji, “Rhythms of the Body: A Study of Sensation, Time and Intercorporeity in the 
Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl” (PhD diss., Emory University, 2002), 1. 
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Ideas I upholds a hylomorphism71 that is Kantian in structure: what Husserl calls 
hyletic data is analogous to the first Critique’s sensory given; intentional acts give form 
to this data in the same way that the forms of intuition operate for Kant, even though 
Husserl refuses to proclaim that hyletic data are subject to an “animating synthesis” and 
even questions whether they play a constitutive role in intentionality.72 The pure 
objectivity of the hyletic layer must be, as in Kant, inferred from perception—it is never 
experienced in its pure form or given to consciousness, as it is always at least minimally 
filtered and formed by intentionality.73 Just as in Hegel, perception is the most basic 
experience of what is given: “The object-giving (or dator) intuition of the first, ‘natural’ 
sphere of knowledge and of all its sciences is natural experience, and the primordial dator 
experience is perception in the ordinary sense of the term.”74 Nevertheless, the hyle is 
what grounds the constitutive acts (noeses) of consciousness in something posited as 
nonsubjective: this ground provides an ideal limit—the “noematic nucleus” which 
outlasts, as “objective,” all of the adumbrations of any given object75—for subjective 
constitution; its role is merely formal, necessary to explain the whence of sensory input. 
A tension immediately arises: if the hyletic layer is situated on the side of the subject, but 
is supposed to provide the nonsubjective, nonideal ground of noetic acts, what are we to 
                                                     
71 Cf. Husserl, Ideas I, §85. 
72 Husserl, Ideas I, 227: “Whether…sensile experiences in the stream of experience are of necessity 
everywhere the subjects of some kind of ‘animating synthesis’ which informs them…or, as we also say, 
whether they ever take their part in intentional functions, does not here call for decision.” 
73 Dodd suggests that Husserl’s idealism is even stronger than Kant’s: “Husserl’s strategy is to claim that 
the sources of knowledge are not hidden, but ‘are’ only within an ‘experience’ that itself is a unity given in 
reflection—this is against Kant.” Idealism and Corporeity, 46. 
74 Husserl, Ideas I, 45. He goes on to specify that “to have something real primordially given, and to 
‘become aware’ of it and ‘perceive’ it in simple intuition, are one and the same thing.” Yet, in The Crisis of 
the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, trans. David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1970), 164, Husserl will admit that each of our perceptions is simply an “appearance” of 
an object that transcends each of its perspectives. That is, he admits the “thing in itself” into his ontology—
but on what grounds? It he not in the same position as Kant, forced to speculate on the givenness of the 
thing in itself and thus break from the phenomenological attitude? 
75 Husserl, Ideas I, §§128-129. 
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make of the ontological status of the hyletic material? Husserl is forced to postulate the 
reality of a nonintentional source of sensory material in order to avoid idealism, but this 
can only occur through a betrayal of his allegiance to the evidence of phenomena qua 
phenomena. 
Husserl distinguishes sensibility, or what remains phenomenally after the sensory 
content of perception has passed through the senses, from the hyletic layer which 
functions as the basis for meaningful acts of consciousness.76 Distinguishing both 
sensibility and hyle from the animating acts of consciousness or noeses, Husserl regards 
the hyletic layer as (formally or functionally) objective while designating the phenomenal 
data of sensibility as the subjective manifestation of hyletic material. He writes: “Both 
[hyle and sensibility] together compelled the old transfer of the originally narrower 
meaning of sensibility to the spheres of sentiment and will, to the intentional experiences, 
namely, in which sensory data of the spheres here indicated play their part as functioning 
‘materials’.” He continues by concluding that “we need a new term which shall express 
the whole group through its unity of function and its contrast with the formative 
characters….” This new term is hyle; it encompasses the affective and sensuous material 
that is formed by intentionality and given meaning by consciousness.77 He distinguishes 
the formative acts as “psychical” to distinguish them from the bodily and sensory,78 but 
emphasizes in response to Brentano’s psychologism that both the noetic (Brentano’s 
“psychical”) and the material (Brentano’s “physical”) fall within “the stream of 
                                                     
76 Husserl, Ideas I, 228. 
77 Husserl, Ideas I, 228. 
78 Husserl, Ideas I, 229. 
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phenomenological being.”79 Accordingly, both matter and form are circumscribed by 
consciousness; sensation loses its nonsubjective feature.80 
Because Ideas I is primarily concerned with the correlation between acts of 
consciousness and their intentional objects insofar as this correlation can be given a 
transcendental significance, the investigation of sensory material for its own sake remains 
subordinate to the project of transcendental phenomenology. In Husserl’s words, an 
engagement with sensory material as such, or a “pure hyletics,” “wins significance from 
the fact that it furnishes a woof that can enter into the intentional tissue, material that can 
enter into intentional formations.”81 Ideas I is then not the best place to find Husserl 
engaged with the corporeality of sensation, even if it is representative of his general 
philosophical perspective. It is best to look at Ideas II, where sensation (Empfindung) is 
dealt with explicitly with respect to the body and the hylomorphic structure of 
consciousness—which sees sensation as amorphous and innocuous—is contested.82 
Since an understanding of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of the lived body (corps 
propre) is informed by Husserl’s lived body (Leib) in Ideas II, it suffices to indicate here 
that Husserl’s account of sensation in this text is quite different than the theory of hyle in 
Ideas I and primary contents in Logical Investigations. As Alia Al-Saji reads it, the 
second book of Ideas shows Husserl focusing “on the way the lived Body is constituted 
through the localization of… sensings [Empfindnisse], i.e., the particular lived spatiality 
                                                     
79 Husserl, Ideas I, 229, 230; Dodd, Idealism and Corporeity, 44-45. 
80 Dodd, Idealism and Corporeity, 45, writes: “Insofar as the thing is present in perceptual consciousness an 
apprehension that bears within itself a sense-content is involved; sensation itself, however, is not to be 
confused with anything thingly-real—which means, within the transcendental perspective, that sensation 
does not belong to the noematic [object side] correlate of the act of perception.” 
81 Husserl, Ideas I, 233. 
82 Al-Saji, “Rhythms of the Body,” 2. 
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of the Body.”83 This is the prototypical version of sensation I will be eliciting from the 
work of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas as well as defending as the one most faithful to the 
aesthetic life of our bodies. It is one which attends to the affective and kinaesthetic life of 
the body84 and, perhaps most importantly, attempts to reveal the materiality of sensation 
and the subject’s reliance on this materiality. 
 
SENSE DATA AND THE AESTHETICS OF EMBODIMENT 
We have sketched some of the problematic aspects of the idealist and/or constructivist 
treatment of sensation, focusing specifically on where sensation is localized vis-à-vis the 
subject. In the case of Kant, sensation is found on the far side of cognition among the 
things in themselves. For the Husserl of Ideas I, sensation as hyle appears within 
consciousness, and merely functions as the “external” layer of noetic acts. In both cases, 
sensation is cut off from the body and neither enables nor poses a threat to the 
constituting subject as such. By contrast, philosophers adherent to empirical realism, 
Bertrand Russell and G.E. Moore, for example, often speak of sensations as internal or 
subjective signs for something objectively given.85 Because these realists defend an 
ontology that posits discrete, fully formed objects existing outside the mind, they believe 
that these objects are made known to us via the sensory data they transmit to our minds. 
                                                     
83 Al-Saji, “Rhythms of the Body,” 4. For a thorough analysis of similar themes in Merleau-Ponty, see 
David Morris, The Sense of Space (Albany: SUNY Press, 2004). 
84 Cf. Alia Al-Saji, “The Site of Affect in Husserl’s Phenomenology: Sensations and the Constitution of the 
Lived Body,” Philosophy Today 44, SPEP Supplement (2000): 51-59, where she aims to show how Husserl 
allows us to “rethink sensation as a creative, differentiating, and dynamic multiplicity, as the way we feel 
our contact with the world, with others, and with our own life” (52). 
85 “Let us give the name ‘sense-data’ to the things that are immediately known in sensation,” like color, 
texture, etc. “We shall give the name ‘sensation’ to the experience of being immediately aware of these 
things.” Given this distinction, he draws that conclusion that we can infer the existence of objects which 
might cause our sensations, but do not appear directly to us. “Thus the various sensations due to various 
pressures or various parts of the body cannot be supposed to reveal directly any definite property of the 
table, but at most to be signs of some property which perhaps causes all the sensations, but is not actually 
apparent in any of them.” Bertrand Russell, The Problems of Philosophy (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), 11, 12. 
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Our minds subsequently reconstitute this data into the objects we perceive as outside of 
us. When our reconstitutions correspond to the object in itself, we can claim to know that 
object objectively. Merleau-Ponty thoroughly criticizes this model under the name of the 
“constancy hypothesis” (PP 7-12/13-19)86 and in so doing steps through the door, opened 
by Husserl’s Ideas II, to an embodied view of sensation. 
I am a bit more sympathetic to the realist view than Merleau-Ponty, but I am 
critical of it for two reasons. First, I think it is wrong to conceive sensation as internal, or 
as some kind of epiphenomenon of the mind. It is more than just a feeling or the 
subjective correlate of a physiological stimulus. Sensations provide a direct link to the 
world of objects, animals, people, and qualities. This link is a bi-directional 
communication. Given this, sensations must be seen as in some way external to the mind; 
however, this exteriority cannot be complete. Otherwise an unbridgeable ontological 
chasm opens between subject and world—this is precisely the view we are calling into 
question. The realist does not have a problem positing objects as external, but sensations 
are another story. In my view, sensations must be given some external status in order to 
preserve their objectivity and to explain their effectiveness. Such objectivity is required 
in order to explain how our bodies are responsive to sensations. So, my two points of 
praise for the realist are: 1) their objectivist view of objects and 2) the way this 
objectivism gives leverage to an externalist view of sensations. 
The idealist critique of objectivism remains valid: if it is the case that we never 
experience an object in itself, let alone raw sensory material; and that we can only ever 
                                                     
86 The constancy hypothesis is a staple of direct realism, but it problematically situates perception in the 
mind and therefore sets up a questionable kind of correspondence. Merleau-Ponty summarizes: “Hence we 
have in principle a point-by-point correspondence and constant connection between the stimulus and the 
elementary perception” (PP 8/14). 
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know the world through the secondary qualities we perceive (à la Berkeley), then talk 
about mind-independent reality must be speculative. Such speculation becomes 
necessary, however, in order to account for the dependency of our minds and our bodies 
on what is other. One could object that this begs the question by appealing to mind-
independent bodies to argue for the reality of mind-independent bodies. But I think that 
such bodies are necessary to explain such phenomena as the constitution of the body, its 
responsive nature, as well as the disintegration of the body. The constitution of the world 
may be explicable by transcendental idealism, but it is difficult to see how such a view 
can explain the dissolution of the world it constitutes. In a word, if nothing other than the 
mind or consciousness or intentional objects exist, then what delivers violence and death 
to the subject? The materiality of the subject, that is, its engagement with an autonomous 
corporeal world and its means of communication with this world must be accounted for. I 
think a revitalized realism about sensation, which risks some speculative remarks, can do 
this. As speculative, this realism must go beyond both Kantian criticism and strict 
phenomenology. 
We should avoid posing the question of sensation in terms of a false dichotomy: it 
is not the case that sensation is either a representational content, like Husserl’s hyle, or an 
amorphous, discrete data about which nothing meaningful can be said. Instead, sensation 
can be seen as fundamentally multiple and composed of at least five main dimensions: 
1. Objectivity: sensations belong to independent objects, animate as well 
inanimate,87 and make up the singular qualitative constitution of these objects. 
                                                     
87 Merleau-Ponty resists such a view when he writes in a working note of The Visible and the Invisible, 
trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968), 250, that “the flesh of the world 
is not self-sensing (se sentir) as is my flesh—It is sensible and not sentient—I call is flesh nonetheless…in 
order to say that it is a pregnancy of possibles….” Even in this later text, which is often thought to 
overcome the latent dualism of the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty retains a dualism which 
separates the being into two spheres, the human and the nonhuman, but this division comes without 
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Sensations are effective in so far as they can bring about changes or engender 
responses in other objects. For example, sandpaper can smooth wood because it 
has an abrasive texture. Or rather: it’s abrasiveness just is its capacity to affect 
wood in this way. Similarly, we can enter an illuminated room because a light 
bulb or the sun is able to produce brightness.88 Sensations are capacities 
possessed by objects, not inert properties; or, if we insist on calling them 
properties, they must be conceived as detachable rather than dependent on the 
substance in which they inhere.89 
 
2. Relationality: relationality must be taken in tandem with, not as a refutation of, 
objectivity. Continuing with the sandpaper example, it can be said that sandpaper 
is abrasive only to surfaces that are receptive to abrasion. A piece of wood will 
receive sandpaper sensations differently than a piece of glass or marble. So, while 
sensations belong to objects as their affective qualities, they only make sense or 
manifest themselves when they enter relations, something which is constantly 
occurring. Humans are not a necessary condition for the manifestation of 
sensations; abrasion “makes sense” to any surface that is susceptible to scratching. 
Sensations are therefore liminal and diacritical: they always express themselves 
in relation to other objects and are effective in different ways, determined by the 
sensory capacity and susceptibility of the objects encountered. For humans, 
liminality is made possible by the fact that the body is both part of and, in a sense, 
outside of the world.90 Diacriticality means that sensations are always caught up 
in a sensory system, each system comprising a distinct, complex environment.91 
 
3. Ambivalence: sensations can be both enabling and disabling, tame or violent. 
Because sensations are ambivalent it is not possible to regard them as merely 
subjective. Some sensations result in the dissolution of the subject and these must 
be accounted for. Neither Merleau-Ponty nor Levinas adequately addresses this 
dimension of sensation. Sensory ambivalence provides the chance to build an 
                                                                                                                                                              
explanation. Precisely how this division comes to be, if it actually exists, is a metaphysical problem that 
Merleau-Ponty does not resolve. 
88 For objectivity, I follow for the most part the realist theory of objects developed by Graham Harman, 
principally in his Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects (Chicago and La Salle: Open 
Court, 2002) and Guerrilla Metaphysics: Phenomenology and the Carpentry of Things (Chicago and La 
Salle: Open Court, 2005), as well as the ethics of things defended by Silvia Benso in her book, The Face of 
Things: A Different Side of Ethics (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000). 
89  See Ernst Mach, The Analysis of Sensations, trans. C.M. Williams and Sydney Waterlow (New York: 
Dover, 1959), 5. Mach allies himself with the “philosophy of immanence” and cites Spinoza as his original 
predecessor (46), a point we will return to in our discussion of bodies, plasticity, and the meaning of their 
integrity. The idea that objects possess capacities or “powers,” as well as the ontological status of these 
powers, is the subject of a debate in analytic philosophy, a short overview of which can be found in the 
introduction to George Molnar, Powers: A Study in Metaphysics, ed. Stephen Mumford (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003). 
90 This formulation is more appropriate for the account of embodiment given in Phenomenology of 
Perception, where the consciousness-object duality is still at play. Merleau-Ponty acknowledges the 
inadequacy of this model in The Visible and the Invisible, 200/253; a reformulation of this model is evident 
in his searching discussion of the “two leaves” of the body (135-138/178-183). 
91 The diacritical nature of perception is affirmed by Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible, 
213/267, and likewise in the chapter on “The Thing and the Natural World” in Phenomenology. 
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ethics of embodiment in terms of our vulnerability to and nourishment by 
sensations. 
 
4. Alimentation: it has already been said that sensations must be in some sense 
objective if we are to explain their effectiveness. This objectivity also accounts 
for their capacity to nourish our senses and feed our bodies in the way that a 
melody, painting, or landscape has the power to transform or invigorate us, or 
how a contour of the ground orients our posture and gait. Without alimentation, 
our bodies are left to languish in their habitual sensory circuits.92 Alimentation 
and nourishment are two of the most significant elements that I take from 
Levinas’s carnal ontology. 
 
5. Anonymity: the anonymity of sensation is what prevents it from becoming an 
anthropocentric conception, one which would drive a wedge between the human 
and nonhuman realms. Sensations do not need humans for them to be effective; 
humans may feel the abrasiveness of sandpaper in ways that a piece of wood 
cannot, but this is only because humans (and animals) possess the power to 
translate sensations into affections or to process sensations into perceptions or 
cognitions or linguistic expressions, thus personalizing them. This is why I would 
say that perception is personal while sensation is not. The human ability to 
translate sensations into something personal speaks to the relationality of 
sensations, not to their objective constitution. It will be said that sensations are 
always attached to a particular object (Merleau-Ponty speaks of the unique red of 
this carpet), but this by no means renders the quality qua quality proper to any 
particular object. I will argue that our identity is constituted by the sensations we 
receive as well as the sensations we give off, but I will insist that these sensations 
do not belong to us, but rather we belong to them. 
 
These five dimensions arise out of a rereading of the carnal ontologies of Merleau-Ponty 
and Levinas. But neither Merleau-Ponty nor Levinas subscribes to all five of the 
dimensions. Such adherence requires that we formulate an independent position which is 
in some respects at odds with these two thinkers. This is what I try to accomplish in the 
chapter on plasticity (Chapter 4), wherein I attempt to develop an original view of the 
embodied subject and its reliance on sensation. 
 
                                                     
92 I began to explore the theme of sensory alimentation and its ethical potential in an article entitled 
“Enabling/Disabling Sensation: Toward an Alimentary Imperative in Carnal Phenomenology,” Philosophy 
Today 52, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 99-115. 
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THREE BODY TYPES 
I have tried to suggest that the modern view of sensation has not adequately addressed the 
reality of sensations. This omission orients my entire thesis. Correlatively, I have 
suggested that this inadequacy arises because sensation is always kept at a safe remove 
from the subject and that this gesture is supported by a dualist ontology that keeps the 
body separate from the perceptual and cognitive operations of the subject. Such a view, I 
argue, obscures the subject-object relation. My cursory history of the fate of sensation in 
the post-Kantian milieu serves not as an indictment of modern idealism tout court, but 
rather as an heuristic with which to understand the carnal phenomenologists’ desire to 
rehabilitate sensation. The problem now is to give an account that adheres to the volatility 
of sensation and captures aspects of experience that the Kantian/Husserlian model does 
not. The resolution of this problem will reveal not only a more complex picture of 
sensation as such, but will also demonstrate the central function of sensation in the 
constitution of identity and the body-world relation. Such an understanding will enable a 
critique of the phenomenology of the body and the development of an ethics of 
embodiment. 
My own view of the body as plastic will emerge via an exploration of the 
phenomenologies of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. Chapters 1 and 2 will engage what will 
be called Merleau-Ponty’s reversible body, which is developed in response to the modern 
theory of sensation and really begins to take form in the chapter on “Sense Experience” 
(le sentir) in Phenomenology of Perception. There are traces of the reversible body at 
play in The Structure of Behavior and this model is modified in texts like “Eye and 
Mind,” “Cézanne’s Doubt,” “The Child’s Relations with Others,” and The Visible and the 
Invisible, but the most substantial articulations appear in the Phenomenology. 
l 
Partly in response to what is perceived as an ethical lacuna in Merleau-Ponty’s 
own philosophy, Levinas deploys what I will call the susceptible body. If Merleau-
Ponty’s body downplays its passivity in favor of its competence or grasp (prise) of 
things, and therefore misrepresents the volatility of its sensitive life and poses a threat to 
the solicitations of other bodies, then Levinas has provided an account of the body which 
overstates the vulnerability of the body to the detriment of the enabling effects of 
sensation. He provides unique resources for thinking sensation in its transcendental and 
alimentary functions, as well as its affective and material dimensions. The Levinasian 
body will be dealt with in Chapter 3. 
The plastic body which I will oppose to both Merleau-Ponty and Levinas is a 
reconstruction, built from components found in both thinkers’ texts, most important for 
which is the carnal sensibility they offer as a replacement for the Kantian model. The 
plastic body tries to balance what I see as two extreme descriptions of the body-world 
relation. Once this balance is struck we will have an account of embodiment that provides 
an alternative to the Kantian view of sensation and subjectivity, closes the apparent gap 
between phenomenology and nonphenomenology (i.e., poststructuralists like Foucault 
and Deleuze as well as the embodied cognition movement) and provides the basis for an 
ethics of embodiment that is grounded in the aesthetic life of the body. This ethics will be 
sketched in my conclusion. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
PERCEPTUAL PRIMACY AND SYNCHRONY OF THE LIVED BODY 
 
 
The body is a strange thing, and when it is caught up in an accident 
involving non-human forces, there is no predicting the result. 
– Aira, An Episode in the Life of a Landscape Painter 
 
 
The Introduction has provided a brief but adequate context in which to situate the 
reformulation of sensation in Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. The following two chapters 
will now focus on what Merleau-Ponty has to say about the body’s constitution, the 
aesthetics of embodiment and the nature of sensation, and try to make clear the inherent 
divergence between sensation and perception as Merleau-Ponty understands it. The 
central text for this reading will be the Sense Experience (Le Sentir) chapter of 
Phenomenology of Perception. My purpose is to characterize Merleau-Ponty’s ontology 
of the body, with specific attention given to the concrete aspect of its sensibility, and to 
challenge his thesis that the intercorporeal relation is fundamentally reversible. My 
critique will result in the claim that if we maintain Merleau-Ponty’s thesis that the 
perceptual life of the reversible body is the bedrock of experience, then it becomes 
difficult to explain the asymmetry of violence and the reality of hostility, as well as the 
death of the body and therefore the disintegration of perception entailed in death. 
It is undeniable that Merleau-Ponty makes the body central to his philosophy of 
the subject and that the ideality of the real is contested by his theory of embodiment and 
his primacy of perception thesis. By putting the body at the base of his analyses, indeed at 
the birth of the world, he puts the body immediately in touch with the objects of 
perception and argues for the codependent, dialogical constitution of subject and object. 
By making perception primary, he shows how things and persons, minds and ideas—in 
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short, determinacy itself—arises out of the indeterminacy of the perceived world. 
Sometimes he equates body and perception; other times he casts the body as an 
instrument of perception or consciousness. Most commentaries resolve this inconsistency 
by showing that Merleau-Ponty means to overcome mind-body dualism by relocating 
consciousness from the mind and into the body. There is no conscious mind “within” the 
body: it is just the body itself which is conscious. 
It is not always noted, however, that the body is only important for Merleau-Ponty 
because it is essential to giving an account of the nature of perception. His introduction of 
the body into the discourse of perception is meant to challenge classical philosophers of 
mind (Descartes, Hume, and Kant, for instance) as well as the dominant psychological 
theories of his day. The body adumbrates the primacy of perception thesis with a 
constitutive, practical perspective that redefines the objective world by imbuing it with a 
meaning determined by the carnal constitution of the subject. It is this embodied 
dimension of perception that is missed by the philosophers. As for Merleau-Ponty’s 
opponents in psychology, they fail to acknowledge that a mechanistic view of behavior 
overlooks the vital role that meaning plays in human consciousness. Human 
consciousness “has the ability to orient itself by the possible, the virtual” and these 
possibilities are to be found in the structures of perception.93 
In a way, Merleau-Ponty is not really interested in the body as a material entity or 
its relations, but with how the body shapes perceptual experience and the meaning of the 
world. This means that he is not immediately interested in addressing the metaphysical 
questions which surround the body or incarnation, nor is he bothered too much about 
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 Gary Brent Madison, The Phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty: A Search for the Limits of Consciousness 
(Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1981), 7. 
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reconciling the phenomenology of embodiment with the research of the physical 
sciences. Or, rather, he would prefer to explain the latter on the basis of the former. The 
body as perceived and lived—as given phenomenally to the consciousness inhabiting it—
is his object of description. Most of what he says about the lived body is manifest to 
perception, neither speculative nor deductive. Thus, he adopts Husserl’s distinction 
between Leib and Körper in order to set the latter aside and focus exclusively on the 
former. Körper is the determinate, objective body of science. It is the physiological body 
that functions in many ways below the level of consciousness and that is constantly 
degenerating and regenerating with the passage of time. Leib is the conscious body, the 
body that experiences the world as a network of meaning instead of as a field of cause-
effect encounters. When the lived body (Leib) is in pain it confronts that pain with horror 
or with patience. By contrast, pain for the objective body (Körper) is little more than a 
physiological change of state and is legible not by the body itself but only by an external 
observer trained to read its biochemistry.94 Whenever Merleau-Ponty is explicating the 
life of the body, it is the lived body he intends. His object of study is circumscribed by a 
methodological decision: his adoption of phenomenology and its strict adherence to what 
appears (is given) to consciousness. 
The problem of the body is not for Merleau-Ponty a matter of simple description 
or vindication of first-person experience. It is the problem of how “there is for us an in-
itself” (PP 71/86), or how it is possible for perception to immanently order the perceptual 
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field while at the same time revealing the world as a transcendent phenomenon. To 
reconcile this apparent paradox, Merleau-Ponty turns to perception and interrogates the 
ontological fact that perception is never divorced from a body’s perspective on things. In 
order to disclose the meaning of the perceived, he is forced to come to terms with the 
meaning of the body. Therefore, instead of considering the body as an “obstacle” to be 
overcome, Merleau-Ponty conducts a critique of the body as the very condition of 
possibility for disclosing the world (PP 68/82). “The object-horizon structure, or the 
perspective, is no obstacle to me when I want to see the object; for just as it is the means 
whereby objects are distinguished from each other, it is also the means whereby they are 
disclosed” (PP 68/82). This means that our corporeity not only renders us finite creatures 
who are determined by our given spatial and temporal horizons, but that horizonality, or 
the figure-ground structure, is basic to perception, knowledge, and individuation. 
 It must be kept in mind that inserted in the middle of the figure-ground structure 
is a “third term.” This is the body (PP 101/117).95 Since the body plays such a pivotal 
role in the structuring of perception, it is necessary to determine the ontology of this body 
to reveal Merleau-Ponty’s more general ontology. After all, he says that the perceiving 
subject is the perceived world (PP 72/86). To understand Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the 
subject and how this subject interacts with the world, we must first know what makes up 
the body. 
It would seem that by beginning with perception Merleau-Ponty is mainly 
concerned with epistemological questions, or at least with the question of how we access 
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things. This is implied when he says in “The Primacy of Perception” that his project is 
“not a question of reducing human knowledge to sensation [sentir], but of assisting at the 
birth of this knowledge, to make it as sensible as the sensible, to recover the 
consciousness of rationality” (PrP 25/67). Similarly, M.C. Dillon’s Merleau-Ponty’s 
Ontology is oddly oriented by a classical epistemological problem: Meno’s paradox.96 
This suggests that Merleau-Ponty is occupied with unraveling our knowledge of the 
things themselves rather than the things themselves. Moreover, by closely following 
Husserl, it would seem that Merleau-Ponty is endorsing some form of idealism,97 even if 
not the transcendental type. But Merleau-Ponty actively criticizes idealist presumptions 
by repeatedly pointing to the incongruity between perception and thing perceived. Thus, 
while his primacy of perception thesis works as a response to a host of epistemological 
viewpoints,98 it also advances an ontological position which speaks to the constitution of 
both subjects and objects, and finds these entities to manifest an autonomous life of their 
own which actively resists a neat synthesis or total comprehension.99 
The dual epistemological/ontological concern marks a tension with Merleau-
Ponty’s methodological starting point: the immanence of perceptual phenomena. How 
can specifically human perception reveal to us what ultimately exists in itself? The 
tension is ostensibly relieved when it is recognized by Merleau-Ponty that the duality of 
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subject and object, in-itself and for-itself, is founded upon perception, rather than 
presupposed by it. 
The first philosophical act would appear to be to return to the world of actual 
experience which is prior to the objective world, since it is in it that we shall be 
able to grasp the theoretical basis no less than the limits of that objective world, 
restore to things their concrete physiognomy, to organisms their individual ways 
of dealing with the world, and to subjectivity its inherence in history. Our task 
will be, moreover, to rediscover phenomena, the layer of living experience 
through which other people and things are first given to us, the system ‘Self-
others-things’ as it comes into being; to reawaken perception and to foil its trick 
of allowing us to forget it as a fact and as perception in the interest of the object 
which it presents to us and of the rational tradition to which it gives rise. (PP 
57/69) 
 
The immediacy of perception, which “is no longer the impression, the object which is one 
with the subject, but the meaning, the structure, the spontaneous arrangement of parts” 
(PP 58/70), is now defined in nonobjective terms and cannot be dissociated from the 
network of concrete meanings that are exchanged at the intercorporeal level. Perception 
is not first a matter of intuitive apprehension or judgment, it is a dialogue of 
physiognomies—arrangements whose sense is made determinate and deciphered by the 
body’s practical know-how. 
John Sallis identifies three important characteristics of perception that summarize 
the consequences of Merleau-Ponty’s primacy of perception thesis. By designating 
perceptual experience as primary, Merleau-Ponty shows that perception is original, 
autonomous, and foundational.100 All of our reflections, and thus everything we know, 
have their origin in perception. The fund of perceptual experience is already there before 
our senses, full of animation, form, and meaning. Perception is not produced by the 
subject: the subject always finds itself inhabiting, from a singular perspective, a 
phenomenal field whose horizon is forever receding. For phenomenology, the resistance 
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this field offers to our gaze reveals it to be beyond our comprehension and in some sense 
prior to us. This open field that Husserl calls the Lebenswelt comprises phenomenology’s 
transcendental (PP 61/74; VI 185-186/239). 
Whereas for Kant the transcendental ego is what unifies the sensible order, for 
Merleau-Ponty only a subject situated within an environment is able to negotiate the 
coordinates that characterize our experience and furnish itself with the material that 
founds understanding, judgment, and reflection. “A subject so aloof from the world as to 
be able to constitute space as pure form would be no more capable of distinguishing ‘up’ 
from ‘down’ than would a subject so subordinated to the world as to be merely receptive 
of non-oriented sense-content,” says Sallis.101 Perception takes place between subjects 
and objects; it therefore belongs neither to the subjective nor the objective, but rather 
involves (folds, envelopes) the subject and the object. The fundamental opacity or 
ambiguity of this involutionary movement resists appropriation and prevents the evidence 
of perception from being “absorbed into the circuit of reflective thought.”102 The object 
given in perception is never given completely, yet we observe it as a unified thing (PrP 
15/47). 
By designating perception as the birthplace of the world while at the same time 
imbuing this place with an irreducible ambiguity, Merleau-Ponty poses a considerable 
challenge for anyone asking, “What exists?” It seems necessary to always reformulate 
this question as “What can I make sense of, given my finite, corporeal constitution?” Of 
course, this is echoes the Kantian critical question, “What can I know?” But Merleau-
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Ponty modifies the Kantian problem, which attempts to draw the limits of rational 
knowledge, by turning the synthetic act of the understanding into a problem whose key is 
the lived body. “The body, to which is linked the whole series of reductions that indicate 
the need for synthesis, is, in a sense, the agent of the synthesis that is needed.”103 This 
does not mean that Merleau-Ponty simply replaces Kant’s transcendental ego with a lived 
body that would remain free of the effects of history. The body is always already 
“saturated with its object” (PP 215/249); the body which performs the synthesis of 
perceptual experience is never completely “aloof” from the world because there is always 
something impersonal and improper about the body (PP 215/249), unlike its self-identical 
doppelganger, the transcendental ego. Despite its capacity to “withdraw” from the world 
in reflection, the lived body always remains tied to its world by an intentional thread (PP 
72/86).104 
The need for a transcendental faculty of synthesis becomes superfluous since the 
body accomplishes the coordination of experience. “In positive terms, Merleau-Ponty’s 
task is to retrace, beginning at the level of profiles, the constitution of the object, in such 
a way as to show how at each level there is already a synthesis initiated within the matter 
itself without there being any need for an extrinsic act of synthesis.”105 The body is 
inserted directly into the perceptual horizon insofar as it is the anchor “in a total system 
of possible profiles in their correlation with certain motor possibilities”106—the body is 
always practically converging upon an optimum perspective, or an increasingly coherent 
system of appearances, but never absolute knowledge (PP 301-303/347-350). The object 
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is always evading the reach of perception despite our increasing ability to make sense of 
or manipulate it. Although foundational, perception discloses objects as independently 
constituted. 
In a frequently cited working note to The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty 
acknowledges that by beginning with perception in Phenomenology of Perception he 
prevented himself from articulating the kind of nondualist ontology that was being 
worked out in his later texts. When he admits that “The problems posed in Ph.P. are 
insoluble because I start there from the ‘consciousness’-‘object’ distinction” (VI 
200/253), he realizes that it is impossible to bridge the gap between subject and object, or 
lived body and objective body, if these binaries are cast as ontologically distinct. By 
beginning with perception, subject and object are supposed to achieve their (abstract) 
distinction from out of the unity of perception, considered as a dynamic intentional 
nexus. Ultimately, it is the body’s practical competence that traces the contours of reality: 
“My body is the fabric into which all objects are woven, and it is, at least in relation to 
the perceived world, the general instrument of my ‘comprehension’” (PP 235/272). It is 
clear that it is only through the body—here portrayed as a prosthetic of the 
understanding—that the world is organized for perception. 
The lived body possesses a kind of double life. On the one hand, Merleau-Ponty 
wants the body and its practical aims to provide the background against which perception 
is generated (cf. the privileging of “spatiality of situation” over intelligible space in PP 
100/116). On the other hand, Merleau-Ponty insists that the body always finds itself 
caught up in a world populated with objects, people, meanings, and ideas. He maintains 
the first position in order to escape a naturalistic or positivistic conception of subjectivity. 
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He maintains the second position in order to avoid charges of idealism. These evasions 
force him to maintain a view of the embodied subject as both generative of and generated 
by its perceptual world. The generated world would be identical to the perceived subject 
insofar as the subject is what gives form to the world, by orienting its spatiality, for 
example (cf. PP, Chapter 3). The objective world which generates the body would weave 
the perspectival and practical environment that we always find ourselves within. This 
latter would be the world in which things store their unseen profiles, the forgotten world 
of anonymous, nonintentional sensory existence which lines the visible world  (PP 215-
216/250-251). 
By bracketing the objective world as well as the objective body, and beginning 
with the world as perceived, Merleau-Ponty gives himself over to phenomenological 
interrogation of the aporia of how my body can be both the origin of the world and its 
product. He details the ways in which the body interacts with its world at the phenomenal 
level, that is, at the level of perception. This interaction is several times characterized as a 
dialogue or reciprocal determination (PP 127, 129, 132/148, 150, 154). But this 
methodological maneuver raises questions about the pre-perceptual genesis of the body, 
particularly at the level of sensation. Some of these questions are addressed by Merleau-
Ponty, but we must ask whether his account of the pre-perceptual genesis of the body 
falls within the scope of phenomenology or whether it must have recourse to a 
speculative metaphysics. I will argue that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology does draw 
upon a certain metaphysics of the body, but that this metaphysics is spurred by his 
phenomenological investigations. 
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Merleau-Ponty acknowledges that the primacy of perception thesis remains bound 
to an idealist epistemology which assumes the constitutive power of consciousness in the 
form of the lived body. But if the body is what makes perception part of the objective 
world while at the same time serving as the condition of that world’s appearance, then a 
kind of distance must be introduced between the material world in which the body is an 
object of science and the lived world in which the body engages a meaningful existence. 
As Merleau-Ponty remarks, “If my consciousness were at present constituting the world 
which it perceives, no distance would separate them and there would be no possible 
discrepancy between them” (PP 238/275). 
What makes the body more than a physical object is the distance opened within 
consciousness by the binding polarization of subject and object that is intentionality. 
Intentionality is both what animates the body as a subject, but also what keeps it 
necessarily correlated with the world. Like the figure-ground structure, intentionality is 
an ontological fact of existence (PP xvii/xii): this principle says that our conscious life 
and knowledge are inextricably bound up with the historical horizon in which we exist. 
At the corporeal level, intentionality denotes a fundamental connection between my lived 
body, my objective body, the body of the other, and the objects of the world. 
Merleau-Ponty’s lived body must belong, in a realist sense, to the material world 
for his phenomenology to challenge the constitutive phenomenology of Husserl. To 
achieve this materialization, he must posit a pre-perceptual life of the body; that is, he 
must allow for a body whose capacity for perception is not the result of its own ideal 
activation and whose constitution is comprised of “existentials”107 that “operate in 
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perceptions” but remain unperceived themselves (VI 178, 180, 189/232, 233-234, 243; cf. 
PP 238/275). Upon reflection, the phenomenal field must show itself to have already 
been a field full of already extant bodies. Without this site of intercorporeity Merleau-
Ponty would have to resort to a quasi-theological account of the incarnation of 
consciousness in the body, or leave the birth of consciousness shrouded in mystery. 
Despite the constraints placed on his discourse by the phenomenological 
perspective, he does not pass over in silence the pre-phenomenal constitution of the body. 
However, he delimits its material constitution from an ontological, rather than 
physiological or biological, perspective. This requires some speculative deviation from a 
strictly phenomenological method. 
When I say that Merleau-Ponty “speculates” about the constitution of the body, I 
mean that he admits elements into his account of subjectivity that are not disclosed 
phenomenologically. Methodologically, his phenomenology is synthetic rather than pure, 
a mixture of phenomenological description, empirical research, and metaphysical 
speculation. This is partly what enables him to escape the fate of subjective idealism; it is 
what Lakoff and Johnson admire when they call Merleau-Ponty an “empirically 
responsible” phenomenologist.108 For instance, in order to explain the rigidity of 
psychological prejudices (like racism) and their influence on the structuring of 
perception, Merleau-Ponty appeals to the genetic, historical, and physiological 
dimensions. He does this not to show that perception is always forced to conform to a 
reified biological or social structure (Child 107/15), but to argue that heredity and social 
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conditioning are co-constitutive of the individual and his or her attitude toward others. He 
writes that it is not the case that “the way in which the child structures his social 
environment is unrelated to the hereditary or constitutional dispositions of his nervous 
system” (Child 108/16). The individual is never simply determined by his or her 
environment. The individual operates between the biological and the social, “takes a 
position in the face of [these] external conditions” (Child 108/17, my emphasis). This is 
the phenomenological point. The child’s perceptual prejudices are the result of a “single 
global phenomenon” that emerges from certain natural determinations and social 
conditioning, but against which the child is able to make his or her own meaning (Child 
108/17). To comprehend the genesis and alteration of this meaning it is necessary to see 
how perception is both something given (as social prejudice and physiology) and enacted 
(in the body’s meaningful responses to its perceived environment). 
Unfolding the constitution of the body means giving an account of the genesis of 
its dimensions with a view to exposing how these dimensions make up the “new 
definition of the a priori” discussed at several points in the Phenomenology of Perception 
(e.g., PP 220-222/255-257). This corporeal a priori is addressed from at least three 
aspects which do not always display a coherent picture: the primacy of perception thesis, 
the body as the hinge109 of perception, and sensation as the body’s original communion 
with the world. The primacy of perception thesis says that the things we encounter are 
conditioned by, which is to say oriented according to, our field of perception. This field is 
coordinated by the (partially anonymous) constitution of our bodies and their (often 
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impersonal)110 capacity to practically synthesize the world (PrP 14/45-46). Of particular 
importance for this synthesis is the schéma corporel, or body schema,111 and a number of 
other concepts which function transcendentally to inform Merleau-Ponty’s view of the 
body as reversible. These will be examined in the following section. 
Although it operates as a transcendental, the lived body is never detached from 
external bodies, objects, other persons.112 The material world and the body as subject are 
“co-transcendentals,” we might say. This is Merleau-Ponty’s original philosophical 
innovation.113 The body for Merleau-Ponty is not “an agency underlying the organization 
of experience” or “the foundation of transcendental constitution.”114 Merleau-Ponty does 
show that the body organizes the space it inhabits into functional and practicable places, 
but he does not want to say that places are generated spontaneously. Instead, the body’s 
organizational capacity “is a response to the questions the world raises,” which means 
that its transcendental function “is inconceivable apart from its receptive, responsive, 
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centripetal role before the givenness of the world, its existence as flesh amidst the flesh of 
the world.”115 When we speak of Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental perspective, we must 
always keep in mind that his is an impure transcendental, a set of conditions that are 
themselves conditioned by the body’s mutable history. This “historical a priori is 
constant only for a given phase and provided that the balance of forces allows the same 
forms to remain” (PP 88/104). Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of habit, which we will 
examine below, fills out the meaning of the historical a priori.116 
Sometimes he speaks to the contrary, but there is neither a pure a priori nor a pure 
a posteriori in Merleau-Ponty.117 For instance, he says that the habituated body schema 
“remains forever anterior to perception” (PP 238/275), which would seem to indicate that 
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the body schema is always prior to existence, and thus belongs to an a priori plane. The 
body and perception would be disidentified in this case, the former being always already 
constituted prior to the appearance of temporal events. But temporality is always central 
to embodiment for Merleau-Ponty. “We must understand time as the subject and the 
subject as time,” he says (PP 422/483).118 If the body and perception are identical—that 
is, if there is no body before perception and no perception before body—it is necessary to 
make sense of the latent body, the body lived unconsciously,119 prior to reflection and in 
the background of explicit perception. As Merleau-Ponty writes in “Eye and Mind:” 
“There is that which reaches the eye directly, the frontal properties of the visible; but 
there is also that which reaches from below—the profound postural latency [latence 
posturale] where the body raises itself to see…” (EM 187/85-86). This is the body in the 
grip of the corporeal world, constrained by the exigencies of its embodied experience. 
When posited from the phenomenological point of view, the primacy of 
perception thesis has the disadvantage of not really explaining how it is possible for the 
body—its habits, body and postural schemata, behavioral circuits, style, or 
physiognomy—to be constituted prior to perception. Indeed, it does not allow us to speak 
of an “anonymous” or “impersonal” body that underlies conscious perception and 
precedes the differentiation of my body from the body of the other (PP 240/277; Child 
119/33). Like Merleau-Ponty (VI 200/253), I see this as a methodological problem that 
limits his early work but which can be overcome by adopting an ontological perspective, 
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as he does most explicitly in The Visible and the Invisible when he shifts from the 
language of consciousness and object (dualism), to the language of the flesh of the 
sensible (monism).120 Despite his focus on first-person perception, however, Merleau-
Ponty’s earlier texts have plenty to say about pre-perceptual and anonymous elements of 
the body and, while an adequate metaphysics of corporeal individuation may be lacking 
in the Phenomenology of Perception, there is a healthy ambiguity that attends the 
transcendental status he assigns to the body. For instance, the body schema might be 
designated a pure a priori if it can be shown to possess an immutable element (PP 
142/166; SB 189/204). 
What I am suggesting in this discussion of the primacy of perception thesis is that, 
if perception is in a strong sense essential to all constitution, it is not clear how we are to 
conceive the materiality of the body prior to perception. And yet, if it is the body that 
perceives (PP 238/275), and this body is the product of “a past which has never been 
present” (PP 242/280), then we are obliged to elucidate the metaphysics of this originary 
constitution. On Merleau-Ponty’s view we are forced into the position of thinking the 
body as a condition of possibility of experience while simultaneously upholding the view 
that both body and world are the products of perception. To resolve this issue it seems 
necessary to distinguish the body from perception and lend a certain primacy to the body 
as a thing that perceives only secondarily. Such a view challenges the primacy of 
perception thesis by undermining the transcendental character of perception and shifting 
the transcendental to the level of corporeal sensibility. This can be accomplished by a 
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examining the Sense Experience chapter of the Phenomenology, where the privilege of 
perception is called into question as Merleau-Ponty attempts to delimit the difference 
between sensation and perception. It is here that we see the most radical elements of 
Merleau-Ponty’s transcendental philosophy, as well as his most fertile attempts to 
rehabilitate the concept of sensation in the name of a carnal ontology. 
To illustrate these points I will defend the deliberately provocative thesis that 
Merleau-Ponty gives priority to sensing, not perceiving, as he attempts to account for the 
body’s relation to its world. This priority is granted from an ontological/metaphysical 
perspective, but not from a phenomenological one. Along the way, the basic question I 
attempt to answer is: What constitutes this body that orients our perceptual field? 
Merleau-Ponty has plenty to say about this. I will also pursue a second question: Where 
does this body come from; how is it individuated from the ambiguous field of the 
sensible? I will first unpack some of the primary elements of the body and show that 
Merleau-Ponty mainly conceives the body as reversible, that is, synchronized with its 
environment. 
Now that we have seen how the problem of the body is a problem of perception, 
we must ask: What is this body that coordinates and conditions the subject’s capacity for 
perception, indeed is this capacity, and gives meaning to the world as perceived? Where 
does it come from and what is it made of? Here we will review some of the components 
of the lived body and determine in what sense these components enable perception. 
The lived body is not explicitly thematized in our daily operations, although we 
are always in some sense aware of it; some of its components exist in the background as 
we carry out our mundane activities, and we rely on its stability as we go about our 
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business. When the body becomes ill or is disturbed in some other way, it announces 
itself like Heidegger’s broken hammer121 and becomes an object to be examined.122 In 
these cases, it presents itself as an obstacle to be overcome rather than a tool that allows 
us to move with facility about our environment. Under normal circumstances our body’s 
are attuned to their environment and function together as an uninterrupted unity. As 
Shaun Gallagher puts it, 
When the lived body is “in tune” with the environment, when events are ordered 
smoothly, when the body is engaged in a task that holds the attention of 
consciousness, then the body remains in a mute and shadowy existence and is 
lived through in a non-conscious experience. But when the lived body loses its 
equilibrium with the environment, it suddenly appears at center stage, announcing 
itself as painful, fatigued, distorted, clumsy, embarrassed, etc.123 
 
This does not mean that we inhabit two ontologically distinct bodies or that the body can 
be divided up into multiple ontological levels.124 It means that the lived body is most of 
the time absent from perceptual experience while at the same time conditioning that 
experience.125 It assumes various levels of disclosure, but for the most part remains 
inconspicuous. 
Given this image of the normal mode of embodiment, I want to argue here that the 
texts prior to The Visible and the Invisible catalogue a series of correlations between body 
and world that prefigure the concept of flesh, a concept which provides a problematic 
image of the body-world relation. These correlations can be found in Merleau-Ponty’s 
discussions of, for example, habit, style, physiognomy, and body schema. Admittedly, the 
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language of “correlation” prejudges the matter at hand by smuggling in objectivist terms 
when these terms are precisely what Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology aims to dispel. 
However, given that perception always “takes advantage of work already done” (PP 
238/275) it is clear that there is a (qualified) ontological realism at play in Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology that authorizes the term. Moreover, Merleau-Ponty’s use of 
terms like “communion,” “dialogue,” and “synchronization” suggests that perception in 
the Phenomenology can be thought within a dualist framework, even if this framework is 
only to be understood as the result of a more originary unity of subject and object. 
The emphasis on synchronization expresses Merleau-Ponty’s desire to take the 
middle road between rationalism and empiricism, and to strike a balance between active 
and passive conceptions of the embodiment. The body is not fully responsible for 
creating the world in which it exists, but neither is it completely vulnerable to all of the 
impressions inflicted upon it by material events. It is an entity whose actions are partly 
enacted according to its desires and partly dictated by the impersonal contours of its 
physical locale. As Madison puts it, “The subject of perception is not the free subject, the 
master of itself which realizes itself to be a unique individual.”126 Because the body is 
bound up with the world and given a form or “logic”127 that it does not give itself, its 
capacity for action, its constitution as an “I can” rather than an “I think,” is determined 
within the “unreasonable promiscuity”128 it carries on with its environment when it is not 
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reflecting on itself. The prepersonal unity of the body first informs perception and all that 
perceptual experience entails.129 
 Perhaps the central correlation of body and world involves habit. Merleau-Ponty’s 
account of the habituated body is closely linked to his discussions of the body/postural 
schema, physiognomic perception, and behavioral circuits, each of which is supported by 
what he calls an “intentional arc.” The intentional arc subtends consciousness and draws 
the various threads of the practicable environment together into a meaningful horizon of 
possibilities. It does this by first unifying the senses into a synchronized system. This is 
what Merleau-Ponty means by “synaesthetic perception” (PP 229/265). The body is not 
just a reflex mechanism; it is a physical entity that interprets and makes sense out of the 
disparate stimulation it receives. The “personal core” (PP 134/156) of the body “brings 
about the unity of the senses, of intelligence, of sensibility and motility” and “goes limp” 
in illness, as the Schneider case reveals (PP 136/158-159). Habits are crucial because 
they provide the body with its corporeal identity, in the form of latent or sedimentary sets 
of actions that makes our surroundings familiar and workable, that enables our body to 
sense and perceive without always having to explicitly appeal to the personal core of 
consciousness. 
Habits give our bodies their stable form. They are not merely supplemental or 
ancillary modifications of a bare corporeity. Or rather, insofar as we acquire them from 
our cultural and social environments they are a kind of original prosthetic, like language 
(Child 99/4-5). Habits allow us to sink our attention in the present without having to 
attend at each moment to the body. The body as a unified system is, Merleau-Ponty says, 
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“my basic habit” [l’habitude primordiale] (PP 91/107). In order to free itself from the 
environment, the body adopts “pre-established circuits” that give it the space to pursue its 
intellectual projects. As he says, “it is an inner necessity for the most integrated existence 
to provide itself with an habitual body” (PP 87/103).130 This is a view shared with 
William James, who maintains that habit condenses and simplifies the movements 
required to complete a particular task, thus habit “diminishes fatigue” by freeing up 
attention.131 
Habit, for James, is a material phenomenon that is registered both on and in our 
bodies. He holds that our habit sets “depend on sensations not attended to,” which means 
that our “body’s attitude” or proprioception132 subtends the series of movements which 
make up a given habitual action, like buttoning one’s shirt.133 The body’s attitude is 
written in the body and, like Merleau-Ponty’s intentional arc, what enables the body to 
make sense of a particular series of sensations and unify them into a coherent habitual 
action. As he writes in The Principles of Psychology, “the phenomena of habit in living 
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beings are due to the plasticity of the organic materials of which their bodies are 
composed.”134 
Merleau-Ponty does not share James’s naturalistic/neuroscientific interpretation 
of habit. For Merleau-Ponty, habits are not stored in the physiology of the body as muscle 
memories or neurological patterns. Habits are an acquired “power”135 that is built upon 
the body’s unified capacity to grasp an environmental directive and imbue that directive 
with a meaningful “motor significance” of its own (PP 143/167). The sedimentation of a 
habit in the body is always permeated, as Edward Casey notes, by the “intentional threads 
that go back and forth between the body and its ever-changing phases, which are 
continually reanimated by current experience.”136  
The acquisition of a habit involves the “rearrangement and renewal of the body 
schema,” which underlies the habitual process as an “immediately given invariant” (PP 
141, 142/165, 166; translation modified). The body schema is an open system of motor 
potentiality that is receptive to the cultivation of habit. It remains open because it is 
arranged according to the practical objectives of the subject. Practical objectives are not 
determined in a vacuum, however; they are horizonal, and thus always motivating new 
projects. The subject sets his or her tasks according to the layout of his or her situation 
and the practical possibilities it presents, while habits rearrange the body schema 
according to the singular way these possibilities are inhabited. Correlatively, the body 
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schema is structured as a response to concrete conditions; it is a dynamic form that is at 
once shaped by material forces and ordered by the intentional arc of the embodied agent. 
Casey writes, “the habituation which such inhabitation accomplishes involves a delicate 
dialectic between the implied passivity of enclosure…and the activity of getting to know 
our way around in a given circumstance.”137 There is never a point at which this dialectic 
is not underway, which is why Merleau-Ponty can say that space “is already built into my 
bodily structure, and is its inseparable correlate” (PP 142/166).  
The sedimentation of habits in the lived body release the subject from the 
immediacy of the present and enables the “movement of transcendence” that 
characterizes Merleau-Ponty’s conception of being in the world. In his discussion of 
being in the world we find one of the strongest statements of Merleau-Ponty’s 
correlationist view of embodiment:  
The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing but 
a project of the world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a 
world which the subject itself projects. The subject is a being-in-the-world and the 
world remains ‘subjective’ since its texture and articulations are traced out by the 
subject’s movement of transcendence. (PP 430/491-492, my italics).138 
 
As we know, this is not an endorsement of idealism. It does, however, indicate that 
Merleau-Ponty sees our capacity to transcend any present situation as predicated upon the 
immanent organization of that situation by the body’s perceptual activity. Conversely, 
this activity must also be seen as a fundamental passivity of the body. The world, too, 
turns the subject into a project. Despite the apparent symmetry, there is a sense in which 
the strict correlation of body and world—i.e., the immanence of embodiment—described 
by Merleau-Ponty is dominated by the projects/projections of the subject. This is because 
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world is an articulation of the subject’s practical freedom, which means that the 
constraints imposed on the subject are, in a sense, self-imposed. Moreover, it is as though 
the world would be a deprived wasteland without the “texture” provided to it  by 
subjectivity. It is not so much that the subject possesses a mysterious power to escape 
immanence, but that Merleau-Ponty’s immanence is never pure. It is always already 
permeated by avenues of transcendence traced out by the subject. Perception guarantees 
the complicity (rather than identity) of subject and world by permeating their immanence 
with an intentionality that binds while its liberates. This complicity remains 
dissymmetrical, however, for it is the subject that introduces intentionality and initiates 
the movement of transcendence. The dissymmetrical relation accounts for the ability of 
the subject to cultivate its own habits.139 Without the movement of transcendence the 
habits of the body would only be imposed on the body from outside influences. 
Just as tissue, neurons, blood, etc. work together to form our physiological 
system, the habits we adopt, cultivate, and inherit make up the lived body’s non-
biological armature. Without the economizing effect of habits our bodies are destined to 
expend their energy on simple reflexive behavior or waste it relearning how to perform 
operations they have performed many times before. Our bodies are normally not 
restricted to these modes of existence. Much of our lives are routinized and we carry out 
many daily tasks as if we were automata. But automation is only apparent. Our habitual 
activities actually enable us to expand our range of spontaneous actions, which is what 
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Merleau-Ponty means when he says that “habit expresses our power of dilating our being 
in the world, or changing our existence by appropriating fresh instruments” (PP 143/168). 
The armature of habit is no less fundamental than the biological constitution of 
the body. It is true that Merleau-Ponty says that habit is “merely a mode” of the body’s 
fundamental capacity to transform a spontaneous action into a personal gesture (PP 
146/171, translation modified), that habit particularizes the body through repetitious and 
regular acts. But he also points to habit as ontologically basic to the body. As Casey 
shows, this primacy is two-fold. First, habit is the corporeal manifestation of a past that 
lives on in my body as its unreflective history. “In this way habit takes the lead over the 
very body it requires for its own realization.” Second, habit forms the basis upon which 
corporeal style and personal expressivity rest. It mediates between the general, 
anonymous body and the sculpted body built up by our culture and conduct.140 Habits are 
what enable our bodies to understand their environment, to achieve a “harmony between 
what we aim at and what is given, between the intention and the performance” (PP 
144/169). This understanding is of course not mental, but inscribed in the body as the 
physiognomy and corporeal sens that at once opens and limits our field of perception (PP 
152/178). 
Before we achieve the freedom to cultivate our own habits we must have reached 
a workable state of equilibrium. The forces and impulses we are born with must be tamed 
in order to become manageable. Only at this point are we free to take up the world as a 
field of equipment. In a sense, this is done for us as we enter into the circuits of behavior 
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maintained by our culture. As Alphonso Lingis puts it, “One is born with forces that one 
did not contrive. One lives by giving form to these forces. The forms one gets from the 
others.”141 As human beings, we are delivered directly into a world whose form has been 
shaped by human artifice. These forms are technologically produced and conducive to the 
kinds of beings that we are. Cultural artifacts are ideally made to enable the postures that 
we normally adopt as we take our position in the environment. The built places that 
receive us as newborn infants already have us in mind, or they at least anticipate that our 
bodies will resemble those which came before. When they do not, we rebuild them or 
adapt our postures accordingly; or, the body endures the labor of forced adaptation and 
potential debilitation. The network or circuit of places made to accommodate our 
corporeal physiognomies constitutes the meaning of our built environment. 
The development of the lived body that Merleau-Ponty describes is supported not 
just by the foresight of architects, but also by atavisms of culture that live on in our 
human bodies. Following André Leroi-Gourhan, Lingis explains, 
Unlike other mammals, which make their way head first, the nose is no longer in 
contact with the environment; the eyes have become the directing organ. The 
upright posture disengaged the hands from the terrain; they now become 
coordinated with the eyes. As humans begin to alter and reconstruct the 
environment about them, new functions are taken on by different body parts and 
organs.142 
 
So it is not just that our bodies are born into inhabitable spaces that will enable the 
acquisition of habits. The ways in which we as humans have come to inhabit our 
environment are ingrained in the physiology of our species, and therefore operate to 
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construct the postures we assume. This point echoes, from an evolutionary perspective, 
Merleau-Ponty’s remarks about the symbiotic relation between the child and his/her 
world: 
In fact, from the time of his birth the child who will have prejudices has been 
molded by his environment, and in that respect has undergone a certain exercise 
of parental authority. Consequently, there is no moment at which you could grasp, 
in a pure state, his way of perceiving, completely apart from the social 
conditioning that influences him. Inversely, you can never say that the way in 
which the child structures his social environment is unrelated to the hereditary or 
constitutional dispositions of his nervous system. […] And so the internal 
characteristics of the subject always intervene in his way of establishing his 
relations with what is outside him. It is never simply the outside which molds 
him; it is he himself who takes a position in the face of the external conditions. 
(Child 108/16) 
 
Ultimately, the individual is neither social nor natural to begin with. He or she is both at 
once. The space between these two organizational forces—nature and culture—possesses 
an “elasticity” [élasticité], says Merleau-Ponty, because it can manifest both reactive and 
active responses within the child (Child 108/16). 
Similarly, the body is always caught up in circuits that are basically affective. 
Affective circuits lend our bodies an emotional identity by economizing the things we 
feel. 143 Since the body is never without its passions, never without a certain emotional 
disposition or mood, its affectivity must be regarded as constitutive of embodiment.144 It 
can be argued, as Lawrence Hass does, that it is affectivity that separates us from the 
world of inanimate things.145 Our affects imbue our intercorporeal encounters with a 
resonance that can energize us (joy) or enervate us (sadness). But it is not just personal 
encounters that are laced with affectivity—it is the entirety of aesthetic experience. This 
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insight is behind the discussion of color in the Phenomenology of Perception, where 
colors are said to have a “felt effect” and a “motor significance” that explains why, for 
instance, “red signifies effort or violence, green restfulness and peace” (PP 209-211/242-
244).146 This is not to say that our bodies are hopelessly at the mercy of their sensory 
environment. As Merleau-Ponty argues, “The subject of sensation is neither a thinker 
who takes note of a quality, nor an inert setting which is affected or changed by it, it is a 
power which is born into, and simultaneously with, a certain existential environment, or 
is synchronized with it” (PP 211/245). Sensory and affective circuits carry our bodies 
along, pushing and pulling them, because our bodies are of the sensible realm and 
informed by its sensory countours. Yet we retain the ability to seize upon and transform 
their meaning, and thus transcend ourselves through aesthetic/affective creation. “I 
cannot be caught in immanence,” says Paul Klee.147 
Gail Weiss notes that it is the intentional arc that enables a series of disparate 
affects to be drawn together into a personal circuit. The intentional arc acts as a kind of 
internal circuit of the lived body insofar as it is what is always running in the background 
as the (normal) subject sets out to enter into new and habitual series of tasks. Unlike the 
habitual circuits that we find in James, where the body runs according to an established 
set of neural pathways that correspond to its observable behavior, for Merleau-Ponty it is 
the body’s intentional arc that allows it to engage in habituated activities unthinkingly. 
“This intentional arc,” writes Weiss, “provides human beings with an affective sensibility 
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that enables the integration of quite dissimilar experiences into a synthetic whole.”148 For 
Merleau-Ponty, it is the intentional arc (which is not reducible to a physical event) that 
underpins the body’s competence, its coherent and almost effortless way of moving, 
acting, gesturing, and expressing itself corporeally. Or more specifically, it is the 
habituation of the body’s intentionality through practical interaction with the environment 
that establishes the intentional arc as the grid upon which the world is always 
projected.149  
There is evidence to suggest that the emotional life of the brain is at least as 
fundamental to the lived body’s normal functioning as the meaningful dialogue it carries 
out at the perceptual level. The point here is not merely that the lived body cannot 
perform without having an emotion, and that this emotion emerges in the brain, it is the 
more salient point that the meaning culled from the world by the lived body is always in 
part produced by the affective valence of our situations. A “situation,” as Mark Johnson 
understands it, is a complex event which occurs between an organism and its 
environment. It is very close to what Merleau-Ponty means by our existential situation, or 
being in the world. Drawing from the philosophy of Dewey as well as the neuroscience of 
Antonio Damasio, Johnson argues that 
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Emotions are key components of complex processes of assessment, evaluation, 
and transformation. As such, they are integral to our ability to grasp the meaning of a 
situation and to act appropriately in response to it. Most of this ongoing processing and 
action is never consciously entertained, but it is nonetheless meaningful to us, insofar as it 
constitutes an important part of our maintaining a workable relation to our 
surroundings.150 
Without emotions, it is difficult (or impossible) for our bodies to determine 
whether or not their present environment is safe to inhabit. Without such assessment, the 
body cannot act rationally or free itself from the defensive posture in which it remains 
vigilant against imminent threats. By the same token, the body cannot read hostility or 
security into the land without having fashioned an intentional arc that will allow it to 
judge another body as congruent or incongruent with itself. Affectivity and intentionality 
are woven together to infuse the body’s sensibility. 
Anticipating a bit, I would say that Merleau-Ponty too often focuses on the 
intentional life of the body while neglecting its affective and material life. In this he 
remains very much a proponent of the subject as primarily an active agent. It is not that 
he fails to see that these two dimensions of embodiment are intertwined and 
equiprimordial,151 but that he tends to pathologize those moments when the body loses its 
competent hold on the world or when its intentional arc loses its coherence. This results 
in an inadequate view of how the body acquires its identity and maintains its integrity 
vis-à-vis the environment. Similarly, he tends to overlook the physical or material aspects 
                                                     
150
 Johnson, The Meaning of the Body, 68. 
151
 This is perhaps most apparent in “The Child’s Relations with Others” (cf. 108-113/17-23). 
 32 
of how objects and emotions orient the body’s activity.152 The dialogue of subject and 
object—which forms the kernel of Merleau-Ponty’s narrative regarding the primacy of 
perception—is driven by the exchange of meanings intended by bodily consciousness, 
not by unregistered signals (autonomic) received from the environment or mundane 
sensations that fail to solicit attention. It is, for the most part, only figures which stand 
out against a horizon that interest Merleau-Ponty. He has considerably less to say about 
insignificant and “neutral”153 situations, as well as situations where the body is so 
overwhelmed that its intentional threads are severed and the figure-ground structure is 
torn asunder.154 
Shannon Sullivan explains that for Merleau-Ponty objects regulate the body 
intentionally as well as materially. “The keyboard,” for example, “has a particular shape 
and manner of operating that call for a specific bodily comportment in order to use it.”155 
There is a plurality of significance transmitted to the body by the keyboard that can be 
accommodated in a variety of ways; but the body must adapt itself if it wants to dialogue 
with, rather than dominate, the object. My body does not perceive the material world 
without that world confronting me with a meaning that I or someone else has projected 
onto it. Sullivan writes: “The keyboard has a meaningful place within my world because, 
through my body’s familiarity with the keyboard gained through the repeated use of it, a 
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piece of plastic and metal has become an extension of my intentionality.” And: “My 
intentionality turns a heavy object into a paperweight; it is because of my need to hold 
papers down that a random stone nearby becomes a cultural object.”156 These 
descriptions imply that the lived body controls the order of perceptual significance and 
the circuits of meaningful behavior. 
There are instances, however, when the materiality of the world seizes upon our 
bodies and perception becomes unhinged. Lingis describes the orgasmic body as one 
whose seizure is not merely a failure of the intentional arc, but the result of a 
decomposition of the body’s postural schema itself.157 In a different context, George 
Yancy describes a scene wherein the body of a white woman is given over to involuntary 
gestures that cannot be explained with a Pavlovian reflex theory or a theory of dialogical 
perception. Something else is required to account for the “ambush”—the visceral 
response solicited in the white woman when the body of a black man enters her elevator. 
She may tell herself that she knows this body; that she has a handle on what a black body 
is; that she has no reason to clutch her purse closely. Yancy writes how “she may come to 
judge her perception of the Black body as epistemologically false, but her racism may 
still have a hold on her lived body.”158 Despite herself, she tenses up, her body recoils. 
She does not search the man’s body to bring its sense into relief; nor does she objectify 
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him. She has no need to: his darkness symbolizes a threat. Conversely, she becomes self-
aware, nearly to the point of paralysis; she averts her eyes and fixes them straight 
ahead.159 But it is not that the black man’s gaze has turned her into an object, as Sartre 
would say. It is the very darkness of the man’s body, his sensory and symbolic 
constitution, that arrests the white woman’s movement. He remains an ambiguous 
presence, his darkness gripping her. 
Yancy’s work draws insight from Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks, a 
book wherein Fanon explicitly takes up the concept of the body schema to interrogate its 
function in intercorporeal relations. Ordinarily, the body schema is described as the 
“implicit knowledge” possessed by the body that enables it to reach for the cigarettes at 
the corner of the desk, or lean backward to retrieve the matches buried in the desk’s 
drawer.160 Such postural facility is experienced by the white body whether it is in its 
office or out in public. The black body, by contrast, is not afforded this facility when the 
gaze of a white person descends upon it. Recalling such an encounter, Fanon describes 
himself as “completely dislocated” by the white gaze, which apprehended and returned 
his body to him “sprawled out, distorted, recolored, clad in mourning….”161 “What else 
could it be for me but an amputation, an excision, a hemorrhage that spattered my whole 
body with black blood?”162 What gets excised from Fanon’s subjectivity is precisely his 
body schema, or at least its enabling function. It is replaced by a “racial epidermal 
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schema”163 that, if anything, disables his body by entering it into an economy which 
operates according to hues and tints, shades of light and dark. 
As objectified, the black body becomes laced with legends, symbols, myths, and 
fantasies—all of which are woven into it by the look of the white person and supported 
by what Fanon calls a “historico-racial schema.”164 This schema, which is situated 
anonymously below the body schema, calls upon or “hails” the black body to be more 
than a practical, competent corporeality, or what Merleau-Ponty calls an “I can.” 
Merleau-Ponty says that it is our competent embodied perception that weaves the fabric 
of the real (PP x/iv-v). Fanon reminds us that it is the perception of the white body that 
traces the contours of the world and forces the nonwhite body to respond accordingly. “I 
wanted to come lithe and young into a world that was ours,” laments Fanon, “and to help 
build it together.”165 To summarize this contrast, we might say that whereas the white 
body is solicited by the world to actively complete it, the black body is made to perform 
in a world that has always already been completed for it. It is in this economy of colored 
skin that the dialogical theory of perception exposes its limitations. 
Reading Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology, it is easy to feel that the world he has 
in mind is for the most part a world filled with things to be handled or manipulated, or 
what Heidegger called the ready to hand. The manipulation of things often leads to a 
better understanding of them; this is where knowledge comes from. We can manipulate 
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things because we are things ourselves, albeit a special kind of thing—the kind of thing 
that directs itself toward goals and orders its surroundings into a meaningful habitat. The 
problem of other persons and how we recognize them as such is certainly considered, but 
the exemplary scenes in the Phenomenology involve a human being confronting an 
inanimate object. When the human is incapable of maximizing its grip on the object, that 
is, when the human is unable to adjust its body to the physiognomy of another body, 
Merleau-Ponty signals a pathology (PP 136/158). Yancy’s description of the “elevator 
effect” and Fanon’s theory of the racial epidermal schema, however, reveal corporeal 
incompetence and dissymmetry as norms of embodiment. We too are manipulated by 
objects, symbols, and stimuli, and not just in ways that enable our bodies or aid our 
perceptual grasp. 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of color-perception in the Phenomenology underscores 
his more general point that our body’s communication with its environment happens 
primarily at the level of perceptual meaning, or what he often calls “physiognomy” or 
“motor physiognomy” (PP 209/243). The subject is not a pilot navigating the body from 
within or a merely organic mechanism. The subject can negotiate its surroundings 
because its corporeal composition is legible by other bodies, and other bodies are legible 
for it. Bodies possess the power to read and respond directly to both formal and 
qualitative features. Merleau-Ponty insists that perception is always laced with sense, and 
it is this sense that enables the body to respond to “sensations.”166 To say that colors 
induce the body to move in specific ways because they display a certain physiognomy is 
to say that sensory experience is always figured, that even colors are never experienced 
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as detached from a significant horizon.167 The body can negotiate this horizon because it 
possesses its own physiognomy, one which is arranged by the physiognomy of the world 
and displayed in the arsenal of gestures it typically deploys (PP 143/168). 
Merleau-Ponty deploys many concepts to characterize the original unity of body 
and world. In the Phenomenology, it is perception, physiognomy, and style; in the course 
on nature, it is natural environment and the Earth;168 in The Visible and the Invisible, it is 
the flesh of the sensible, “this generality of the Sensible in itself, this anonymity innate to 
Myself” as Merleau-Ponty puts it (VI 139/183). Individual bodies for Merleau-Ponty are 
always cut from the same impersonal cloth—personal individuation is something 
achieved, not given. The meaning of the personal, however, can only be understood 
against the backdrop of a prepersonal milieu, whether this is nature, the sensible realm as 
such, or the world as an eminently expressive style: 
The natural world is the horizon of all horizons, the style of all possible styles, 
which guarantees for my experiences a given, not a willed, unity underlying all 
the disruptions of my personal and historical life. Its counterpart within me is the 
given, general and pre-personal existence of my sensory functions in which we 
have discovered the definition of the body. (PP 330/381) 
 
The notion of style gives us a clue to Merleau-Ponty’s view of corporeal identity as 
something dynamically constituted by environmental conditions. In a strong sense, our 
bodies are products of the sedimented meaning that makes up our cultural milieu.169 Born 
into a stylized environment which calls upon it to adopt a compatible bodily 
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comportment, the body is not inscribed with a style as much as it coherently expresses an 
historical embeddedness, a set of social and physical limitations or constraints. The body 
is “a certain style informing my manual gestures and implying in turn a certain style of 
finger movements, and contributing, in the last resort, to a certain bodily bearing.” Its 
identity is, in a word, “a work of art” (PP 150/176). 
Style is not fixed in the visible form of the body; nor is it an abstraction from the 
many postures a given body assumes. A style is nothing other than the specific animation 
of a body, the invisible force that renders it recognizable in its singularity (PP 
327/378).170 As Graham Harman writes, “style is a real force that animates the qualities 
[of a body].”171 Style is not spontaneous expression, however, and in the last analysis the 
general style of the natural and social worlds serves as the condition of possibility for the 
emergence of individual style.172 “Expression,” therefore, “has the form not only of a 
creative, but also of a responsive expression.”173 
By defining it in terms of style, Merleau-Ponty lends a determinate fluidity to 
corporeal identity. “A style,” he writes, “is a certain manner of dealing with situations, 
which I identify or understand in an individual or in a writer, by taking over that manner 
myself in a sort of imitative way, even though I may be quite unable to define it” (PP 
327/378). As we know, style is recognizable across an array of individual examples. 
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“One can hear a newly discovered Charlie Parker recording and immediately recognize 
the style; one can and will say that ‘that solo is really classic Bird’, even though up till 
now it was not part of the known Parker oeuvre.”174 Beyond a certain threshold of 
differentiation a specific style begins to break up and morph into another style. We can 
imagine a masterful jazz musician like Parker deviating so far from his usual delivery so 
as to approximate John Coltrane. In such an instance, what is left of Parker? Has he not in 
a sense become Coltrane, insofar as Coltrane’s identity just is his musical style? In a 
strong sense, Parker and Coltrane are the sounds they produce. A visual example is given 
in The Visible and the Invisible, where Merleau-Ponty explains how a pebble or a shell 
exhibits an identity that persists throughout “their variations within certain limits.” On his 
principle of identity, bodies maintain their identity so long as their sensible modifications 
do not disintegrate the style that animates them. Identity is lost when a body moves 
“beyond a certain range of their changes” (VI 161/213), or crosses a stylistic threshold.175 
Merleau-Ponty does not fully explore  the causes of these deviations of identity. 
For Descartes, it is the mind that judges an object’s identity as continuous 
throughout its modifications, or that determines a cloaked figure perceived from some 
distance to be a person rather than an automaton.176 It is this same mind which, removed 
from the mutable world of extended substance, retains its identity and subsists through 
every modification of the body. For Merleau-Ponty, by contrast, it is the body that 
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recognizes another human body beneath the cloak. “It is through my body that I 
understand other people, just as it is through my body that I perceive ‘things’” (PP 
186/216). The dialectic of recognition becomes a dialogue of styles that unfolds without 
mediation. “The concept of style,” writes Linda Singer, “secures the Other’s direct 
accessibility as a distinctive way of inhabiting the world. […] His integrity is not that of a 
conceptual consistency, but of an existential project which is directly present, even if I 
cannot reconstruct its inner workings.”177 In Merleau-Ponty’s words, the other is, for me, 
“an unchallengeable style” that relays an identity to my own body’s identity and makes 
the other “in principle accessible to me as I am to myself” (PP 364/418; SB 222/238). 
Style is one of the most plastic phenomena adduced by Merleau-Ponty. It 
“ensures my existence of a stability, while allowing for the possibility of growth and 
change.”178 It points to the fluid constitution of bodily integrity and defines the 
intercorporeal realm as a sphere of immanence, where bodies communicate and influence 
each other. This communication is at once personal and anonymous, inherited and 
created.179 But corporeal style remains dependent on the body schema, which offers a 
form of stability amid the fluid immanence of the intercorporeal dialogue. Gallagher 
holds that the body schema should not be regarded as something that stands between 
subject and object as mediator or “screen” (SB 219/236), but rather that “insofar as it is 
dynamic in taking up certain postures and thus situating the body in respect to the 
environment, it remains experientially invisible—absently available.”180 The body 
schema does, however, play the “active role of organizer” of sensations and “reflects and 
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determines the posture that is taken up by the lived body in its everyday situations.”181 
This seems to suggest that the activity of the body schema plays a more fundamental role 
in the organization of perception than any passivity. 
Merleau-Ponty holds that a figure against a background is the simplest of sensible 
experience. Lest we interpret this to be a merely empirical truth, he notes that “this is not 
a contingent characteristic of factual perception” (PP 4/10). It is an ontological fact. But 
like all transcendentals in Merleau-Ponty, one that is historically conditioned. Elizabeth 
Grosz points out that the body schema (she says “body image”) is at work in the 
structuring of this a priori. She says that, 
The body image is necessary for the distinction between figure and ground, or 
between central and peripheral actions. Relative to its environment, the body 
image separates the subject’s body from a background of forces; but also within 
the body, the body image establishes the distinctions—between movements of 
limbs, say, and the rest of the body—which provide it with its corporeal context. 
A single movement reorients the whole of the body, creating what might be called 
a gait or posture, an individual and cultural bodily style.182 
 
Sullivan calls such an ordering of the environment “projective intentionality” and, like 
Grosz, sees such a view as problematic from a feminist ethical perspective: 
Instead of being an account of the dynamic, co-constitutive relationship between 
self and other, the model of intersubjectivity offered by Merleau-Ponty tends 
toward that of a subject’s monologue with itself that includes a domineering 
erasure of others in its projective ‘communication’ with them.183 
 
Although invaluable for understanding the corporeal structures of lived experience, 
Merleau-Ponty’s account of the body schema is often blind to raced, gendered, and other 
forms of embodiment.184 I would add that he equally neglects non-figured experience, or 
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the experience of sensing an ungraspable—like wind or cold—that does not stand out 
against a backdrop. This blind spot in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of embodiment informs 
his mistaken view that body and environment are synchronized or reversible, and that our 
primary mode of engagement with the world involves manipulation of things. 
We have already noted that habits are rearrangements of the general body schema 
underlying the habituated, stylized body which serves as the invariant against which the 
modifications of the body are registered. We have seen, moreover, how Fanon calls into 
question the historicity of the body schema and how Grosz and Sullivan raise problems 
about its constitutive activity. For these reasons, we can say that the body schema’s 
dynamic relation with its surroundings is fundamental to its individuation and its so-
called invariance (PP 141/165) pertains only to its role as active regulator of movement, 
not to the determinate regulations themselves. These regulations are determined 
culturally, historically, intercorporeally; they configure the world we perceive. Despite its 
variability, the body schema nevertheless operates as the dominant organizing principle 
of perception. From the perspective of lived experience, the world cannot but appear as 
complicit or synchronized with the body-subject’s practical agenda, even if this agenda is 
laced with anonymous, impersonal, and unconscious prejudices. 
On the one hand, it is possible to characterize Merleau-Ponty’s conception of the 
body schema and habit as plastic, as Weiss does.185 This should not be taken to mean that 
the lived body’s structure begins as a blank slate and only subsequently becomes 
schematized and habituated. The lived body requires habits and body schemata in order 
to perceive, and without them “perception is impossible” (Child 122/37). These basic 
structures maintain their stability while also remaining open to modifications that would 
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restructure them. Since perception is internally linked to the body’s constitution, any 
restructuring entails a new style of movement, and thus a new perceptual experience.186 
On the other hand, it seems to me that Merleau-Ponty does not want to grant that 
the lived body is fully plastic. So long as it is a living (human) body, and not a body 
reduced to its objective relations in the world, it maintains a set of invariants that do not 
succumb to any transformation. These invariants include the figure-ground structure of 
perception. The figure-ground structure rests on the body schema, which suggests that the 
body schema must be always present in some form for the body to perceive. On this 
reading, perception is no longer primary. An unschematized body will not be capable of 
distinguishing figures and will not, therefore, be able to enter into dialogue with the 
environment. Such a body would not be living in Merleau-Ponty’s terms. 
Since perception presupposes a functioning body schema, and the body schema is 
acquired dialogically, body and world must be synchronized for perception to occur. 
Otherwise, the body schema could not develop. I think this synchronization is behind 
Merleau-Ponty’s conception of reversibility. It is responsible for his later view that 
subjects and objects are basically articulations of a single sensible element called the 
flesh, where “seer and visible reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees 
and which is seen” (VI 139/183). 
 Merleau-Ponty employs the language of synchrony on more than one occasion. 
For instance, he speaks of impersonal biological life and personal life as for the most part 
operating in concert, the former being “practically taken for granted” as something “I rely 
on to keep me alive.” As Merleau-Ponty puts it, we exist “without…being able either to 
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reduce the organism to its existential self, or itself to the organism” (PP 84/99). Citing the 
biography of Saint-Exupéry, Merleau-Ponty notes that on rare occasions our organic life 
can be almost completely suppressed by our personal life: “It may even happen when I 
am in danger that my human situation abolishes my biological one, that my body lends 
itself without reserve to action” (PP 84/99). Later on in the Phenomenology he explicitly 
speaks of the synchronization of the biological and human, yet lends a certain primacy to 
the biological: 
…as we have indicated above, biological existence is synchronized 
[embrayée]with human existence and is never indifferent to its distinctive rhythm. 
Nevertheless, we shall now add, ‘living’ (leben) is a primary process from which, 
as a starting point, it becomes possible to ‘live’ (erleben) this or that world, and 
we must eat and breathe before perceiving and awakening to relational living, 
belonging to colours and lights through sight, to sound through hearing, to the 
body of another through sexuality, before arriving at the life of human relations. 
(PP 159-160/186) 
 
Instead of taking this to be a glimpse into Merleau-Ponty’s latent naturalism, we should 
see it as an example of his “empirically responsible” phenomenology. For, from an 
existential point of view, the biological does not come first and the human is not built 
upon the organic unity of the body. The lived body reciprocally expresses the 
physiological and psychic because it always finds itself already absorbed in a meaningful 
circuit of behavior. 
 This is one of the reasons that Merleau-Ponty will speak on the one hand of an 
original syncretism of body and world, but then quickly dispel the notion that sensing 
(sentir) is ever without a human sense. “The subject of sensation is neither a thinker who 
takes note of a quality, nor an inert setting which is affected or changed by it, it is a 
power which is born into, and simultaneously with, a certain existential environment, or 
is synchronized with it” (PP 211/245). And yet, Merleau-Ponty will speak of our 
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sensibility as belonging to an anonymous life of the senses that thrives “on the fringe of 
my own personal life and acts.” He writes, “Each time I experience a sensation, I feel that 
it concerns not my own being…but another self which has already sided with the world, 
which is already open to certain of its aspects and synchronized [synchronisé] with them” 
(PP 216/250). Now, this is a form of synchrony that the lived body is not in control of, 
for it is established nonintentionally and concerns the body as something that senses 
before it perceives, that lives materially before it grasps meaningfully. 
It is here that we see Merleau-Ponty catching sight of the relation between sensing 
and sensed that defines his notion of flesh. More importantly for us, however, we also see 
the point at which the body-world relation becomes a volatile one. It is at the level of 
sensing that the body is at its most vulnerable, where its hold on the world and its 
capacity to dialogue with other bodies is not yet accomplished, and is even susceptible to 
experiences that could disable its integrity. 
Sensing relies on a synchronization or synthesis of the senses (with each other and 
with their object) whereby each organ’s unique means of exploring is brought together in 
the intersensory realm of perception. This realm is made possible by the “domain of 
sense itself, the community of significance between [the visual and tactile] being 
inadequate to ensure their union in one single experience” (PP 225/260). This union, as 
we have seen, is effected by the body and the intentional arc that allows it to actualize the 
“motor potentiality” of an object and thereby grasp its meaning effectively. 
I am able to touch effectively only if the phenomenon finds an echo within me, if 
it accords with a certain nature of my consciousness, and if the organ which goes 
out to meet it is synchronized with it. The unity and identity of the tactile 
phenomenon do not come about through any synthesis of recognition in the 
concept, they are founded upon the unity and identity of the body as a synergic 
totality. (PP 316-317/366) 
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Thus, the dialogue of subject and object, of styles and physiognomies, only occurs when 
the lived body is capable of conforming itself to the “logic of the world,” that is, when it 
is capable of synchronizing with it (PP 326/377). 
In his treatment of sensibility/sense experience, Merleau-Ponty seems to 
acknowledge the diachrony of sensations and their capacity to disrupts body-world 
synchrony. But, as we will see, he is reluctant to lend primacy to sensing over perceiving. 
Indeed, these potentially distinct modes of experience are collapsed in most of Merleau-
Ponty’s descriptions. Understood as a pre-perceputal and anonymous mode of 
embodiment, the volatility of sensing poses a threat to synchronization of body and 
world. It opens the body to forces foreign to perception. 
The concept of flesh developed in The Visible and the Invisible follows up the 
idea of synchronization with the insight that seer and seen, touching and touched, are 
reversible or chiasmic phenomena. The subject-object dialogue, which retains the dualist 
form, is transformed into an immanent ontology that regards subjects and objects as 
individual expressions of the sensible in general. Now, I would not want to go so far as to 
say that such a move “reduces the other to the same” or eliminates alterity from 
intercorporeal relations. However, I agree with Levinas when he says that “[there is a] 
priority of the flesh…to the detriment of another ambiguity or ambivalence, that of the 
enigma of sensation-sentiment, which is played out in the passivity of the senses affected 
[sens affectés] by the sensorial, between the pure undergoing or suffering and eventual 
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pain, and the known [su] of knowledge that remains behind as its residue or trace.”187 
This insight is what will orient Chapter 3 below. 
Merleau-Ponty tames the volatility of sensation in two ways: first, by defining it 
in terms of synchrony and treating it as something that for the most part enables our 
perceptual competence; and, more radically, by arguing for a “fundamental narcissism of 
all vision” which is supposed to describe the mode of being of the flesh. The general 
reversibility signaled by this portrayal of the sensible may pertain to peaceful and 
mundane experiences of others, but it neglects all the ways sensations can disable us, as 
well as the uncertainty involved as our bodies move from one sensory environment to 
another. It does not do justice to novel or extreme sensations, and it downplays the reality 
of hostile or deadly environments. In a word, it trivializes the vulnerability of our 
sensibility. 
As we have noted, Merleau-Ponty does recognize a layer of sensation that 
operates “below” perception. As pre-perceptual it does not solicit a dialogue from the 
lived body. Instead, it remains out of sync with lived experience and presents the body 
with a volatile situation.188 Merleau-Ponty’s emphasis on body-world synchronization 
obscures the asymmetry of intercorporeity at the level of sensation; this comes as a result 
of his desire to assimilate sensation (as le sentir, sense experience or sensing) to the 
model of perception as “communion.” The thesis of reversibility can only be advanced by 
ignoring the alterity of the material world, that is, at the peril of sensation’s autonomy. 
This is why neither the phenomenology of perception nor the ontology of the flesh can 
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adequately address the problems of embodiment and why the metaphysics of bodies we 
find in Spinoza or Nietzsche,189 for instance, is also needed. 
In giving an account of subjectivity and the immanence of the body-world 
relation, I think Merleau-Ponty does make significant advances past Kant and Husserl by 
developing concepts like style and physiognomy. These concepts allow him to speak 
coherently about perception and intersubjectivity as corporeal interactions that do not 
require the mediation of a transcendental subject. For this reason, Merleau-Ponty should 
be regarded as a kind of materialist.190 This ambition becomes even more apparent when 
he is writing about sensing, or when he speaks of the “carnality” of the flesh in The 
Visible and the Invisible. Here his theory of embodied perception shifts its focus from the 
form of perception to the material of perception—i.e., sensations, the sensible as such—
even though he does not endorse the form-matter distinction. It is in his analysis of 
sensation that we can best see Merleau-Ponty trying to negotiate the immanence of body 
and environment. But his account of immanence is compromised by his endorsement of 
the primacy of perception thesis and his methodological commitment to the principle of 
intentionality. The limit of his materialism, moreover, appears when his theory of habit is 
contrasted with a neurophysiological account like that given by James.
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CHAPTER 2 
 
SENSING, REVERSIBILITY, AND THE PROBLEM OF VIOLENCE 
 
 
Let us return to sensation and scrutinize it closely 
enough to learn from it the living relation of the 
perceiver to his body and to his world. 
– Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception 
 
 
Merleau-Ponty begins his rehabilitation of sensation as early as Phenomenology of 
Perception. After rejecting the modern view of sensation as a unit of content that must be 
assembled with other units in order to build the objects of perception, he endorses a view 
of sensation as sensing (which is a more appropriate translation of le sentir, sense 
experience)191 which is adopted from Erwin Straus’s The Primary World of Senses, on 
the one hand, and Husserl’s Ideas II, on the other. This notion of sensing, which regards 
sensation as “that vital communication with the world which makes it present as a 
familiar setting of our life” (PP 52-53/64-65) is central to Merleau-Ponty’s postdualist 
perspective and the primacy of perception thesis that it defends. For my part, I will argue 
that sensing is the body’s primary mode of engagement, that sensing operates below the 
level of intentionality and is even more basic than operative intentionality, which is 
defined as the “natural and antepredicative” form of perception. Operative intentionality 
is what first opens us to the phenomenal field, “furnishing the text which our knowledge 
tries to translate [via deliberate judgments] into precise language” (PP xviii/xiii). Like 
operative intentionality, sensing lends continuity to the body-world relation and is 
fundamental to the nondualism of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, although his privileging 
of perception often threatens to reinstate a discontinuity between subject and object. 
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Merleau-Ponty recognizes a distinction between sensation and perception. 
Whereas perception is constantly striving to pull objects out of their ambiguous presence 
and into a practicable relief, it is sensation that can occasionally breaks up the synchrony 
accorded to perceptual experience. To claim that such an interruption is merely an 
invitation to explore the undiscovered meanings contained in the perception horizon is to 
miss the qualitative difference between an experience that engages our attention and one 
that simply happens to our bodies.192 Sensation, however, is often assimilated to 
perception in Merleau-Ponty’s texts. This entails a reduction of the alterity of sensation, 
as well as a glossing of the problem of passivity posed by sensory experience.193 But a 
healthy ambiguity inhabits the border between sensation and perception. For instance, it 
is in his treatment of sense experience that the affective and passive dimensions of 
embodiment turn up. The question now becomes, are these dimensions recuperated as 
forms of (perceptual) activity or are they afforded an irreducible otherness? 
Perhaps anticipating that privileging embodiment is not sufficient to free 
phenomenology from transcendental idealism, Merleau-Ponty suggests that it is the 
“primary layer of sense experience [sentir]” that allows perception to “break with the 
critical attitude” (PP 238, 239/276). It is here that I think Merleau-Ponty most 
deliberately departs from his precursors, Kant and Husserl, in order to champion the 
existence of an experience that is not prey to any kind of subjective synthesis. By 
beginning with the sensible, Merleau-Ponty begins with an always already synthesized 
form and content instead of positing a form and content that can only be brought together 
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by a unifying faculty.194 This latter way of proceeding begins with abstractions, not with 
what is given, and is responsible for the mistaken view that the subject’s role in 
experience is to imprint the chaotic world of sensation with form. 
Merleau-Ponty’s concern is to keep the subject always in touch with the objective 
world and to demonstrate how this immanent relation provides the sole content of 
perception. This results in the view that the world does not achieve an explicit form 
unless it is put into dialogue with a human agent (PP 320/370).195 Oftentimes the subject 
of perception is described as immediately in touch with a semi-determinate, but never 
amorphous, world of things which is always on its way to becoming more precisely 
formed and therefore more hospitable to the body’s motor capacity. This ambiguous and 
anonymous “lifeworld” provides the transcendental conditions of perception (PP 
365/418-419).196 More fundamental than the lifeworld is, I believe, the realm of the 
sensible. 
Both sensation and perception are sometimes designated as anonymous, as when 
Merleau-Ponty writes that “Sensation [sensation] can be anonymous only because it is 
incomplete.” Or: “Perception is always in the mode of the impersonal ‘One’” (PP 216, 
240/250, 277). These remarks have generated consistent criticism from feminist 
philosophers who charge that by affirming the reality of an anonymous body, Merleau-
Ponty overlooks the role that gender plays in the construction of experience. This 
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criticism is justifiable, but it does not apply to all of the senses of “anonymous” intended 
by Merleau-Ponty. That is, I do not think it applies to the anonymity of sensation insofar 
as sensation is something undergone by the body unconsciously or prepersonally. Before 
explicating this level of sensation, we need to see what anonymity refers to. 
There are at least four ways to understand anonymity. First, there is the 
precommunicative stage in the psychogenesis of the child, where his or her body is not 
yet distinguishable from the other’s body. Here “there is not one individual over against 
another but rather an anonymous collectivity, an undifferentiated group life” (Child 
119/33). Second, there is the anonymity of habitual actions. It is true that a person’s 
habits inform their style, and thus their personal identity. But to the extent that habits can 
be triggered unthinkingly or operate automatically, they possess a certain anonymity. 
Third, Merleau-Ponty sometimes speaks of the body in general, by which he means the 
organic body that lives “as a prepersonal cleaving to the general form of the world, as an 
anonymous and general existence” (PP 84/99). The idea that there is a general—i.e. 
gender-free, race-free—body “beneath” the personal is problematic because, as Sullivan 
argues, it suggests a neutral ground upon which our bodies communicate with other 
bodies. But no such ground exists, as our bodies are always individuated by habits and 
other particularized bodily behaviors. When I assume that the gestures of the other are 
understandable because we share a common body, then I run the risk of deciphering the 
other in terms of my corporeity (or the myth of a universal body), rather than trying to 
achieve a site of communication that preserves the other’s particularities.197 
Johanna Oksala rejects the view that an anonymous body subtends the 
intersubjective relation and that intersubjectivity is something that needs to be achieved. 
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She argues that the body-subject is historically generated all the way down by “language, 
tradition, and community.”198 Even the anonymous body is structured by environmental 
and social conditions. We have already seen that Merleau-Ponty does not quite offer a 
fully historicized body, that there are certain structural invariants that assume different 
modes but are not open to historical transformation. Or, as Butler argues with reference to 
his treatment of sexuality, Merleau-Ponty’s appeal to “the universal structures of bodily 
existence” “prefigures the analysis of lived experience, investing the body with an 
ahistorical structure which is in actuality profoundly historical in origin.”199 Whether he 
subscribes to an invariant body in general or not, it seem that Merleau-Ponty recognizes 
at least one anonymity that is at once historical and radically ahistorical—this is the 
anonymity of sensation, “which remains forever anterior to our perception [qui reste 
toujours en deçà de notre perception]” (PP 238/275). 
There are two forms of sensation at play in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, one that 
he criticizes (call it “substantive” sensation) and one that he endorses (call it “transitive” 
sensation). The transitive form is conceived under two registers: the phenomenological 
and the transcendental. Despite what has been said about Merleau-Ponty’s impure 
transcendental philosophy, he does provide a concept of sensation that seems like a pure 
a priori, in which case sensation would serve as a condition of perceptual experience. To 
argue for the primacy of sensation in Merleau-Ponty, it is necessary to read closely the 
Sense Experience chapter of Phenomenology of Perception and contrast the notion of 
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sensing (sentir)200 developed there with the classical conception of sensation (sensation) 
found in modern philosophy, which Merleau-Ponty critiques in the opening chapter of the 
Phenomenology. The classical notion of sensation views sensations as data, as discrete 
bits of material received from the external world and processed by the mind into 
representations. Merleau-Ponty rejects this view as a fiction that betrays the evidence of 
experience. Merleau-Ponty’s positive thinking about sensation is often overshadowed by 
his critique of sensation as a “unit of experience.” This is unfortunate because his own 
theory of sensing forms the basis of his theory of painting in essays like “Cézanne’s 
Doubt” and “Eye and Mind,” and since he proclaims that “any theory of painting is a 
metaphysics” (EM 171/42), an understanding of his conception of sensing can reveal 
features of his metaphysical commitments. 
The classical conception which he rejects gets reinforced in everyday language when we speak of 
sensations as discrete properties that cause us to see, for example, a book as red or to feel it as 
smooth. Red and smooth, we say, belong to the cover of this book, but they affect our senses 
separately. Color is received by the eyes; texture is apprehended by the fingertips. It is the task of 
the mind to reassemble these bits of data into representations that correspond to the real world 
objects that emit them. The problem with this view is that it puts metaphysical prejudices ahead 
of experience (PP 5/11). As Taylor Carman puts it, 
Nowhere in our perceptual awareness do we come across discrete qualitative bits 
of experience fully abstracted from the external, perceptually coherent 
environment. […] This is in part just to say that perceptual experience is 
intentional, that it is of something, whereas impressions, sensations, and sense 
data are supposed to be the nonintentional stuff from which the mind somehow 
extracts or constructs an experience of something.201 
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We perceive things, not sensory units. Sensations are inferred from perception when we 
reflect on how it is that an object, which is “not completely our work,” can transmit its 
qualities to us (PP 37/46). This line of thinking assumes that objects exist apart from us, 
fully formed with sharp boundaries and fixed properties. It puts an objectivist 
metaphysics ahead of the ambiguous content of perception, which for Merleau-Ponty is 
the first and final arbiter of what exists. “Experience,” writes Carman, “rarely exhibits 
such sharply defined features…and no analysis of perception into discrete attitudes with 
crisply defined contents intending isolated qualities can capture the peculiar ‘perceptual 
milieu’, always at once a ‘behavioral milieu’, in which things show up for us under 
meaningful aspects.”202 When we attend to what we are actually given, we never discover 
sensations. Instead, we find figures against backgrounds and semi-determinate bodies 
which become more determinate via perceptual adumbrations. We find qualities that 
entice and repel us, a sensible realm that perception “infuses” [imprègne] with 
significance and style (PP 34/43). 
What is required is a concept of sensation that does not reduce the style of the 
sensible to the intentional life of the perceiving subject and which does not completely 
subject the materiality of sensation, its affective and directive force, to the formality of 
the understanding. Turning away from the language of sensation, Merleau-Ponty thus 
begins to speak of sense experience (le sentir) as “an experience in which we are given 
not ‘dead’ qualities, but active ones” (PP 52/64). This is what I am calling the shift from 
a substantive to a transitive notion of sensation. In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, “Sense 
experience is that vital communication with the world which makes it present as a 
familiar setting of our life.” It “invests the quality with vital value, grasping it first in its 
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meaning for us, for that heavy mass which is our body, whence it comes about that it 
always involves a reference to the body” (PP 52-53/64-65). By taking sensation to be 
communal, Merleau-Ponty shows that there is an active and a passive dimension to 
sensing. By making it a corporeal event, he puts the subject immediately in touch with 
the object itself. 
The insistence that sensing is a bodily event at once active and passive is taken 
over from Husserl and Straus. In addition to the kinds of sensations that make up the 
appearance or representation of what we perceive, Husserl’s Ideas II describes the role 
that kinaesthetic sensations play in the constitution of perception. Kinaestheses are the 
nonrepresentational sensations basic to motility. They denote “one’s inner sense of the 
movements, tensions and possibilities of one’s own Body,” as Alia Al-Saji puts it. As the 
body moves about its environment and encounters other bodies, it responds almost 
automatically to the directives and solicitations communicated to it. This practical know-
how, or competence, requires no mediating idea or judgment in order to be executed, 
although it typically draws on habits. As Al-Saji says, “there is no question of mimesis 
between kinaestheses and the qualities of the perceived thing. It is rather by moving 
around things and tracing their contours that kinaestheses make perception, as a concrete 
dynamic process, possible.”203 She concludes: “Kinaesthetic sensations are hence a 
function of my Body’s orientation in the world; they are my way of feeling the active 
engagement of my Body with an outside.”204 
A similar view of the nonrepresentational directive function of sensations is to be 
found in the work of Erwin Straus, a figure Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology appeals to 
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and whose analysis of sensing clearly influenced the latter’s own position. In his The 
Primary World of Senses, Straus argues that Descartes is responsible for the view 
pervasive that sensations are conscious, mental events. “As mere ideas of color, light, and 
the like, sensations to Descartes lack any intrinsic contact with physical things. This 
relationship is only inferred….”205 On this view, the subject has sensations but does not 
suffer them. This is because the subject that senses, for Descartes, is “removed from time 
and becoming” and “receives indifferently and unmoved.”206 For Straus, this entails the 
elimination of the “life” of sensing, by which he means its dialogical or communal 
character as well as it affective valence. He writes: 
All sensory impressions are answers to questions; they are not simply there in the 
way in which the physiological processes underlying them are. We receive 
sensory impressions insofar as we orient ourselves within our primary relationship 
with the world by questing, seeking, expecting.207 
 
Sensing and knowing are sharply distinguished in Straus’s view. When we know 
something, we grasp its meaning by suspending our vital commerce and rendering a 
dispassionate judgment about the thing in question. This image of cognition is analogous 
to what Merleau-Ponty calls intentionality of act. “Sensing,” which is closer to Merleau-
Ponty’s operative intentionality, is “a sympathetic experiencing. It is directed to the 
physiognomic characteristics of the alluring and the frightening.” Straus writes, in 
language echoed in Phenomenology of Perception, 
When we grasp an expression, a communion is established which seizes and 
changes us, which holds and confines us; while in knowing, it is we who seize the 
world, who appropriate it and detach ourselves from the particular, attaining the 
full scope of an horizon which, ultimately, we transcend.208 
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We see Straus here appreciating the ambivalence of sensations, their ability to provide us 
with appearances as well as their capacity to direct and transform our corporeal identities. 
He even acknowledges their disabling potentiality: “it is just in sensations of pain that we 
feel the world attacking and invading us.”209 It is this last point that gets covered over 
when the perceptual field is regarded primarily as a totality of tools or equipment to be 
handled. 
Straus’s theory of sensing is useful here because it brings out the material, vital 
dimension of sensing that is endorsed by Merleau-Ponty but sometimes overshadowed by 
the latter’s commitment to describing the body’s instrumental life. Straus demonstrates 
that the body’s sensibility is neither constituted by a series of passively received stimuli, 
nor is it the strictly human faculty which projects a spatiotemporal grid into the sensible 
field. As Renaud Barbaras says of Straus, 
sensibility must be apprehended in the form of sensing, understood as a specific 
mode of relation, as the communication of the living being with a world. Sensing 
is the mode according to which the living being as such is linked with the world 
(and this is why it defines a common ground between human and animal), it 
designates the living being’s originary mode of existence.210 
 
This is a more naturalistic view of the lived body than we usually find in Merleau-Ponty. 
Straus’s phenomenology of sensory communion is inflected with a biological perspective 
adopted, however, by Merleau-Ponty in his Nature course at the Collège de France.211 
But it is not so much a biological conception of human embodiment that Straus is 
concerned with articulating. He is much more interested in drawing a distinction between 
the affective and cognitive modes of existence, or what he calls the “pathic” and 
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“gnostic” modes. These modes correspond for Straus to sensing and perceiving, 
respectively, and do not display a continuity.212 Needless to say, Straus spends most of 
his energy unpacking the mode of sensing, which Barbaras says “corresponds, in fact, to 
a mode of immediate communication, to a sympathy with the world that does not entail 
any thematic dimension.”213 
Although he does not draw such a definitive distinction between sensing and 
perceiving, Merleau-Ponty displays a similar concern with the immediate, affective 
dimension of body-world contact. When describing the transitive form of sensation, or 
sensation as communion, he refers to sensing as the “primary layer [couche originaire]” 
(PP 238/) of perception. He does not regard sensing as modally distinct from perceiving, 
although it is not always clear precisely what their relation is. One thing is clear, 
however: sensation is not just the inferred material of perception or the passive reception 
of stimuli; it is a material event undergone by the subject and constitutive of the body’s 
integrity. 
A purely physiological perspective cannot capture the phenomenon of sensation 
because it is blind to intentional dimension of sensing, as the Phenomenology says: 
Sensation is intentional because I find that in the sensible a certain rhythm of 
existence is put forward—abduction or adduction—and that, following up this 
hint, and stealing into the form of existence which is thus suggested to me, I am 
brought into relation with an external being, whether it be in order to open myself 
to it or to shut myself off from it. (PP 212-213/247) 
 
As can be gleaned from this passage, “intentionality” does not just denote the fact that all 
sensory experience is directed toward an object. It suggests that to have a sensation 
involves being taken into or pushed out of an situation. Intentionality and affectivity are 
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conflated here. To sense is to be directed by an external object, to be carried or assailed 
by its rhythm. This is what it means for sensation to have a “motor physiognomy” or 
“living significance” (PP 209/242-243). If it is the case that “the world ceaselessly assails 
and beleaguers subjectivity as waves wash round a wreck on the shore” (PP 207/240), 
then we must regard the directives of sensations as fundamental to the constitution and 
“power” (puissance) of subjectivity (PP 210, 211/244, 245). We will see this theme 
recurring in some of Levinas’s writings on sensation and aesthetics. 
As Alphonso Lingis argues in “The Sensitive Flesh,” sensation for Merleau-Ponty 
is able to play a part in the arrangement of our subjectivity because sensibility is 
internally related to our postural schema and the practical objectives it means to 
accomplish. Lingis writes that “the postural schema is not simply a diagram of the way 
all the parts are equilibrated: the body does not tend to a state of rest, but tends to 
maintain a state of tension centered in a particular direction.” This centering is directed 
by the body’s posture, “that is, the motile way the body centers and converges all its 
receptor surfaces upon an objective.”214 But we also cannot forget that the body “is itself 
a sensible being that continually schematizes itself, makes a gait of its movement, a 
gesture of its displacement, makes of each of its here-now particular configurations or 
positions into a posture or attitude maintaining itself or varying itself continuously.”215 
This means that the body’s rhythm remains always susceptible to the sympathetic and 
antipathetic physiognomies of its environment. 
For the most part, Merleau-Ponty regards sensing as an a amicable affair, the 
mutual completion of subject and object. He speaks of it, after Straus, as a “sympathetic 
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relation” with objects. “Apart from the probing of my eye or my hand, and before my 
body synchronizes with it, the sensible is nothing but a vague beckoning [une 
sollicitation vague]” (PP 214/248). Despite the fact that consciousness is “saturated” with 
the sensible, Merleau-Ponty insists that “the sentient and the sensible do not stand in 
relation to each other as two mutually external terms, and sensation is not an invasion of 
the sentient by the sensible” (PP 214, 215/247-248).216 The tireless influx of sensory 
stimuli is no affront to the subject’s sensibility, but rather an invitation to mutual 
animation. Sensation under this rehabilitated model is the primary mode of contact with 
being, neither completely active nor passive, and the means by which bodies originally 
respond to one another. 
Exactly what Merleau-Ponty means by sensation is perhaps best illustrated when 
he is writing about painting. The painter, unlike the scientist, is someone who foregoes 
the manipulation of objects and “returns to the soil of the sensible” (EM 159, 160/9, 12). 
Bypassing the formal and practical aspects of things, the painter tries to capture the birth 
of the thing by depicting the self-organization of its qualities and its “internal animation” 
(EM 182/71). This is possible, says Merleau-Ponty, because the painter’s body is 
“immersed in the visible” and can be used by the visible to give artistic expression to its 
many senses (EM 162/17-18). The painter is in the midst of a sensory environment that 
will direct his or her body’s affective and motor capacities, and so the painter must be 
willing to lend his or her body to the visible in order to communicate its nascent meaning. 
And this is precisely what painting is: it is the “transubstantiation” (EM 162/16) of the 
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sensible from the sensory field to the canvas, a process which is made possible by 
complicity of sensitive subject and sensible object.  
By situating the painter and painted on the same plane—namely, the visible—
Merleau-Ponty is able to collapse the distinction between art and nature, on the one hand, 
and the distinction between reality and representation, on the other. These distinctions are 
replaced by a general economy of sensation and expression, which is to say that sensation 
becomes for Merleau-Ponty the means by which the material and imaginary realms enter 
into communion. He cites Cézanne in “Cézanne’s Doubt:” “Art is a personal 
apperception, which I embody in sensations and which I ask the understanding to 
organize into a painting” (CD 13/22). To do this, the painter must become an articulation 
of the sensible, the mechanics of which are key to grasping Merleau-Ponty’s nondualist, 
nonrepresentational theory of painting. 
Central to his theory is the idea that painter and painted, the seer and the seen are 
of the same flesh. In “Cézanne’s Doubt,” there is a flesh of nature, whereas in “Eye and 
Mind” (which is contemporaneous with The Visible and the Invisible) it is the 
visible/sensible that defines this flesh. In both instances Merleau-Ponty wishes to 
demonstrate how subject and object participate in a “locus of reversibility”217 which 
allows them to work together to generate the aesthetic dimension of being. In the role of 
painter, the subject catches onto the rhythm of the visible and allows it to commandeer 
his or her body’s intentions and gestures. In this way, “the visible world and the world of 
my motor projects are each total parts of the same Being” (EM 162/17). It is this 
overlapping of seer and seen, this chiasm of visibility, that disallows us from positing a 
distinction between the interiority of the subject and the exteriority of the world. 
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To understand the act of transubstantiation carried out by the painter, the image to 
be rendered and the gestures required to render it must be seen as continuous with each 
other. There cannot be a gap between the sensible and its representation, for this would 
violate Merleau-Ponty’s doctrine of the flesh, which maintains the seer and seen are the 
two sides of a single visibility (EM 163/19-20). As Michael B. Smith says, “Merleau-
Ponty’s aesthetics of painting is grounded in a metaphysics of vision, and vision, in turn, 
in an ontological description of the body subject as a seeing seenness.”218 Vision is not 
something controlled by the viewer; it is not at first a form of thought, but rather 
“‘incited’ [excitée] to think by the body” (EM 175/51). For the painter, this thinking is 
embodied in the painterly gesture itself. The unique contours of the visible spectacle seize 
upon the painter’s body and, catching the painter in a circuit of immanence, induces that 
body to adopt a physiognomy that expresses the “carnal formula” of the object to be 
painted. This entire process is made possible by the reversibility of visibility or, more 
generally, the “duplicity of sensing” (EM 164/23, translation modified) which is the 
animating principle of both body and world.  
Sensing occurs neither inside nor outside the subject. It is a liminal event, and 
originarily responsible for the style adopted by the body and the aesthetic style of the 
painter. “Style is what orients and shapes in view of a revelation,” says de Waehlens.219 
Before it becomes a defining trait of an artist, or an object of reflection for the artist, it 
“germinates at the surface of the artist’s experience” (ILVS 53/66).220 The “exigency” of 
style is compromised by an overly intellectualized encounter with the sensible. 
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Intellectualism in philosophy and objectivism in art both eliminate the contingency of 
experience (PP 38-39/48-49) and thereby undercut its volatility. Our style is our manner 
of accessing the real or negotiating its rhythms. These rhythms are first received, as 
directives of sens, by sensibility; secondarily they become habits, gestures, clichéd 
expressions. The problem, for someone concerned with portraying their immediacy, like 
Cézanne, is to portray these directives as communicated to sensibility—“to make visible 
how the world touches us” (CD 19/33)—without imposing a form that is not given by the 
sensible itself. Instead, the style of the painting should reflect the immanent negotiation 
of subject and object that takes place at the level of “viscous, equivocal” appearance (CD 
17/30), rather than at the level of pragmatic manipulation.221 
It is Cézanne’s painting, argues Merleau-Ponty, which is exemplary in its attempt 
to render perceptual the “chaos of sensations” (CD 13/22). This is why his work is 
populated by figures which seem to be on the verge of breaking down or losing their 
form; or, on their way to metamorphosing into an altogether different figure. It attempts 
to bring to appearance what he refers to as the “unstable, and alien” element of “natural 
perception” (PP 225/260). Cézanne, says Merleau-Ponty, “wanted to depict matter as it 
takes on form, the birth of order through spontaneous organization” (CD 13/23). If this 
organization is to be truly spontaneous, and therefore not mediated by the artifices of 
technique or idealization, then Cézanne would have to develop a style that matched the 
immediacy of his theme: the emergent sensory order, or the world as it acquires its 
contours. “The outline should therefore be a result of the colors if the world is to be given 
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its true density. For the world is a mass without gaps, a system of colors across which the 
receding perspective, the outlines, angles, and curves are inscribed like lines of force; the 
spatial structure vibrates as it is formed” (CD 15/25-26). This conception of spatiality is 
antithetical to Kant’s in that it makes spatial organization a product of the sensory 
manifold, thereby locating the principle of animation in the matter, rather than the form, 
of perception.222 
How is the painter animated by the sensible? Like his or her chosen subject, the 
painter possesses a physiognomy that can adapt to the physiognomy or “motif” (CD 
17/29) of still-life objects, landscapes, the faces of others, etc. This motif, which is “no 
more than a combination of colors” (CD 16/27), provides the body of the artist with 
directives which initiate the creative event, “an event which grips [the] body, and this 
grip circumscribes the area of [sens] to which it has reference” (PP 235/272). Art is not 
first and foremost an act of symbolism. It is an affective response engendered by the 
body’s sensibility. The artist’s body “is an object which is sensitive to all the rest, which 
reverberates to all sounds, vibrates to all colors, and provides words [or lines, colors] 
with their primordial significance through the way in which it receives them” (PP 
236/273). 
Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of Cézanne suggests a distinction, but not a division, 
between sensation and perception. This is discernible in his remark that Cézanne breaks 
with the Impressionists by rejecting the latter’s attempts to “capture, in the painting, the 
very way in which objects strike our eyes and attack our senses.” This attack, he says, 
occurs at the level of “instantaneous perception” (CD 11/19) and appears as the “chaos of 
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sensations” mentioned above. The Phenomenology of Perception also implies that 
sensation is part of perception, but distinguishable from what is ordinarily perceived—
whole objects projected against a background and graspable by the body. “What is called 
sensation is only the most rudimentary of perceptions, and, as a modality of existence, it 
is no more separable than any other perception from a background which is in fact the 
world” (PP 241/279). Merleau-Ponty finds continuity (unlike Straus) between sensation 
and perception because he wants to avoid making the latter the “form” and the former the 
“matter” of experience. Phenomenologically, no such distinction exists. 
Despite his allegiance to the thesis that all consciousness is both directed toward 
an object and always projected against a horizon of meaning, Merleau-Ponty does 
concede that a nonintentional form of sensing exists, which he describes as “forever 
anterior to perception” (PP 238/275). This formulation opens a distinction between 
sensing and perception and points to an originary, prephenomenological encounter with 
the sensible. When Merleau-Ponty speaks of the anonymity of the body, it seems to me 
that it is this encounter—rather than a neutralized conception of embodiment—that he 
intends. Moreover, this conception of sensibility situates sensing on something like a 
transcendental level, or in “a kind of original past, a past which has never been present” 
(PP 242/280). It is into this original past that perception must reach in order to apprehend 
what is there to perceive. This is because, as Al-Saji argues, “perception lags behind 
sensibility—so that consciousness and being do not coincide, despite Merleau-Ponty’s 
claim in the ‘Temporality’ chapter [of Phenomenology].”223  
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There is, then, more than a distinction to be drawn between perception and 
sensation. Sensation and the prepersonal actually take precedence over perception and the 
personal on Merleau-Ponty’s model, even though he usually includes these disparate 
experiences in the image of perception as communion. There is a fundamental diachrony, 
or non-coincidence, at the heart of perception that breaks up its synchronization with the 
sensible. This diachrony is the work of sensation, the “‘primary layer’ of sense 
experience” (PP 227/262) “which at once grounds perception and assures its opacity and 
non-coincidence,” in Al-Saji’s terms.224 Upon this ground lie at least three other layers 
which comprise the perceptual experience. These are outlined in a discussion of hearing. 
Admittedly, these layers of sound are only identifiable once the unified 
experience of listening, say, to a piece of music is analyzed by reflection. After making 
this phenomenological point, Merleau-Ponty ventures to speculate about the 
multidimensionality of the sensation of sound itself: “there is an objective sound which 
reverberates outside me in the instrument, an atmospheric sound which is between the 
object and my body, a sound which vibrates in me ‘as if I had become the flute or the 
clock’; and finally a last stage in which the acoustic element disappears and becomes the 
highly precise experience of a change permeating my whole body” (PP 227/263). This 
describes the liminal nature of sensation—it “is between the object and my body”—and 
its capacity to subject the body to transformation. This transformation could manifest 
itself in dance, which is arguably the most obvious example of the body communing with 
its sensory environment. However, given Merleau-Ponty’s description here, we cannot 
posit the dance as primary. What comes first is the “objective sound which reverberates 
outside me in the instrument.” This reverberation reaches us in a highly complex 
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situation, against a background of noise and silence, and in principle could drown out this 
background by reaching an oppressively loud volume. That is, the sound is potentially 
hostile to the body and the body’s communion with its aural environment. This power 
results from the fact that its liminality places it outside the world as perceived: it is there 
whether anyone is there to perceive it or not. 
Since we never experience the pure reverberation of an instrument outside of an 
aural context, and yet Merleau-Ponty claims that this objective sound occurs in the 
instrument rather than in our ears, it is helpful to think of our perception of sound or any 
other sensation as delayed, as Al-Saji does. “We learn to perceive according to Merleau-
Ponty,” she says.225 The world possesses rhythms that solicit synchronization from our 
bodies; it challenges us with dissonant rhythms; it meets our bodies’ gropings with 
inconvenient designs and incapacitating rhythms. Our sensory environments are not 
always ergonomically advantageous: they contain sensations that are “alien” and 
“unstable,” but whose meaning we are nevertheless saturated by (PP 214, 215/248, 249). 
In a sense, perception “converts the elements of the sensory encounter into recognizable 
and representable identities” and effects a “transformation of the inherent ambiguity and 
intertwining of the sensory—a transformation that the sensory suggests but as a result of 
which it comes to be overlaid and forgotten qua sensory life.”226 On this reading, sensory 
life becomes the virtual dimension of perceptual life. Always beyond the reach of 
perception, but nevertheless serving as the “unreflective fund” (PP 242/280) that provides 
it with phenomenal content, the sensory life of the body must be seen as the anonymous, 
objective ground of any actualized perception. In Al-Saji’s words, 
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Perception may be a prospective actualization, but it is experienced as the 
discovery of what was always already there. It is this anteriority that makes 
objects appear real to us—our experience of their presence being given though 
their inexhaustibility and alterity. This inexhaustibility is due to the coexistence 
and non-coincidence of rhythms in sensory life, a life which at once constitutes 
the ground of perceptual experience while being irreducible to perceptual form. 
What allows the experience of anteriority to be more than an illusion for Merleau-
Ponty is that it relies on, and holds the trace of, a more original delay—that of 
sensory life as forever past with respect to perception.227 
 
So it is not so much that Merleau-Ponty subscribes to the view that there is an 
anonymous body subtending the historically and culturally inscribed body, but that he 
acknowledges a carnal sensibility which cannot be exhausted by consciousness. This 
sensibility is basic to the prepersonal identity of the body, and thus is constitutive of an 
“unconscious” dimension of subjectivity. Put otherwise, only a portion of what the lived 
body senses makes its way into perception, and even less becomes the object of 
reflection. When Merleau-Ponty writes that “Perception is always in the mode of the 
impersonal ‘One’” (PP 240/277), we have to take this to mean that perception is at every 
moment the renewal of the synthetic act228 which reaches into the past while projecting 
into the future in order to fix the object of perception before us. Perception is an “ever-
recurrent failure” [échec perpétuel] to hold onto what is given in sensation (PP 240/277). 
Perception apprehends a phenomenal field which is “never presented in any other 
way than integrated into a configuration and already ‘patterned’ [‘mise en forme’]” (PP 
159/186). Following Gestalt principles, this basically means that no sense experience 
happens outside of the horizon subtended by my personal intentional arc and the 
historico-cultural horizon in which I am always situated. However, this phenomenal field 
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cannot be identical to the field engaged immediately by the senses, for the latter is 
marked by a singularity which resists entry into the intentional horizon. Sensibility, then, 
remains bound to a prepersonal field wherein “each sensation, being strictly speaking, the 
first, last and only one of its kind, is a birth and a death” of the body which encounters it. 
Moreover, 
the subject who experiences it begins and ends with it, and as he can neither 
precede nor survive himself, sensation necessarily appears to itself in a setting of 
generality, its origin anterior to myself, it arises from sensibility which has 
preceded it and which will outlive it, just as my birth and death belong to a 
natality and a mortality which are anonymous. (PP 216/250) 
 
The carnality of the subject inhabits two distinct spheres, the practico-personal, on the 
one hand, and the sensual-impersonal, on the other. 
The tension between the personal and impersonal body is palpable in Merleau-
Ponty’s reluctance to disengage sensation from perception, and potentially allow the 
former to devolve into the formless data of the empiricists or the pure sensory manifold 
of Kant. This is why sensation appears sometimes as a rudimentary form of perception 
(thus guaranteeing its inherent form) and at other times as the transcendental condition of 
perception (which ensures Merleau-Ponty’s anti-idealist credentials). In the last analysis, 
Merleau-Ponty wants to maintain the primacy of perception while at the same time 
championing its irreducibly carnal dimension—which is clearly endorsed in his analysis 
of Cézanne’s painting and its ability to express the dialogue of physiognomies which is 
the body-world relation. By contrast, if there is a truly anonymous and preperceptual 
form of sensing acknowledged in the Phenomenology, then there is reason to suggest that 
the sensations undergone by the body’s organs house an a priori that is better depicted by 
 71 
the Impressionists, however speculative or nonphenomenological their aesthetic might 
be. 
As Merleau-Ponty tells us, Cézanne breaks with the Impressionists because the 
latter try to portray how objects strike our senses (CD 11-14/19-23). The Impressionists, 
then, are wont to paint what would be the pure a priori of perception, or sensation, 
whereas Cézanne’s painting exhibits nature as it emerges into an organized form. On this 
reading, the Impressionists would be the painters of the “non-thetic, pre-objective, and 
pre-conscious experience” that depicts “sensation as a private phenomenon” (PP 
242/279). It is this private sphere that is most problematic from the perspective of 
perception, which “The Primacy of Perception” determines to be a fundamentally 
intersubjective experience (PrP 17-18, 26-27/52, 70-71). As Merleau-Ponty writes in 
“The Philosopher and His Shadow:” 
The fact is that sensible being, which is announced to me in my most strictly 
private life, summons up within that life all other corporeality. It is the being 
which reaches me in my most secret parts, but which I also reach in its brute or 
untamed state, in an absolute of presence which holds the secret of the world, 
others, and what is true. (Shadow 171/215) 
 
Sensation, then, appears problematic because it harbors a form of solipsism. The touch of 
sensation opens the body to the world of objects, others, and communication. But in itself 
it cannot be represented or articulated. The problem of solipsism raised by the 
“aesthesiological” is resolvable only when it is assimilated to perception, for perception, 
writes Merleau-Ponty, “is never a matter of anything but co-perception. I see that this 
man over there sees, as I touch my left hand while it is touching my right” (Shadow 
170/215). As he will write elsewhere, perception is always already reversible. If there is 
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solipsism, then it must be wrested from the intersubjective sphere and therefore no 
solipsism at all. 
Merleau-Ponty’s entire critique of sensation derives from the observation that we 
do not really encounter much of what the classical empiricists and rationalists say we do. 
For the most part, he is right: we do not perceive sense impressions or sense data. We 
perceive things. Against classical theory he claims that we only arrive at the 
imperceptible through analysis, which must necessarily begin with the perceptible. This 
may be true phenomenologically, but it does not foreclose the possibility that, 
ontologically speaking, perception is a derivative experience, subtended by a more 
rudimentary form of embodiment. 
Merleau-Ponty acknowledges the existence of imperceptible encounters with things, which is 
why I think the realist strand of his analysis of sensing supports the thesis that perception derives 
from the transitive form of sensation. When he speaks of the sound reverberating in the 
instrument before it reaches the ears of the listener, he acknowledges the primacy of a liminal 
sensory atmosphere: here lies the anonymity of sensory experience that saturates our bodies and 
cannot be recuperated by the subject-object dialogue. The concept of flesh develops this 
anonymous sensibility into a general theory of carnal being. 
The flesh (la chair) radicalizes insights from the Phenomenology by replacing its 
residual subject-object dualism with a monistic account of the sensible. Our bodies and 
the bodies of others (humans and nonhumans) are said to only achieve full expression 
through the co-constitutive dialogue of perception. This dialogue is made possible 
because both subject and object belong to a common “element,” the sensible as such, or 
the flesh. It is this element that brings together while at the same time separating the 
poles of perception: “the thickness of flesh between seer and the thing is constitutive for 
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the thing of its visibility as for the seer of his corporeity” (VI 135/178). The separation of 
bodies, then, is derivative of the fundamental narcissism at the heart of the sensible. In 
The Visible and the Invisible, it is no longer perception that gives birth to discrete objects, 
but the so-called dehiscence (écart) of the flesh. Dehiscence is the name Merleau-Ponty 
uses to describe the fission of the sensible into sentient body and sensible world; it 
denotes the coiling back or enfolding performed in vision: 
[The flesh] is the coiling over of the visible upon the seeing body, of the tangible 
upon the touching body, which is attested in particular when the body sees itself, 
touches itself seeing and touching the things, such that, simultaneously, as 
tangible it descends among them, as touching it dominates them all and draws this 
relationship and even this double relationship from itself, by dehiscence or fission 
of its own mass. (VI 146/191-192) 
 
At bottom, it is the dehiscence of flesh that constitutes my body as an individual that 
senses (VI 140/185) and can assume a distance from what is perceived. Since 
individuation results from the separation (écart) of the flesh understood as a single 
element, it entails a kind of reversibility between bodies. At the crossing where 
reversibility occurs, “perception is born” (VI 154/202). 
By “reversible,” Merleau-Ponty means that at any moment the one who sees can 
become the one seen, or the one who touches can become the touched. The possibility of 
a passive body becoming active or an active body becoming passive is immanent to 
embodiment as such. He holds that the reversibility of the sensible is analogous to what 
happens when I touch my left hand with my right. This is the narcissistic element of the 
flesh: “the seer and the visible reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees 
and which is seen” (VI 139/183). Sensing is here attributed not to individual subjects who 
exist apart from their worlds, but to the flesh as a substance that divides itself into 
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sensible and sentient beings.229 Thus, sensing takes on less humanistic form. Merleau-
Ponty explicitly points out that the presumed reversibility of sensible and sentient is 
always imminent, never accomplished (VI 147/194). In other words, my left and right 
hands cannot both be touching each other at the same time; one of the pair must play the 
role of passive object while the other actively senses. More generally, sentient/subjective 
and sensible/objective never fully synchronize. 
The impossible coincidence at the center of reversibility is, in part, a product of 
the analogy of self-touching employed by Merleau-Ponty. It does not seem to apply to 
what we typically consider an intercorporeal relation, however. Nor does it apply 
universally to sensing. For instance, smelling, tasting, and hearing do not bear the kind of 
symmetry necessary for reversibility. Sure, I can be smeller or smelled, but the scent that 
invades my nose is in no position to take in my scent. The same could be said of a taste or 
sound. These sensations are more invasive than the tactile and give us a good idea of the 
basically irreversible or dissymmetrical nature of sensing. Something like a handshake, 
by contrast, appears to offer a better analogy for reversibility.230 But even the handshake 
proves irreversible—perhaps it is exemplarily irreversible—since the strength and 
delicacy of the persons shaking will most likely be disproportionate. This is why Beata 
Stawarska argues that the flesh performs a “massive reduction of the specifically 
intersubjective experience of the body manifest in an encounter with another embodied 
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person to the corporeal dynamic operative within the body proper.”231 Self-touching 
offers us a helpful image of reflection, but not an accurate account of the intercorporeal 
encounter. 
The experience of the handshake illustrates that intercorporeal touching and self-
touching maintain a basic difference. The handshake exhibits an exchange of sensations 
that is not present, in the case of self-touching, when I shift my attention and convert my 
touched hand into the hand doing the touching. As Stawarska writes, “What distinguishes 
the intercorporeal relation from the intracorporeal one is that the passivity of my hand 
touched by the other—unlike the passivity of my hand that I touch—cannot reverse into 
an activity (of touching) for me, even though I can respond to the other touching me by 
touching them in turn.”232 The idea that bodies are reversible assumes that any passive 
relation is potentially convertible into an active relation, even if this reversal is an 
impossible one.233 (Torture and death are exemplary here.) Such a presupposition 
effectively neglects a fundamental feature of violence: the bilateral nature of the 
sensations exchanged. Bilateralism is precisely what makes intercorporeity irreversibile. 
Rewriting the Cartesian cogito, Merleau-Ponty argues that the subject is an “I 
can” [“je peux”] before it is an “I think” (PP 137/160). But this formulation is only 
partially true, because the subject is also equally an “I can’t,” a perpetually constrained 
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actor whose abilities cannot be privileged over its inabilities. Nowhere is this more 
evident than in the disabled body or the corpse. If the subject, on Merleau-Ponty’s model, 
is to be identified with the body in all of its materiality (not just the body insofar as it is 
animated by an incorporeal consciousness or mind, i.e., the lived body), then each of the 
body’s manifestations must be taken into consideration when embodied subjectivity is in 
question. Moreover, the intercorporeal relation cannot just be the site where perception is 
born. It must also serve as the site where perception disintegrates. 
Merleau-Ponty does not completely neglect the reality of violence; he at least 
recognizes the inherent vulnerability of the body in the face of the other. Not unlike 
Sartre, who theorizes the gaze of the other as an instrument of objectification or seizure, 
Merleau-Ponty considers how the presence of the other entails a conflict of 
interpretations where the truth of the object is concerned (PrP 18/53). Just as I do, the 
other seizes his or her grip on objects and appropriates them in the system of holds that 
make up their own practical horizon. My body, too, can be seized by perception. 
Merleau-Ponty speaks of a “passive vision…as in the case of a dazzling light,” wherein 
perception is rendered incapable of making sense of what is seen (PP 315/364). He 
recognizes the impact of pain and fatigue on our capacity for action (PP 441/504; SB 
189/204). Ultimately, he will define the freedom of the body negatively as “tolerance” of 
institutional and physical stimuli, thus eschewing the ideal of a pure subject who remains 
invulnerable to material forces (PP 454/518). 
In order to accurately portray intercorporeity (especially its violent form), a strong 
notion of irreversibility or alterity must be provided. This does not mean that reciprocity 
should be deemed impossible between bodies (which seems to be implied in Levinas’s 
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ontology, as we will see in Chapter 3). What we need is a model that allows bodies a 
distance from each other, but also enables them to exchange a common currency and 
participate in a common economy. I think we can understand sensations as providing this 
currency. Moreover, I think Merleau-Ponty noticed this possibility. It is present in his 
recognition of sensation as the past that never presents itself to perception; it is there in 
his acknowledgement of the affective quality of sensing (PP 53/65). These are the 
moments of divergence and diachrony in Merleau-Ponty, places where he rejects the 
happy alliance of body and world. The dehiscence of the flesh, what Hass calls the 
“constitutive difference in the fabric of experience,”234 offers another form divergence. 
But if it is not the work of perception, then the mechanism of this folding of the sensible 
remains a metaphysical mystery. In the Phenomenology it is time that drives the 
dehiscence of being, but time is conceived there as “born of my relation with things” (PP 
412, 426/471, 487, translation modified). Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy does not 
provide us with a metaphysical explanation of dehiscence or an adequate account of how 
bodies are individuated from out of the singular flesh of being.235 
Merleau-Ponty acknowledges that the (real or apparent) gap between entities 
never reaches closure; that is, reversibility is “always imminent” (VI 147/194). 
Nevertheless, his analyses most often suggest the possibility of convergence: the subject 
is always on the way to better understanding the object; the left hand is always on the 
verge of touching instead of being touched; perception is perpetually on its way to 
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expression.236 This faith in reversibility effectively misrepresents, once again, the 
intercorporeal relation by mitigating the volatility introduced by the transcendence of the 
other. Levinas would say that Merleau-Ponty’s ontology ultimately reduces the other to 
the same and that reversibility denotes a relation whose “terms are indifferently read from 
left to right and from right to left” and which has been reduced to a “simple correlation” 
(TI 35/5). 
Levinas’s charge is a bit hyperbolic in the case of Merleau-Ponty since the latter’s 
treatment of intersubjectivity cannot be reduced to a simple correlationism and, indeed, 
actively works to overcome such a reduction. He does, however, tend to subordinate what 
Levinas calls the “enigma of sensation-feeling [l’énigme sensation-sentiment]”237 to the 
competent grasp [prise] of perception. Merleau-Ponty writes: 
my body, as the system of holds on the world, founds the unity of the objects 
which I perceive, in the same way the body of the other…tears itself away from 
being one of my phenomena, offers me the task of true communication, and 
confers on my objects the new dimension of intersubjective being or, in other 
words, of objectivity. (PrP 18/53) 
 
The world is not what eludes my grasp; the other is not what threatens my subjectivity. 
Both of these offer possibilities for being because they belong to the phenomenal field 
which is open before me and essentially synchronized with my body’s practical horizon. 
Between seer and seen there is “an intimacy as close as between the sea and the strand” 
(VI 130-131/173).238 
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The ideal of reversibility fails to notice that sensation, even in Merleau-Ponty’s 
own terms, is precisely what cannot become phenomenal if phenomenality is 
synonymous with perception. Sensation remains forever out of step with the unfolding of 
perception; it is the dark side of visibility and ideality, what gives birth to perception and, 
perhaps, what accounts for its disintegration. 
If we are going to talk about the centrality of the body, then it is necessary to 
attend to every aspect of its environmental sensitivity, the physiological as well as the 
phenomenal, insofar as this sensitivity gives rise to the corporeal structures that inform 
the contours of our perceptual and practical engagements. A neglect of the autonomy of 
sensation, by which I mean the sensible events which take place below the level of 
intentional consciousness and which remain “unstable” and “alien” (PP 225/260-261)239 
can only hinder a philosophy that seeks to overcome the conceit of an idealism which 
refuses to recognize the corporeal dimension of subjectivity, freedom, and responsibility. 
Despite whether sensation is a viable phenomenological concept or not, it is necessary to 
conceptualizing embodiment. And we risk misconception when we overemphasize the 
constitutive activity of the subject, or when we reject its susceptibility, incompetence, 
disintegration, and mechanical or autonomic240 responses.  
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Merleau-Ponty’s privileging of perception entails a misrepresentation of how the 
body’s identity is informed by its sensory environment. He endorses the dialogical notion 
of identity offered by Cézanne. Though instructive, this view does not do justice to the 
irreversibility of sensation. The pixelated images of the Impressionists, by contrast, may 
offer us a better representation. Impressionism gives something like a snapshot of 
sensation; it captures the sensory event which, “strictly speaking,” is “the first, last and 
only one of its kind, is a birth and death” (PP 216/250). These images ring false from a 
phenomenological perspective, but this is because the latter eschews speculation, 
preferring to derive ontology from what is given to consciousness. For a philosopher like 
Merleau-Ponty—unlike, say, Hume—the chaos of sensation can only be hypothesized 
from the more coherent world of perception, which is why he favors Cézanne over the 
Impressionists. But once again, Cézanne is a painter of reversibility, of sensing taken as 
an amicable dialogue. He bypasses the immediacy of sensation. 
One of the problems here is to theorize the distance between bodies without 
succumbing to the allure of absolute transcendence, as Levinas does. Failure to concede 
the continuity or immanence of the intercorporeal realm results in a failure to capture the 
demands communicated directly to the subject by the sensory environment. A notion of 
sensible directives or immanent imperatives is crucial to understanding the emergence of 
the body’s competence and integrity. There are solicitations issued by the environment 
that the body must respond to in order to effectively adapt. Thus, they are more than mere 
solicitations: they are imperatives.241 Sometimes these responses are pleasurable, 
sometimes painful. They can end in bodily obliteration, which is an extreme form of 
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incompetence but nonetheless a form of responsiveness. Merleau-Ponty appreciates this 
to some degree, but he mitigates the imperceptible quality of sensation, its objective 
power, and pathologizes the vulnerability of the body. The tension between sensation and 
perception, which is clearly evinced in excessive or limit situations that threaten the 
coherence of perception and the organizational capacity of the body’s schemata, is passed 
over in favor of a more sympathetic reciprocity or the ideal of “maximum 
clarity”/“optimum balance” in perception (PP 318/367).242 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy has the virtue of being grounded in the carnality of 
life, and it does so without submitting to physicalism. Indeed, the depth of his 
phenomenological descriptions are borne out of the concrete practices of the self as it 
engages other bodies, human and nonhuman. The ontogenetic narrative Merleau-Ponty 
tells about the subject’s embodiment, which is first and foremost a story of the body’s 
anonymity and passivity, is grounded in the sensitivity of the body, what we could call its 
carnal sensibility. This sensibility is at work in the sensuous communion of subject and 
object in Phenomenology of Perception; it is at the heart of The Visible and the 
Invisible’s notions of flesh, chiasm, and écart; and it is crucial to the psychogenesis of the 
child in “The Child’s Relations with Others” and his analyses of Cézanne’s style of 
painting. The problem we are left with is how to disengage the notion of carnal 
sensibility—which is anonymous and productive of the body’s organizational capacity 
rather than its product—from the intentional structure(s) of perception. Only after 
sensibility is differentiated from perception can we understand both the passivity of the 
body and its nonintentional responsiveness to sensations, that is, its obedience to the 
immanent directives embedded in the environment. 
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Reading Merleau-Ponty, it is easy to get the impression that the body is operating 
as a tool or prosthesis of consciousness, rather than as a post-Cartesian surrogate. This is 
because he sometimes speaks of perception or consciousness as though they were not 
identical to the body: “Consciousness is being-towards-the-thing through the 
intermediary of the body” (PP 138-139/161). In his more radical formulations we are our 
bodies, nothing more. Establishing a nonreductive version of this identification of self 
and body is the most promising prospect of working through Merleau-Ponty’s ontology.  
To overcome modern dualism, it is necessary that he collapse consciousness and 
body. If we are going to avoid conceiving the body as merely a vessel for the mind or 
consciousness or perception, there cannot be any mysterious elements of subjectivity or 
suspicious gaps between subject and world. This means emptying transcendence from 
ontology, something Merleau-Ponty only begins to accomplish in his unfinished later 
work. The challenge is formulated by Deleuze in Pure Immanence when he says that 
“consciousness becomes a fact only when a subject is produced at the same time as its 
object, both being outside the field and appearing as ‘transcendents’.”243 In other words, a 
truly immanent ontology, like the one championed by the primacy of perception thesis or 
the ontology of the flesh, has to embrace an impersonal transcendental field, one free 
from the syntheses of a subject and the configurations of intentionality. 
Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of sensing in Phenomenology of Perception is the 
most promising concept upon which to develop an immanent conception of embodiment. 
Here we find a concept of sensibility that reverses the Kantian view which maintains the 
formality of the subject’s aesthetic faculty. Merleau-Ponty provides us with the means to 
envision sensibility as a kind of material transcendental. Recasting the continuities and 
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discontinuities of the intercorporeal relation in terms of sensations and affects, rather than 
perception or flesh, resolves many of the problems raised by Merleau-Ponty’s carnal 
ontology. Indeed, his reversibility thesis is more persuasive when we distinguish the 
sensible and perceptual life of the body, and restrict reversibility to the level of 
perception while assigning an irreducible alterity to sensing. 
The relation between perception and sensation has a double character. In one 
sense, these two activities are coextensive; in another sense, perception is the product of 
sensation, the latter serving as the “rudimentary” form of the former (PP 241/279). A 
tension between the impersonal, nonintentional layer of experience (sensation) and the 
personal, intentional (perception) arises at this point. If perception is given primacy in 
this tension, then experience must be always regarded as organized by the telos of our 
intentional arc. By the same token, if sensation is cast as the most basic form of 
perception, it can only appear as phenomenal and, in some sense, coordinated by the 
subject. But certainly there are sensations received by the body (what Leibniz would call 
petites perceptions)244 that are never elevated to the level of consciousness and remain at 
the level of proprioceptive information.245 Merleau-Ponty insists that every perception 
has something anonymous about it and that this is linked to the body’s habits and 
schemata as well its “unsophisticated” (i.e., sensory) life (PP 238/275). Therefore, to 
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delimit the sensory life of the body and see how it functions transcendentally for 
perception, it is necessary to remain open to speculation about the “impersonal ‘One’” 
(PP 240/277) whose sensations condition the perceptual life of the phenomenological 
subject. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETICS AND THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF THE BODY 
 
 
Even when unformed, or deformed, by knowing, 
sensible intuition can revert to its own meaning. 
– Levinas, Otherwise than Being 
 
 
In Levinas’s philosophy of the body we find an explicit commitment to the primacy of 
sensation that is only implicit in Merleau-Ponty. Levinas’s analyses of embodiment 
display a marked interest in the materiality of the subject, which is most evident in his 
remarks about sensation and the affective life of the I, as well as in his critique of 
intentionality and opposition to phenomenological method. In his early texts Existence 
and Existents, Time and the Other, and Totality and Infinity this materialism appears 
through an ontogenetic account of the emergence of subjectivity; later, in Otherwise than 
Being, it is via accounts of sensibility and vulnerability that we find Levinas defending a 
materialist ontology. It is in the later work that Levinas’s emphasis on the vulnerability of 
the body—i.e., its susceptibility to wounding—goes too far in its appreciation of the 
reality of violence. The enabling aspects of the body-world relation are overshadowed by 
the exigency of violence that Levinas sees as basic to intersubjectivity. Here I will not 
rehearse the drama of the same and the Other (autrui)246 which dominates Levinas’s 
ethics, but I will reinscribe Levinas’s phenomenology into the discourse of ontology and 
focus on the significance of sensation in this ontology. This is admittedly an heretical 
reading of Levinas, but one that is not forced upon him. 
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Levinas is not the first person invoked when the philosophy of the body is up for 
discussion. His exploration of embodiment is not as broad as Merleau-Ponty’s; it is 
certainly less direct. To unpack Levinas’s ontology of the body the theme must be 
approached obliquely through his treatment of concepts like sensibility, alimentation, 
fecundity, living from, and enjoyment. These concepts and others fall into line with 
Levinas’s general concern with affectivity. As does sensation: following Merleau-Ponty, 
Levinas affirms sensation as basic to embodiment and the constitution of subjectivity. He 
goes further than Merleau-Ponty in pursuing sensation as a transcendental phenomenon, 
however. His analyses of sensation and sensibility try to fully appreciate the primacy of 
sensation and, in particular, its materiality.247 
Claiming that Levinas is engaged in ontology is contentious because so much of 
the force of his philosophy operates as an evasion of ontology. This is because he regards 
ontology as fundamentally violent toward beings in their singularity. Instead of 
approaching beings as unique individuals, ontology subsumes, or “totalizes,” their 
uniqueness under a general system, thus reducing their otherness. To avoid this violence, 
Levinas consistently argues that ethics, rather than ontology, is first philosophy. This 
means that we maintain a peaceful, responsible, and heteronomous relation to the Other 
which is prior to our representation or understanding of him or her. Civil discourse forms 
the basis of the community of knowers, and therefore is the condition of possibility of 
any theory of being or epistemology (TI 72-77/44-49).248 
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The thrust of Levinas’s argument depends on a particular construal of ontology. 
Levinas can assign a priority to ethics only if he understands ontology as an 
epistemological endeavor. It is only if he construes discourse as basically an 
expressive/revelatory affair, and ontology as a theory of our knowledge of being (and the 
being of Others), that he is able to claim the ethical relation—which is, at bottom, a 
relation between beings—as a non-ontological condition.249 He writes in Totality and 
Infinity about how ontology “reduces the other to the same” by making the Other appear 
through a “third term, a neutral term, which is itself not a being” (TI 42/12). This third 
term, through which the “shock of the encounter of the same with the other is deadened” 
is the theory of being, or ontology understood as a system of knowledge about being. 
Prior to any conceuptualization of the Other, Levinas argues, is the “calling into question 
of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other,” or ethics (TI 43/13). But is not this 
calling into question an event that requires us to understand its conditions and terms? 
That is, is it not necessary for us to comprehend the constitution of the subject and the 
Other in order to realize the force of ethics? 
I think Levinas’s critique of ontology is strongest when it is seen as an internal 
critique of prior ontologies, rather than as an evasion of ontology. Moreover, it seems that 
Levinas’s position would be strengthened if he would allow that what he calls ethics is 
actually endemic to ontology. On this reading, our understanding of ourselves, Others, 
and our basic relationality would be seen as at least equiprimordial with, if not prior to, 
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our ethical responsibility.250 This reading gains plausibility when we consider that it is 
not possible to see what is “called into question” by the Other until we have laid bare the 
constitution of the egocentric subject—the individual who cultivates a life of enjoyment 
and material security. 
An understanding of the ontology that informs Levinas’s theory of the subject is 
essential for contrasting Levinasian and Kantian ethics.251 It is through a rejection of the 
Kantian subject as an immaterial agent that Levinas is able to make his case for the 
vulnerability of the subject and, consequently, the ethical responsibility entailed in that 
vulnerability. Levinas argues in Existence and Existents that the Kantian subject, the 
transcendental ego, remains always at a distance from the effects of the world. As that 
which allows things to appear and be apprehended by cognition, the Kantian ego presents 
“a way of relating to events while still being able to not be caught up in them. To be a 
[Kantian] subject is to be a power of unending withdrawal, an ability always to find 
oneself behind what happens to one” (EE 42/77). The Levinasian subject, by contrast, is 
caught up in, produced as an “ontological event” by the world. Indeed, the entirety of 
Existence and Existents can be read as the tale of the subject’s emergence from bare 
existence, the taking up of a “position” in what Levinas calls the il y a (EE 66-67, 88/120, 
149; TI 175/149). This positioning is the material substantialization, or “separation,” of 
the subject, which is recounted in Totality and Infinity in terms of the body which enjoys, 
nourishes, and “lives from” (vivre de) the world: “Enjoyment accomplishes the atheist 
separation: it deformalizes the notion of separation, which is not a cleavage made in the 
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abstract, but the existence at home with itself as an autochthonous I. The soul…dwells in 
what is not itself, but it acquires its own identity by this dwelling in the ‘other’” (TI 
115/88). At bottom, it is the “invulnerability” of the subject—interpreted as an 
untraversable distance separating subject and world—in the face of affection that Levinas 
objects to in Kant.252 It is in this context that Levinas will highlight the affectivity, and 
ultimately the a priori vulnerability, of the subject. 
The story of the emergence of the embodied subject, especially in Totality and 
Infinity but in other texts as well, is guided by the concept of enjoyment (jouissance). It is 
precisely the being that enjoys life—and is individuated as a responsive agent by this 
enjoyment—that is summoned by the Other to respond. So what does it mean to enjoy, 
then? The analysis of enjoyment is wrapped up with companion concepts like living 
from, nourishment, alimentation, and need. These concepts possess physiological and 
phenomenological senses, both of which Levinas attends to. The scope of enjoyment is 
not restricted to what can be consumed, nor is it interpreted as a phenomenon that is 
exclusively attached to the practice of living, using, and doing. Enjoyment is what effects 
our separation and enables our manipulation of things; it conditions the 
economic/practical life that Heidegger sees as primordial to human existence.253 The 
content of this individuation, or independence, is primarily affective: 
One does not only exist one’s pain or one’s joy; one exists from pains and joys. 
Enjoyment is precisely this way the act nourishes itself with its own activity. To 
live from bread is therefore neither to represent bread to oneself nor to act on it 
nor to act by means of it. To be sure, it is necessary to earn one’s bread, and it is 
necessary to nourish oneself in order to earn one’s bread; thus the bread I eat is 
also that with which I earn my bread and my life. But if I eat my bread in order to 
labor and to live, I live from my labor and from my bread. (TI 111/83) 
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Sallis is too quick to reduce enjoyment to a consumptive form of alimentation when he 
characterizes enjoyment in the following way: “the determination by which to comport 
oneself to an object is to appropriate the object, that is, to cancel its otherness and affirm 
its sameness with oneself. As in eating.”254 This not only overlooks affective 
engagements with what could never be consumed (the elemental, the non-possessable), it 
also restricts the meaning of the alimentary. As we will see, alimentation has a much 
broader sense. 
Enjoyment is a phenomenon analogous to desire255 in that it feeds upon and 
produces itself, unlike need which is satisfied once its lack has been filled. Hunger, for 
instance, results from a privation of food, and when I eat my hunger subsides. The 
structure of nourishment which is displayed by enjoyment is of a different order than 
satiable hunger. Levinas’s treatment of enjoyment belongs to his general phenomenology 
of alimentation and his exposition of the concrete features of the interiority, or economy, 
of subjectivity.256 
Nourishment, as a means of invigoration, is the transmutation of the other into the 
same, which is in the essence of enjoyment: an energy that is other, recognized as other, 
recognized…as sustaining the very act that is directed upon it, becomes, in enjoyment, 
my own energy, my strength, me. All enjoyment is in this sense alimentation. (TI 111/83) 
 
To live is to enjoy life and to have that life nourished by the acts which make up living: 
sensing, knowing, imagining, and so on.  Each of these brings us an immediate joy that 
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feeds the egoism at the core of life (TI 112/84). And it is in this enjoyment that the “very 
pulsation” of the I occurs (TI 113/85). “Subjectivity originates in the independence and 
sovereignty of enjoyment,” says Levinas (TI 114/86). This conception of enjoyment is 
significant because it makes little to no appeal to the absolute transcendence which is 
often cited as the condition of possibility for subjective individuation.257 
Correlative with Levinas’s emphasis on the irreducible and absolute 
transcendence of the Other is an attempt to think the immanent production of subjectivity. 
This is evident in the language he employs to describe the movement of the subject in 
enjoyment. He speaks of the subject as “coiling” (enroulement), “folding back” (repli), as 
“spiral” (spirale) and “involution” (involution) (TI 118/91; EE 81/138; OB 73/92). 
Enjoyment is denoted as the “eddy of the same” (le remous même du Même) (TI 115/88). 
The imagery here suggests that Levinas is trying to conceive individuation without 
recourse to some external factor.258 It is true that the call to responsibility commanded by 
the Other singles me out, or individuates me as an ethical agent, but this can only occur 
once I have become someone capable of responding—that is, become a subject who can 
be subjected. Individuation and subjection can be equiprimordial, of course. But for the 
subject to be responsible and capable of substituting him- or herself in the place of the 
Other, which is precisely what Levinas wants to affirm of each one of us, must not the 
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subject already have something to give? That is, it seems necessary for the subject to 
have not only emerged as an individual, but to have also already acquired possessions 
which it can offer to the destitute Other, before it can be designated as a 
responsible/responsive being. There must be some form of subjectivity in Levinas’s 
thinking which is not a subjection to the Other. 
Levinas seems to be grappling with the problem of immanent individuation in 
Otherwise than Being when he writes that, 
Matter “materializes” in satisfaction, which, over and beyond any intentional 
relationship of cognition or possession, of “taking in one’s hands,” means “biting 
into….” It is irreducible to a taking in one’s hands, for it is already an absorption 
of a “within” including the ambiguity of two inwardnesses: that of a recipient of 
spatial forms, and that of an ego assimilating the other in its identity, and coiling 
in over itself. (OB 73/92) 
 
And a little further along, he remarks how “there is enjoying of enjoyment before any 
reflection, but enjoyment does not turn toward enjoyment as sight turns toward the seen. 
Beyond the multiplication of the visible in images, enjoyment is the singularization of an 
ego in its coiling back [enroulement] upon itself” (OB 73/93). What Levinas calls the 
“advent” of the subject from out of the anonymity of existence is not a movement of 
transcendence, but the taking up of a position through effort, labor, and the consequent 
enjoyment which results from these acts. As this enjoyment multiplies, it folds back upon 
itself and wrests the I free and gives substance to the individual (EE 81/138). The 
substance of this subject would be little more than the thickness or viscosity of its 
affective life.259 
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 Levinas’s apology for the primacy of affectivity and the sensuous life of the 
embodied subject operates as a response to a perceived deficiency in the 
phenomenological method devised by Husserl, in particular its principle of objectifying 
intentionality. It also continues his critique of the Kantian subject sketched above. 
Against these two figures, he attempts to rethink the subject as a material event, rather 
than as a transcendental ego that would be the condition of possibility for representing or 
giving meaning to events. Insofar as his philosophy attempts to supplant the privileged 
place of intentionality in phenomenology; as it attempts to install affectivity, alterity, and 
the like at the base of experience, Levinas’s philosophy works against phenomenology in 
the name of a materialist metaphysics. His interest in phenomenology comes less out of a 
desire to contribute to a science of phenomena than it aims to give a nonreductive 
account of events that could otherwise be explained by the physical sciences or 
recuperated by a representationalist epistemology. In a strong sense, Levinas’s critique of 
intentionality is an allergic reaction to what he sees as the hegemony of representation in 
phenomenological approaches to otherness (TI 122-127/95-100). 
Levinas’s objection to phenomenological method is straightforward: if the 
objectifying acts of theoretical consciousness, what Husserl calls meaning-giving 
(Sinngebung) acts, are our primary mode of access to things, then those things can only 
appear to us as representations whose content are predetermined by intentional acts. In 
short, phenomenology becomes transcendental idealism. The problem is that this kind of 
transcendental philosophy leaves no room for the kind of radical passivity Levinasian 
                                                                                                                                                              
a certain anonymity, and thus belong to no subject in particular. What is perhaps needed here is an analysis 
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ethics requires, and it fails to appreciate the ambiguity of the given (TI 123, 125/96, 97). 
“The ‘act’ of representation discovers, properly speaking, nothing before itself” (TI 
125/97). From the practical perspective, the subject who constitutes the content of its 
world through representations retains an identity that remains the same throughout all of 
its experiences. The spontaneity of its freedom to represent is never compromised by the 
objects to be represented. As Levinas says, “in representation the I precisely loses its 
opposition to its object; the opposition fades, bringing out the identity of the I despite the 
multiplicity of its objects, that is, precisely the unalterable character of the I. To remain 
the same is to represent to oneself” (TI 126/99).  
Levinas supplants objectifying acts of consciousness in the order of experience 
and installs sensation at the beginning. An analogous move is made by Merleau-Ponty 
when he places operative intentionality before intentionality of act. Levinas’s move is 
more radical, however, because it makes sensation discontinuous with perception and 
cognition. It is prior to intentionality of any form that Levinas situates sensibility. This 
means that our sensuous contact with what is exterior remains forever anterior to our 
representations. Our sensuous contact with the Other, as well as with matter and the 
sensible as such (the diminutive other), constitutes the transcendental in Levinas’s 
philosophy. This does not mean that Levinas must break completely with phenomenology 
in order to rediscover the force of sensation; in fact, he finds that “intentionality 
rehabilitates the sensible [réhabilite le sensible].”260 How so? Levinas points to the tacit 
dimension of intentional acts, or that which “consciousness sees without seeing.”261 This 
tacit dimension is not just the unintended horizon of unfulfilled intentions which 
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accompany explicit intentions, but is the very excess of intentionality which “is 
inconstestably akin to the modern conceptions of the unconscious and the depths.” There 
is then a reciprocal constitution at play in intentionality, whereby the object which is 
supposedly constituted by consciousness proves to contain more than its explicit 
constitution and this “more than” reveals itself as always already conditioning thought.262 
“A new ontology begins: being is posited not only as correlative to a thought, but as 
already founding the very thought that nonetheless constitutes it.”263 Levinas’s new 
ontology signals the “ruin of representation” and the decentering of the Kantian subject. 
Kant’s schema  requires an imperceptible layer of content that lies below the level of 
representation, but his transcendental method disqualifies the admittance of such a layer: 
The idea of a necessary implication that is absolutely imperceptible to the subject 
directed on the object, only discovered after the fact upon reflection, thus not 
produced in the present, that is, produced unbeknownst to me, puts an end to the 
ideal of representation and the subject’s sovereignty, as well as to the idealism 
according to which nothing could enter into me surreptitiously. A deep-seated 
passion is thus revealed in thought.264 
 
As the transcendental support of representation, the sensible and sensible qualities 
constitute the milieu in which the subject perceives. Totality and Infinity gives a lengthy 
description of this ungraspable milieu of things under the name “the element.” The 
element has no profiles, is a pure quality that we enjoy before we make categorical 
judgments about it (TI 131-133/104-107). As Sallis characterizes it, the element is 
“irreducible to a system of operational references” and “has its own thickness and 
density…[a]nd unlike the things that come to us in the medium, the medium itself is 
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nonpossessable.” “The depth of the element does not, as with a thing, conceal a series of 
other profiles that could be offered to various perspectives.”265 
Lover of ambiguity that he is, the element appears to be missing in Merleau-
Ponty. For Levinas, on the other hand, the element is the very locus of ambiguity; this is 
its value. The elemental/sensuous milieu “is privileged, because within it that ambiguity 
of constitution, whereby the noema conditions and shelters the noesis that constitutes it, 
is played out.”266 Levinas notes that Husserl wanted to designate the sensuous as 
objective, i.e., independent of subjective constitution, but that Husserl’s adherence to the 
primacy of intentionality prevents him from doing so. This is because intentionality 
“plays the role of an apprehension with regard to those contents upon which it bestows an 
objective meaning and which it animates or inspires.”267 By contrast, Levinas insists that 
we live through the objectivity of sensations and that Husserl recognized this too. We 
should say that the “materiality of sensations [matérialité des sensations]”268 is, 
borrowing Levinas’s own expression, lived from or enjoyed, never apprehended or 
grasped by the intellect. In addition to acting as a resistance to representational thinking, 
sensation would provide the aliment which gives birth to the subject who is capable of 
representing. Sensation, then, would not be an effect of the objective on the subject, but a 
“complicity” between the materiality of subject and object: “the corporeity of 
consciousness is in exact proportion to this participation of consciousness in the world it 
constitutes, but this corporeity is produced [produit] in sensation.”269 In Otherwise than 
Being this complicity is explored in Levinas’s analysis of sensibility and in terms of 
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“contact” with otherness, all of which contributes to Levinas’s transcendental aesthetics 
of embodiment.270 
The complicity in sensation between subject and object recalls Merleau-Ponty’s 
idea of sensing as communion. The key difference between the two thinkers, however, is 
that Merleau-Ponty sees this communion as synchronous, whereas Levinas recognizes it 
as the locus of vulnerability and diachrony. What is also lacking in Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding is the idea that corporeity is produced materially by sensations. In 
Merleau-Ponty’s subject-object dialogue, it is movement of perception and the posture of 
the body that is produced, whereas for Levinas sensation actually produces the body qua 
living, sensing, enjoying being.271 In biology there is a name for this process—
metabolism.272 For Levinas, sensing is a metabolic event. It is an intimate kind of 
transaction, beyond mere commerce or exchange. 
There is a distinct shift of emphasis in the analyses of sensibility given in Totality 
and Infinity and Otherwise than Being. In the earlier text Levinas concentrates in his 
narrative of the constitution of the subject on the enabling features of sensibility and the 
dependence of the body on the material environment. In the later text he tends to cast 
sensibility as that which leaves the subject precariously exposed to the outside and 
vulnerable to wounding. That is, a nonreciprocity is implied between subject and other: 
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the Levinasian body ultimately becomes a susceptible body, where susceptibility is 
understood as a radical passivity. In both instances sensibility is given a prereflective and 
prerepsentational role, and it is clear that Levinas understands it as prior to the emergence 
of objectifying consciousness. He affirms, following Descartes, the irrationality and 
ambiguity of sensation. And, like Kant, he separates sensibility from the understanding 
and relegates “matter” to a place beyond “the synthetic power of representation” (TI 135-
136/109). I will try to adduce in the remainder of this chapter Levinas’s “phenomenology 
of the sensible” (TI 136/109) and his divergent perspective on sensibility. 
Totality and Infinity ties sensibility to enjoyment, calling enjoyment the “essence” 
of sensibility. Conversely, sensibility is determined as the “mode of enjoyment” (TI 134, 
135/107, 108). Sensibility is therefore determined as a mode of affectivity or point of 
access for pleasurable and painful encounters. Its modality is undirected and sufficient to 
itself (TI 135/108-109), which means that it does not belong to the order of 
instrumentality that Levinas assigns to the economy of possession—the hand that grasps 
objects as tools/implements (as in Heidegger or Merleau-Ponty) or the mind which grasps 
objects as concepts (as in Hegel).273  Sensibility is neither a means to… nor in the service 
of…, despite it being basic to labor, work, effort, dwelling, and so on. Above all, it is an 
encounter with the otherness which is given through sensations and materiality, which is 
not for Levinas simply a question of resistance to action or opposition: sensibility 
establishes our relation to the elemental through our corporeal enjoyment of qualities (TI 
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136/109). This enjoyment is discontinuous with the synthetic acts of consciousness; it is 
not a stage toward representation, but a pulsating rhythm of the I; or, as Merleau-Ponty 
has put it, a mode in which the subject is born and dies as each instant (TI 136, 143/109-
110, 117; PP 216/250). 
Silvia Benso adduces the concrete form of this process: breathing. Breathing is a 
twofold process, inspiration and expiration. Inspiration and expiration, which are 
structurally equivalent to birth and death, embody the animation of the subject by the 
element. “Such an animation does not occur as the level of cognition, theory, or 
intentionality, claims Levinas. Rather, it is only possible at the level of the body, through 
an incarnation.”274 This interpretation of sentience disengages the body from its reliance 
on the soul by localizing the animation of subjectivity in the intercorporeal, rather than 
spiritual, realm. “The body thus is retrieved from its confinement in that Cartesian…order 
of materiality for which the body and the soul ‘have no common space where they can 
touch’.”275 
The pulsation of the I is supported by the sensible, but the sensible itself remains 
groundless, anarchic. The insecurity entailed in this anarchy is not a precisely a material 
threat, but a question of the temporality of the sensible. The sensible world “precedes me 
as an absolute of an unrepresentable antiquity” that is perhaps only apprehensible by 
imagining the total destruction of the world, an impossible thought experiment (TI 
137/111; EE 51/93). We cannot know from whence it comes or whether it will continue 
in the future. Its promise is precarious, without guarantee. 
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It is true that we always access the sensible in the present and, affective 
encounters notwithstanding, via representation. But “the represented, the present, is a 
fact, already belonging to a past” (TI 130/103). To apprehend the sensible as such would 
be analogous to encountering the il y a, bare existence, in its purity. Despite the 
impossibility of this feat—since we are always already caught up in a world of thought, 
language, perception—Levinas says that we do in fact come face to face with formless 
phenomena (TI 139/112). In Totality and Infinity he speaks of how our identities are 
haunted by the elemental and the insecurity this brings us,276 while in Existence and 
Existents he speaks of the horror of the il y a that we experience in the night. But how are 
these senseless phenomena revealed, that is, accessed phenomenologically? 
Existence and Existents traces the genesis of the individuated existent out of the 
anonymity of pure existence, being qua being. This anonymity, although not temporally 
prior to individuation, maintains an ontological priority over the subject who thinks, acts, 
and feels as a singular ego or person. On Levinas’s account, the existent breaks free from 
anonymity by taking up a position or assuming an identity—exerting itself against the 
indeterminacy of being. It is only when we make an effort through labor that a rift is 
created in being: “Effort is the very effecting of a present,” says Levinas (EE 23/48), 
because the fatigue which results from effort dislocates the existent from its synchrony 
with the uninterrupted duration of existence.277 As an affective (the experience of pain) 
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rather than reflective event, this retroactive movement awakens us to our interminable 
contract with existence; it is not an escape from existence: “Fatigue is to be sure not a 
cancellation of one’s contact with being. The delay it involves is nonetheless an 
inscription in existence…” (EE 25/51). We catch sight of our struggle with existence in 
insomnia as we seek, through what Levinas calls “vigilance,”278 to wrest ourselves free 
from the indeterminacy of the night.279 The insomniac experiences a wakefulness at night 
that contests the spontaneity of the will: he or she wants and wills sleep, but sleep will not 
come. Instead, “One watches on when there is nothing to watch and despite the absence 
of any reason for remaining watchful” (EE 61/109). It is as though, in the grip of the 
night, the restlessness of the insomniac’s body has extinguished the freedom of the ego. 
“I am, one might say, the object rather than the subject of an anonymous thought” (EE 
63/111). And this, says Levinas, is a horrifying condition (EE 55/98).280 
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The horror of existence is articulated with the insecurity bestowed upon our 
bodies by our sensibility, a condition which is warded off (for a time) in dwelling (TI 
137/110-111). In dwelling we shelter ourselves from the elements, and this sheltering 
offers the nourishment of enjoyment. We shelter ourselves because we are incapable of 
getting a hold on or containing the elements that, beyond a certain threshold, begin to 
deteriorate instead of nourish us. The themes of fatigue and effort found in Existence and 
Existents recur in the narrative regarding dwelling and possession contained in Totality 
and Infinity. The phenomenon of dwelling is elaborated against the backdrop of 
enjoyment, on the one hand, and the insecurity involved at the heart of enjoyment, on the 
other. 
Dwelling is an event of alimentation which gives rise to representation and, 
ultimately, possession of objects. There is more than one kind of alimentation involved in 
dwelling, some of them affective and some consumptive. In the home the subject takes up 
a position and takes refuge from the elements. Only after this position is established can 
labor be undertaken, and it is labor, for Levinas, that gives form to matter and produces 
the world of graspable/consumable things—possessions (TI 156, 157, 159/130, 131, 
133).281 “A subject does not exist before the event of its position. The act of taking a 
position does not unfold in some dimension from which it could take its origin; it arises at 
the every point at which it acts” (EE 81/138). Taking a position, which is a condition of 
laboring, is not yet acting, which is a transcendent movement. It belongs to the immanent 
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movement, or involution, of effort and fatigue. Positioning and dwelling are the concrete 
modes through which the subject comes to be situated in the objective world. They lend 
us a support from which to take hold of the elemental through labor (TI 158/131). Yet, 
this is the kind of support that must be constantly taken up, rebuilt, and maintained: a 
Sisyphean labor. 
Labor leads to possession and is guided by what Levinas calls the final causality 
of the hand. “Possession is accomplished in taking-possession or labor, the destiny of the 
hand” (TI 159/132).282 It is contrasted with the enjoyment of sensibility, which is 
characterized precisely by its nonpossession. Levinas wishes to designate possession as 
an ontological affair, but one which assuages the insecurity brought on by our exposure 
to the elemental: “Possession masters, suspends, postpones the unforeseeable future of 
the element—its independence, its being” (TI 158/132). Despite its attachment to 
ontology, however, Levinas refuses here to call labor a violence. This is because “it is 
applied to what is faceless, to the resistance of nothingness” (TI 160/134).  
All of this involves and influences the constitution of the body of the dweller or 
laborer. First of all, the hand is what substantializes things, traces their contours and 
draws them out of the pure quality of the element. Things are not first there, waiting to be 
given.283 Second, Levinas argues that the subject is originally influenced by its affective 
commerce with the element; it is “the product of the medium.” Life is the lived body and 
the body-effect, active and passive at once. This is not an endorsement of the duality of 
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the body, but of its “ambiguous” nature, which Levinas identifies with consciousness (TI 
165/139). Consciousness, he says, is not an incarnation, but a “disincarnation,” a 
“positioning of the corporeity of the body” which emerges in the “concreteness of 
dwelling and labor” (TI 165-166/140). Consciousness, then, arises out of the body’s 
pulsations in labor: the rhythm of labor, and the tension involved therein, give rise to 
consciousness. One is reminded here of Nietzsche’s remarks on the origin of 
consciousness in On the Genealogy of Morality, where the inhibition of our physical 
activity gives birth, in a folding back upon oneself, to the “internalizing of man”—
conscious reflection.284 Only after the fact of embodiment does representational activity 
become possible. Appreciating the ambiguity of the body’s relation with the other, 
Levinas writes: 
In its deep-seated fear life attests this ever possible inversion of the body-master 
into body-slave, of health and sickness. To be a body is on the one hand to stand 
[se tenir], to be master of oneself, and, on the other hand, to stand on the earth, to 
be in the other, and thus to be encumbered by one’s body. But—we repeat—this 
encumberment is not produced as a pure dependence; it forms the happiness of 
him who enjoys it. (TI 164/138) 
 
The body’s capacity to work on things acts as a consolation for its inability to rend itself 
from being; its consciousness relieves it from the physical realm, postponing the 
disintegration and death proper to it. Nevertheless, and at the same time, the body 
remains prey to the other which “paralyzes possession” (TI 170, 171/145). 
 Levinas’s prioritizing of sensibility over the grasp and comprehension works as a 
critique of Merleau-Ponty, in particular the latter’s insistence that our basic modus 
operandi involves an initial hold on things which increasingly converges upon an even 
better hold. While Levinas certainly appreciates that our practical relations with things, 
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our treatment of them as implements, is our primary means of handling the world, he 
likewise wants to remind us that below the equipmental and perceptual level lies the level 
of sensation. Sensation is not perception: perception belongs to the intentional sphere, the 
realm of consciousness, whereas sensation has a transcendental affective function that 
remains anonymous.285 “The very distinction between representational and affective 
content is tantamount to a recognition that enjoyment is endowed with a dynamism other 
than that of perception” (TI 187/161). Levinas realizes that such claims stretch the limits 
of phenomenology, but he aspires to a phenomenology of sensation nonetheless. His 
entire ontology of the sensible is built on his claim that the pure quality of existence is 
independent of us, anarchic, and ungraspable—and yet, it is given. There is no 
reversibility between us and the purely sensible because its exceeding of our 
representational and practical capacities leaves us vulnerable to its precarious future. At 
the heart of sensibility is a diachrony, or dehiscence, that interrupts the synchrony of 
body and world just as a caress of the skin defers the immediacy of contact.286 
In “Reality and Its Shadow,” one of his most sustained treatments of aesthetics 
and art criticism, Levinas argues for the diachrony of aesthetic experience. Here he is 
close to Deleuze in at least one respect: both thinkers see the effects of aesthetic 
“rhythm” as constitutive of aesthetic experience. For Levinas, rhythm is the means by 
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which we are affected, against our will, by the work of art. This affection, however, is 
different from that which we undergo when faced with the il y a, which Levinas says 
“lacks rhythm” (EE 62/111), suggesting that the pure encounter with being is basically 
outside aesthetics. Rhythm conducts the passive moment of sensing, the moment in 
which our active representation is converted into a passive reception: 
Rhythm represents a unique situation where we cannot speak of consent, 
assumption, initiative or freedom, because the subject is caught up and carried 
away by it. The subject is part of its own representation. It is so not even despite 
itself, for in rhythm there is no longer a oneself, but rather a sort of passage from 
oneself to anonymity.287 
 
This is applicable not only to music, but to poetry and painting as well. Rhythm is 
precisely that sensible content that detaches itself from the artwork and seizes upon our 
sensibility, bypassing consciousness, and folds us into the aesthetic event.288 “To insist on 
the musicality of every image is to see in an image its detachment from an object, that 
independence from the category of substance which the analysis of our textbooks ascribe 
to pure sensation not yet converted into perception (sensation as an adjective), which for 
empirical psychology remains a limit case, a purely hypothetical given.”289 
Apart from the figure and form of representational content lies the sensory content 
which informs the rhythm of the aesthetic. Granted, we may not apprehend the latter 
content phenomenologically. But that is just the point: the function of sensation is to 
affect sensibility directly and render the viewer/listener captive. This is why Levinas says 
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that sensibility is “realized only by the imagination.”290 Only the imagination can 
represent the aesthetic event which sensibility comes into contact with, i.e., pure 
sensation. Sensation is an interpellation, a kind of imperative that cannot be dodged 
because it operates immediately on the body, below the level of perception or 
apperception. Insofar as it engages us simultaneously at the level of perception and 
sensation, the aesthetic dimension operates diachronically. Since the sensory event is 
always happening behind the scenes, animating the present representation but never 
rising to the level of representation, it remains forever in the past.291 
Rhythm affects sensibility directly, as a “distinct ontological event.”292 Deleuze 
has argued a similar point about the effects of Francis Bacon’s painting. For Deleuze, 
rhythm is the “logic” of sensation, or what animates/unifies the senses and their discrete 
sensory experiences.293 This logic does not correspond to the physiological layout of the 
organic body, but rather it grasps the body “at the point where rhythm plunges into chaos, 
into the night, at the point where the differences of level are perpetually and violently 
mixed.”294 Because the body is not just an organized set of organs, but also an event (“at 
one and the same time I become in the sensation and something happens through the 
sensation…”)295 whose integrity is constituted by thresholds and limits, the body can be 
seen as organized by the sensations it receives or gives off. Deleuze speaks of how 
sensation is in the body and how the sensory event, rather than the stable form of the 
body, is what Bacon aims to paint: “what is painted on the canvas is the body, not insofar 
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as it is represented as an object, but insofar as it is experienced as sustaining this 
sensation.”296 In a sense, what Bacon paints is the “accumulation” of sensations that 
make up the identity of the body—its sensory fingerprint, so to speak. This fingerprint is, 
however, never fixed or properly personal: it belongs to the anonymous rhythm of the 
sensible and is always prone to the “violence” of sensations emitted by other bodies.297 
Taken together, Levinas’s and Deleuze’s analysis of rhythm allow us to glimpse a 
dynamic conception of identity. On this model, identity is constituted by the exchange of 
sensations between bodies. Corporeal identity, by the same token, is determined by the 
process of aesthetic exchange: bodies are delimited by the sensations they offer to and 
receive from other bodies. They are, as Spinoza has it, capacities to affect and be 
affected. Or, as Hume might have said, I am only the sensations which pass across my 
body. I, for instance, am little more than the sounds, smells, images, and so forth emitted 
from my body. We saw a similar notion of identity take shape in our discussion of 
Merleau-Ponty and style in chapter 1.  
The significance of this conception of bodily identity is ramified in Levinas’s 
work because he regards sensation as foundational. Levinas’s brief discussion of the 
“transcendental function” (TI 188-189/162)298 of sensation circles back to the analysis of 
enjoyment and testifies to the immanent constitution of the subject by its other. But we 
must always keep in mind that sensation, for Levinas as for Deleuze, is never just a 
matter of the “ambivalence” of feeling.299 With the explicit affirmation of its 
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transcendental function we see Levinas appreciating the force of sensation more than 
Merleau-Ponty.300 To do so, however, Levinas must venture outside of phenomenology 
and into metaphysics, affirming the reality of sensation not only as something that 
informs the content of cognition, but also as something that directly shapes the integrity 
of the subject. Sensation, then, names a fundamental, but not radical, passivity of the 
subject. (Radical passivity is proper to the human other for Levinas, because the human 
other is elevated to a quasi-divine status which renders their vulnerability unique, even 
sacred, and my responsibility for them infinite.)301 The subject, as a body, finds itself 
always already in a heteronomous position—affected and nourished by what is other than 
it. Its first receptivity is its sensibility; it lives from sensations which provide the 
alimentary content of its representations. This alimentary layer of sensation “recovers a 
‘reality’ when we see in it not the subjective counterpart of objective qualities, but an 
enjoyment ‘anterior’ to the crystallization of consciousness, I and non-I, into subject and 
object” (TI 188/162).302 Sensation here names the experience of the body in immanence, 
but an immanence which is constantly broken up by the tension between the temporality 
of the represented and the temporality of the sensed. 
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No one has appreciated the alimentary or enabling dimension of sensation more 
than Alphonso Lingis. In fact, Lingis goes so far as to defend the ethical valence of the 
direct force in sensation. Before any formal imperative imposed on the intellect by reason 
is the imperative we receive from the environment, which orders our bodies to adapt 
themselves to the contour of the land, the tool we take up in our projects, or the elements 
which envelop us.303 This contact with things is received as sensations which are 
assimilated into the posture of our bodies and, ultimately, our body schema. Or, to put it 
more radically, the body is schematized by the sensuous environment. Sensation and 
schematization name an identical process: 
The imperative in our environment is received, not on our understanding in 
conflict with our sensuality, but on our postural schema which integrates our 
sensibility and mobilizes our motor forces. It is received on our sensory-motor 
bodies as bodies we have to center upon things that orient our movements, bodies 
we have to anchor on the levels down which our vision, our touch, our listening 
move, on which we station ourselves and move in the heart of reality. It orders 
our competence.304 
 
Of course, we always negotiate with the layout of the environment as we make our way 
through it. But there is a sense in which our bodies are made to move in certain 
nonnegotiable (i.e., imperative) ways: reflexes and other autonomic responses, for 
instance. Levinas speaks of how the face of the other does not compel me to accept its 
solicitation after I have considered it: “In the proximity of the face, the subjection 
precedes the reasoned decision to assume the order that it bears.”305 Lingis finds this kind 
of subjection in sensation writ large, not just in the human face. In any case, these 
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responses cut straight to our sensibility and would be apprehended as pure sensations if 
our perception were not permeated by representations. This is the speculative point. We 
live from these responses because they enable our bodies to move through and work 
competently on the material world. However, we do not constitute them. And all of this 
because our bodies are immanent to, and in many respects dependent upon, other bodies 
like (animate) and unlike (inanimate) our own. Violins, animals, flowers, and people 
impress us with their sensuous content. 
  Immanence takes on a graver tenor in Levinas’s late major work, Otherwise than 
Being, or Beyond Essence. As Stella Sandford argues, “Both stress the corporeality of the 
subject as sensibility, but in Totality and Infinity the emphasis falls on pleasure, while in 
Otherwise than Being the keynote is suffering.”306 The heteroaffection307 of sensibility 
now becomes a kind of transcendental vulnerability and the animation of the subject is 
cast as the “body exposed to the other” (OB 69/87). The alimentary function of sensation 
which is apparent throughout Levinas’s exploration of dwelling and enjoyment in 
Totality and Infinity is displaced by a desire to articulate the way in which sensibility 
leads to the break up of identity, and is the means by which the subject is subjected to the 
diachrony of the sensible (OB 14-15/17-19).308 Levinas goes so far as to identify 
subjectivity with the vulnerability of sensibility (OB 15, 50, 54/18, 65-66, 70). This 
vulnerability is given a carnal form, the skin, but a phenomenological interpretation. 
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Levinas once again points to labor, fatigue, and effort to highlight the embodied 
aspect of subjectivity. But the exposure of the subject to the other is interpreted as 
obsession, pain, and the interruption of enjoyment. Corporeality “is the pain [rather than 
enjoyment] of effort, the original adversity of fatigue, which arises in the upsurge of 
movement and in the energy involved in labor” (OB 54/70). Levinas has replaced the 
originary enjoyment of labor with an originary suffering: “As a passivity in the paining of 
the pain felt, sensibility is a vulnerability, for pain comes to interrupt an enjoyment in its 
very isolation, and thus tears me from myself” (OB 55/71). It is difficult to discern 
whether enjoyment or pain takes precedence now, or whether they are equiprimordial 
modes of existence. For instance, Levinas says that, “It is with savoring and enjoyment 
that the analysis of sensibility will have to begin” (OB 56/72), but this does not mean that 
sensibility is originally savoring and enjoyment. Nor does this statement outweigh what 
he says in defense of the primacy of pain in Otherwise than Being. What is clear is that 
pain and enjoyment both belong to sensibility, which in either case provides the body’s 
first opening onto its other.309 
The immediacy and materiality of sensibility lends it its susceptibility. Levinas 
writes of how matter “materializes” in enjoyment and satisfaction, “which, over and 
beyond any intentional relationship of cognition or possession, of ‘taking in one’s hands’ 
[‘prise en mains’], means ‘biting into….’” (OB 73/92). The materiality of enjoyment can 
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then be correlated with the excess of meaning involved in alimentation.310 But, at the 
same time, what we are nourished by is what threatens the stability or integrity of our 
embodied being. The material which we come into contact with through our sensibility 
contains a basic ambivalence: it enables us, but remains perpetually capable of disabling 
us. Sensibility, as a form of contact, is the reversion of our grasp on things into our being 
grasped by them, a situation which can be described “in the ambiguity of a kiss” (OB 
75/94). This ambiguity cannot be equivalent to the reversibility that Merleau-Ponty sees 
in the handshake, because for Levinas the supposed imminence of reversibility is 
precisely what remains in question and precarious.311 It is as though the ambiguity of the 
kiss as well as the handshake is what short-circuits or prevents reversibility: one never 
knows whether the encounter is reciprocal or violent; both are equally viable possibilities. 
“[Sensibility]” writes Levinas, “reverts from the activity of being a hunter of images to 
the passivity of being prey, from being aim to being wound, from being an intellectual act 
of apprehension to apprehension as an obsession by another who does not manifest 
himself” (OB 75/95). 
Contact has a technical sense for Levinas and describes a precise situation. It is 
basic to the embodied form of the subject and it describes the “proximity of the other” as 
“the immediate opening up for the other of the immediacy of enjoyment, the immediacy 
of taste, materialization of matter” (OB 74/94). Contact likewise describes the original 
exposedness of sensibility to the other, that is, the transcendental aspect of 
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heteroaffection. The subject who enjoys and is born from enjoyment is always already 
enjoying the other as element, sensation, matter. Levinas gives contact/proximity a carnal 
signification: 
Sensibility—the proximity, immediacy and restlessness which signify in it—is not 
constituted out of some apperception putting consciousness into relationship with 
a body. Incarnation is not a transcendental operation of a subject that is situated in 
the midst of a world it represents to itself; the sensible experience of the body is 
already and from the start incarnate. The sensible…binds the node of incarnation 
into a plot larger than the apperception of the self. In this plot I am bound to 
others before being tied to my body. (OB 76/96) 
 
Proximity, then, is prior to the emergence of the subject who can represent or whose body 
is an “I can.”312 It opens the subject to the approach of the other, which arrives “as though 
from an immemorial past, which was never present, began in no freedom” (OB 88/112). 
Our contact with this transcendental past is embodied in the skin, which Levinas, 
sounding like Merleau-Ponty, calls “the divergency [l’écart] between the visible and the 
invisible” (OB 89/113). The skin is not a flesh in which each one of us participates, but a 
surface that at once keeps us separated and yet in contact. It is the liminal site, “the gap 
[décalage] between approach and approached,” where alterity is produced (OB 90/114; 
TI 26-27/xiv-xv).313 
The skin is naturally vulnerable because it is a permeable surface. As Rudolf 
Bernet explains, 
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Even a tight and thick skin has small and large holes that one can adequately call 
‘openings’. There are natural openings as well as artificial or forced openings 
called ‘wounds’. Natural openings are still subject, however, to being forced and 
wounded. The natural openings allowing for a passage and exchange between the 
inside and the outside of a body cannot prevent the violence of a traumatic 
intrusion or expulsion.314 
 
Levinas must have something like this in mind when he argues that sensibility is 
vulnerability and exposure to the other. Bernet goes on to point out that the singular 
nature of the skins involved in contact lend their quality to the intersubjective encounter, 
and help to determine whether the encounter is friendly or violent.315 The skin, or 
contact/proximity, cannot be deemed violent a priori. And if we are going to allow 
Levinas to say that the sensitivity of the skin—sensibility generally—is susceptibility, 
then this condition must be taken in an ambivalent sense. Above all it should be 
maintained that my exposure to the other equally enables and disables my body, and that 
a priori this exposure is neither painful nor pleasurable. 
I have tried to argue here that the aesthetic dimension of existence is foundational 
for Levinas’s ontology of the body. In fact, I would go so far as to say that aesthetics—
understood broadly—must be first philosophy for Levinas.316 The subject’s primary 
opening onto the other is the body’s sensibility—that is, its capacity to sense and be 
affected by the material it lives and dies from. Sensibility is the condition of possibility 
for enjoyment, and therefore a condition of possibility for ipseity, or selfhood. It is this 
ipseity which is interpellated by the Other and called into question. But this ipseity must 
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first be won through effort and labor before it can answer the call of the Other 
responsibly. 
We have also seen that for Levinas sensation has an affective dimension, as is 
connoted in the French sentir, but it is also a distinct ontological event. This event it 
marked by the passivity of the subject who undergoes the sensation, on the one hand, and 
the objectivity of the sensation which comes from the outside and directs sensibility, on 
the other. Levinas’s disqualification of the view that sensation is purely subjective, 
something that happens inside the mind, commits him to a form of ontological realism. 
Unlike Kant or Husserl, whose methodological commitments prevent them from 
speaking about what lies beyond the bounds of the phenomenal, Levinas is entitled to 
make claims about the noninentional/transcendental realm of sensation. He openly admits 
that these claims are metaphysical and beyond the phenomenological method. They are, 
however, not unintelligible: “This is the whole point,” says Sandford.317 
It is precisely because sensations come from outside that Levinas can characterize 
sensibility as vulnerability. Indeed, he requires this corporeal vulnerability in order to 
prioritize ethics before any other branch of philosophy. Or, as David Michael Levin has 
said, “The embodiment of the categorical imperative cannot be understood…until our 
way of thinking about the body undergoes a radical revision.”318 If sensibility were 
merely ambivalent, then the exigency of ethics would dissolve and ontology would once 
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again become first philosophy. Levinas would have us believe that our bodies are 
constantly under attack from the outside, and at times it seems as though he were arguing 
that intercorporeal encounters are essentially violent. He speaks of our openness to 
exteriority as “the vulnerability of the skin exposed, in wounds and outrage” and of 
sensibility as 
a nakedness more naked than that of the skin which, as form and beauty, inspires 
the plastic arts, the nakedness of a skin presented to contact, to the caress, which 
always—even, equivocally, in voluptuousness—is suffering for the suffering of 
the other. Uncovered, open like a city declared open upon the approach of the 
enemy, the sensibility, prior to all will, action, declaration, all taking up of 
positions, is vulnerability itself.319 
 
Like a faithful phenomenologist, Levinas notes that this susceptibility is not reducible to 
the physiological body’s causal relations. No, this susceptibility is a passivity “more 
passive than every passivity,” which is to say, a transcendental passivity. “It is the 
aptitude…‘to be beaten’, ‘to receive blows’.” “In vulnerability there then lies a 
relationship with the other which causality does not exhaust, a relationship antecedent to 
being affected by a stimulus.”320 
It is one of the virtues of Levinas’s analyses that they fully appreciate the reality 
of violence and the fact that an adequate account of alterity is needed in order to render 
this reality intelligible. A conception of alterity which acknowledges that some of our 
experiences do not submit to our representational capacities, that is, exceed what we can 
know or think about them, is required to explain the inevitable encroachment of death, for 
instance. Levinas writes in Totality and Infinity (224/199-200): 
The notion of a mortal but temporal being, apprehended in the will…differs 
fundamentally from every causality leading to the idea of the causa sui. Such a 
being is exposed, but also opposed to violence. Violence does not befall it as an 
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accident that befalls a sovereign freedom. The hold that violence has over this 
being—the mortality of this being—is the primordial fact.321 
 
There is no need, however, to accept that the susceptibility of the body is basically a 
vulnerability. Of course, it is that too. But it is also a capacity to be affected with joy or 
pleasure and to have the body enabled in its posture and kinaesthetic responses by the 
sensations it receives from the other. In short, the sensitivity of the body is a priori 
ambivalent. We can have this ambivalence while at the same time affirming the 
constitutive alterity of embodiment, as Merleau-Ponty does. “Merleau-Ponty,” writes Dan 
Zahavi, “can describe embodied self-awareness as a presentiment of the Other—the 
Other appears on the horizon of this self-experience—and the experience of the Other as 
an echo of one’s own bodily constitution.” For Merleau-Ponty, the Other can be received 
as such because its exteriority mirrors my own exteriority to myself. “The reason I can 
experience Others is because I am never so close to myself that the Other is completely 
and radically foreign and inaccessible. I am always already a stranger to myself and 
therefore open to Others.”322 It is not necessary for alterity to be a matter of pure 
transcendence—a transcendence, it must be said, whose alignment with humanism and a 
certain religious tradition excludes the nonhuman from ethical consideration323—for it to 
command ethical consideration. That our relation with otherness is ambivalent, and that 
we can be enabled as well as disabled by that which we rely upon for our very being, is 
enough to give us pause. 
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It is true that Levinas gives a richer, more complex description of alterity than 
Merleau-Ponty. As well, he does much, contra Kant, to give a corporeal form to 
subjectivity and, consequently, the ethical imperative. But in the process he sacrifices our 
actual experience of embodiment in the name of a transcendental responsibility whose 
foundation remains a hyperbolic claim about the vulnerability of subjectivity. This 
hyperbole respects the reality of sensation while at the same time betraying the plasticity 
of our sensibility. To avoid the ethical exclusivity of Levinas’s anthropocentrism, which 
is most pronounced in the moral privilege he grants the human others,324 and remain true 
to the ambivalence of our sensuous existence, it seems advisable for us to develop a more 
mundane or immanent form of the imperative, situating its force in the sensuous economy 
in which existents and objects interact. But first we need a conception of embodiment 
that avoids the excesses of both Merleau-Ponty and Levinas. That is, we need an 
adequate account of the plasticity of the body. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ON CORPOREAL PLASTICITY 
 
 
…we should try to discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, 
really and materially constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, 
energies, materials, desires, thoughts, etc. 
– Foucault, “Two Lectures” 
 
…sensation is the master of deformations, the agent of bodily deformations. 
– Deleuze, Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation 
 
 
The argument thus far has followed two main trajectories, one critical, the other 
productive. First, it has argued that the two visions of embodiment offered by Merleau-
Ponty and Levinas are inadequate for thinking how our bodies actually interact with the 
material world. Second, it has assembled evidence which suggests that both 
phenomenologists were cognizant of the function which sensation plays in the 
constitution of experience, Levinas perhaps more so than Merleau-Ponty. The precise 
function of sensation, and in particular its difference from perception, has been adduced. 
In this chapter I will build upon the analyses of sensation and sensing given by the 
phenomenologists as I develop a conception of embodiment that balances their 
competing views. In place of the reversible and susceptible bodies I offer the plastic 
body, whose dynamism is truer to the aesthetic dimension of existence and the 
transactional nature of intercorporeal encounters. 
 Methodologically, there is more than one way to elaborate and defend the body’s 
plasticity. Because plasticity is at work in poststructuralist philosophers like Foucault and 
Deleuze, and increasingly dominant in the work of embodied cognition theorists, a 
wholesale assault on the phenomenological body could be launched from a 
nonphenomenological camp. This could be construed as a clash between modern and 
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postmodern views of the body.325 Such a neat division, however, does not do justice to 
the degree of overlap which obtains between phenomenological and 
nonphenomenological treatments of embodiment. This is why I have chosen for my 
defense of plasticity to synthesize the insights of Merleau-Ponty and Levinas with a 
number of nonphenomenologists, from Spinoza and James to Mark Johnson and 
Catherine Malabou. 
It should be noted, however, that what I find most productive in the 
phenomenologists is not always what they produce from a phenomenological perspective. 
In fact, as I have argued in earlier chapters, it is often the phenomenological method itself 
which constrains some of the most fertile insights stumbled upon by Merleau-Ponty and 
Levinas. Oftentimes it is when these two thinkers are on the verge of transgressing the 
strictures of phenomenology that their thinking takes off in (metaphysically) interesting 
directions. 
 What does it mean for a body to be plastic and why is it necessary to conceive the 
body in this way? The term has a popular aesthetic sense and is now common currency in 
the discourse of neuroscience. But I first ran across the term reading William James, who 
writes in The Principles of Psychology that plasticity broadly “means the possession of a 
structure weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield all at 
once.”326 Plasticity not only provides a useful means of imagining the structure of the 
body, it also offers a means of thinking the dynamic integrity of the embodied subject. 
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Assuming, with Merleau-Ponty, that we simply are our bodies. This absolves us from 
positing a self-identical core of subjectivity which would remain untouched throughout 
any and all intersubjective (physical, social, cultural) engagements. In short, it gives a 
fully immanent version of subjectivity, and yet it does not force us to grant the body an 
indeterminate fluidity which would make it difficult to explain how stability emerges and 
is maintained. 
There are empirical and ethical reasons for favoring the plastic body over the 
reversible and susceptible bodies. First, the body disintegrates, decays, and dies. Its 
relation to other bodies—and sometimes to itself, as in the case of autoimmune 
disorders—is often violent, as I have argued. Innumerable examples of nonreversible 
situations can be given. These are defined by the powerlessness of human beings in the 
face of a materiality which exceeds them. As Ronald Bruzina expresses it, “human 
powerlessness is fundamentally that of being subject to structures around and within itself 
that are not of a human individual’s own doing.”327 A piano is pushed out a window and 
crushes someone on the sidewalk below. An airplane plunges into the ocean and is 
obliterated along with all of its passengers. These are situations wherein the bodies 
involved are not on the verge of reversal: the person on the sidewalk has no chance of 
becoming the crusher, nor will the piano become the crushed in this scenario. The airline 
passengers will be killed, their perceptual capacities extinguished, but the material reality 
which destroyed them will remain. Perhaps the perceptual situation is reversible, but 
asymmetrical bodily contact between bodies powerful and powerless is certainly not. Our 
                                                     
327
 Ronald Bruzina, “Method and Materiality in the Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity,” Philosophy 
Today 41, SPEP Supplement (1997): 131. Bruzina enumerates four primary modes of powerless, which are 
derived from our finite relationship to nature: object independence; exposure to accident; sleep and 
fainting; dependence on temporality. 
 123 
bodies, I would contend, sense this in themselves and build upon this sense when forming 
bonds with other bodies.328 
On the other hand, the body is a resilient thing. It resists disintegration by 
nourishing itself, defends itself from assault, and deftly assembles resources which enable 
it to postpone death. It clothes and shelters itself, devises means of repairing itself when 
wounded, and takes measures to prevent further wounding. It gathers these resources 
from its environment and from others; it is enabled by otherness just as much as it can be 
disabled by it. It is true that tragedy can befall the body at any moment, so it is indeed a 
susceptible entity. But the threat of violence cannot be the ground upon which the body is 
defined as a body. It is much more than a passivity: it preserves itself and pushes itself to 
become more powerful; it adapts and evolves, yes, but it also destroys and gives form. 
These are Nietzsche’s lessons.329 That the body is threatened by violence and prone to 
disintegration, but at the same time enabled by what resists its efforts and movement, 
leads us to consider the ethical import of its plasticity. 
A body whose integrity is plastic is determined by its thresholds. This means, as 
we saw with Merleau-Ponty’s notion of style, that its identity is constantly shifting and 
constituted by temporary, fragile relations. These shifts can be induced by a breakdown 
in the body’s own maintenance or by pressures exerted by an external force. In both cases 
what gets compromised is an alliance maintained between a collective of bodies 
functioning together as a singular body (friendship, neighborhood, soccer team) and 
working together to reciprocally determine each individual body’s identity. Such a view 
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of identity obliges us to imagine the substance of identity as fleeting rather than enduring 
and self-sufficient. As Mach proclaims, “The ego is as little absolutely permanent as are 
bodies. That which we do much dread in death, the annihilation of our permanency, 
actually occurs in life in abundant measure.”330 The meaning of death is likewise 
reoriented. 
Spinoza employs the term ratio to denote the alliances that compose corporeal 
identities. He speaks of thresholds as ratios of motion and rest, speed and slowness.331 
Following on his heels, Deleuze and Guattari elaborate the Spinozan conception of bodily 
identity with concepts like assemblage, machine, multiplicity, and body without organs. 
These concepts provide an understanding of bodily identity that makes no appeal to an 
immutable organic (biological, physiological, neuronal) structure: they leave the body 
fully open to deformation and reconstitution, and therefore to the aleatory and to alterity. 
Spinoza begins to build the plastic body. 
For Spinoza, a body is never purely individual in an atomistic sense; it is always a 
composite or collective of bodies. What individuates a body from the single substance 
(God, or Nature) in his monistic ontology is its effect, which is always singular.332 A 
body, then, is determined as this body by what it can do or what it can effectuate 
materially (efficient causes), psychologically (affects), politically (uprisings, policing), 
and so forth. The capacity of the body to create a singular effect, or what we can call the 
body’s power, will always remain variable and vulnerable to disintegration because this 
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power will only subsist so long as the collective of bodies working together to create a 
singular effect maintain their particular ratio of motion and rest. Spinoza writes: 
When a number of bodies of the same or different magnitude form close contact 
with one another through the pressure of other bodies upon them, or if they are 
moving at the same or different rates of speed so as to preserve an unvarying 
relation of movement among themselves, these bodies are said to be united with 
one another and all together to form one body or individual thing, which is 
distinguished from other things through this union of bodies.333 
 
Now, this ratio is not precise: it is plastic, which is to say its identity is marked by a 
threshold of formal variability.334 The form is not what determines the body ultimately, it 
is the kinetics of the body’s composition that expresses its individuality. “The important 
thing,” Deleuze tells us, is to see individuality “as a complex relation between differential 
velocities, between deceleration and acceleration of particles.” This is what Deleuze calls 
Spinoza’s “kinetic proposition.”335 
Deleuze distills the Spinozan problematic regarding bodies into the question, 
What is a body capable of? He asks the question in this way in order to suggest that the 
power of the body is unknown to us and that we are far from fathoming the possibilities 
for action, change, and enhancement that new technologies and new modes of collective 
existence have in store for us. (I am thinking in particular of human-computer interfaces 
(cyborgs), prostheses, genetic manipulation, and the whole range of what Deleuze and 
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Guattari call “unnatural participations.”)336 But Deleuze’s question also pinpoints the 
ontological claim advanced by Spinoza: bodies just are their capacity to affect and be 
affected. Deleuze writes, “a body affects other bodies, or is affected by other bodies; it is 
this capacity for affecting and being affected that also defines a body in its 
individuality.”337 This notion of individuality yields a new method of taxonomy, one 
whose principle of differentiation is produced immanently along with individuation 
itself.338 
This method prefers a genetic conception of form over ancient hylomorphism and 
regards the genesis of form as initiated by the contact of heterogeneous material 
elements, which result in multiplicities that endogenously give rise to singular bodies.339 
Dewey’s definition of aesthetic form is representative here: “Form may then be defined 
as the operation of forces that carry the experience of an event, object, scene, and 
situation to its own integral fulfillment.”340 This formulation crucially acknowledges the 
centrality of circumstance for the determination of capacity, and locates the operations of 
form in the materials and energies which compose an aesthetic event which is, at bottom, 
rhythmic.341 Similarly, Deleuze writes about how 
relations of speed and slowness are realized according to circumstances, and the 
way in which these capacities for being affected are filled. For they always are, 
but in different ways, depending on whether the present affects threaten the thing 
(diminish its power, slow it down, reduce it to the minimum), or strengthen, 
                                                     
336
 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 125; Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, 
trans. Brian Massumi (Mineapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 241. 
337
 Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 123. 
338
 “You will define an animal, or a human being, not by its form, its organs, and its functions, and not as a 
subject either; you will define it by the affects of which it is capable. Affective capacity, with a maximum 
threshold and a minimum threshold, is a constant in Spinoza.” Deleuze, Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, 
124. 
339
 For a remarkably clear exposition of this idea, see Manuel DeLanda, “Immanence and Transcendence in 
the Genesis of Form,” The South Atlantic Quarterly 96, no. 3 (Summer 1997): 499-514, 
340
 John Dewey, Art As Experience (New York: Perigree, 1934), 137 (emphasis in original). 
341
 Dewey, Art As Experience, 147, 150, 154. 
 127 
accelerate, and increase it: poison or food?—with all the complications, since a 
poison can be a food for part of the thing considered.342 
 
The point here is that the maintenance of corporeal identity is not only a matter of 
intersubjective/intercorporeal relations; identity is also dependent on environmental 
conditions and the nourishment they provide (or fail to provide)—the ambivalence of the 
environment is recognized as fundamental to corporeal power and action. 
One of the advantages of working with the Spinozan definition of bodies endorsed 
by Deleuze is that it frees us from entrenched binaries like artificial/natural and 
organic/inorganic. This results from the fact that, for Spinoza and Deleuze, all bodies 
belong to the same ontological plane and can be evaluated in terms that do not force us to 
distinguish between, say, the human and nonhuman. As a consequence of undoing old 
binaries we are free to imagine new composite bodies and, therefore, new possibilities for 
embodied experience and bodily identity. Hybridization becomes the norm. As Elizabeth 
Grosz puts it, 
[Deleuze and Guattari] provide an altogether different way of understanding the 
body in its connections with other bodies, both human and nonhuman, animate 
and inanimate, linking organs and biological processes to material objects and 
social practices while refusing to subordinate the body to a unity or a 
homogeneity of the kind provided by the body’s subordination to consciousness 
or to biological organization. Following Spinoza, the body is regarded as neither a 
locus for a consciousness nor an organically determined entity; it is understood 
more in terms of what it can do, the things it can perform, the linkages it 
establishes, the transformations and becomings it undergoes, and the machinic 
connections it forms with other bodies, what it can link with, how it can 
proliferate its capacities….343 
 
The model of embodiment described by Grosz regards the body, in Deleuze and 
Guattari’s language, as a “machinic assemblage.” This concept is radically democratic in 
so far as it counts a wide range of phenomena as bodies and refrains from privileging one 
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kind of body or relation over another. There is nothing special about a naturally occurring 
body; human bodies are not elevated above their vegetal counterparts. Corporeal 
difference is a matter of degree: what counts is the effects and affects produced by the 
body, irrespective of its compositional heritage. The consequences for environmental 
ethics implied in the concept of machinic assemblage will be explored later. 
Thinking bodies as machinic assemblages extends the Spinozan notion of bodies 
as essentially composites whose identity is determined by the unified effect they produce. 
An assemblage for Deleuze and Guattari is a multiplicity, or a heterogeneous event that 
derives its consistency (or integrity) from a certain threshold for change. This threshold is 
governed by the active conjunctions which make up the assemblage. Assemblages are 
always provisional, nonhierarchical, and precariously organized.344 They subsist only as 
long as they actively maintain their constitutive ratio of motion and rest, that is, their 
intensity.345 An intensity is a bodily event directly related to the “capacity to enter into 
relations of movement and rest”.346 It is the body’s power, which can be assembled in 
myriad ways and with a variety of inorganic and organic components. Think of a wolf 
pack or a school of fish darting through the sea. These are natural events, and thus would 
seem to be governed by a fixed natural law. But this is not the case according to Deleuze 
and Guattari. Assemblages are dynamic unities, immanently organized and constructed 
ad hoc—haecceities. 
Deleuze and Guattari conscript the medieval concept of haecceity because it 
allows them to think identity and individuation in terms of events, intensities, and 
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becoming. This notion is behind their idea of a body without organs, which is something 
like an impersonal, roughly delimited, field of desire. An haecceity, in short, is an 
“accidental form.”347 It contrasts clearly with the notion of substance, substantial form, 
person, subject, thing, and so forth, each of which is held to be self-sustaining and in 
some sense necessary. Again, they are thinking along with Spinoza when they define a 
body as an haecceity, here presented in cartographic terms: 
A body is not defined by the form that determines it nor as a determinate 
substance or subject nor by the organs it possesses or the functions it fulfills. On 
the plane of consistency, a body is defined only by a longitude and a latitude: in 
other words the sum total of the material elements belonging to it under given 
relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness (longitude); the sum total of 
the intensive affects it is capable of at a given power or degree of potential 
(latitude). Nothing but affects and local movements, differential speeds.348 
 
The concept of haecceity enables us to think of individuation, and therefore identity, as a 
contingent intercorporeity, or plasticity. This is helpful because we have been arguing 
against a substantial view of identity while simultaneously trying to articulate a theory of 
identity which displays fluid as well as stable elements, and determines these elements 
immanently. Following Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari provide a number of resources for 
thinking corporeal plasticity, although they seem to push the fluidity of their body 
without organs to an untenable extreme. What opens up on this understanding is the 
potential meaning of “individual” and “body.” Consequently, what a body is, as well as 
what it can do, becomes a perpetually open question; the body’s power becomes free to 
proliferate, and the individual free to develop, under the right conditions. The pragmatic 
function of conceiving the body as an assemblage will become clearer as we progress. 
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What is more salient in the Deleuzian/Guattarian development of the composite 
body is the machinic feature. In Anti-Oedipus, a machine is defined as what introduces 
interruptions into otherwise continuous flows of material (hyle): a machine is “a system of 
interruptions or breaks.” The orifices of our bodies are machines because they interrupt 
the flow of air (mouth) and the flow of sound (ear) and the flow of feces (anus).349 Our 
bodies, then, are complex machines insofar as their sensory apparatus works as a unified 
device for cutting up the manifold of sensory material which it encounters. At the same 
time that it cuts, the machinic body is apt to create linkages to other bodies, that is, 
assemblages composed of intensive relations and affective transactions. Machines engage 
in transactions that assemble “disparate elements,” which means that they cut into and 
synthesize material from any and all realms. Think of a soldier with a titanium prosthetic 
arm. Think of a person whose masochistic desires require leather or stone or plants for 
them to reach sexual satisfaction.350 These people are machines; their identity, materially 
composite. There is a certain technique or artisanship to this process,351 which the body 
already possesses insofar as it effortlessly hooks into environments which produce effects 
that are natural, artificial, physical, linguistic, and abstract. Since the body is never 
without a nourishing environment composed of disparate elements, or prostheses/tools, 
we could reasonably assert that it takes no stretch of the imagination to see that the 
human body just is a machine in Deleuze and Guattari’s sense.352 
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Before going any further I want to gather a fuller account of the meaning of 
plasticity and suggest some of its implications for embodiment and identity theory. This 
will enable us to understand how the machinic body is plastic and how the integration of 
body and environment is critical to understanding corporeal plasticity. Finally, it will 
prepare us to see how the body’s plasticity is determined by its aesthetic constitution, that 
is, the history of its sensory apparatus. 
If it is at least plausible to claim that the modern account of embodiment is 
marked by the view that there is a substantial core or stable structure to the body, whereas 
the postmodern era is characterized by a desire to see the body vanish into an anonymous 
field of desire, pleasure, and fluctuation, then the concept of plasticity belongs to neither 
historical period.353 Given this partition, it would seem that Merleau-Ponty belongs in 
neither the modern nor postmodern camp, for he downplays bodily anonymity just as 
much as he discards modernist substance ontology. Regardless, he does not deliver us a 
plastic body; the operation of his reversible body is more akin to elasticity. Elasticity is 
here understood on the model of the rubber band. The rubber band is flexible and 
deformable, but in the absence of resistance or external force it tends toward a specific 
formal state. Accordingly, it is not open to permanent deformation. Permanent 
deformation means breakage and the elimination of the precise disposition which 
constituted the rubber band—elasticity. The disappearance of its elasticity is equivalent to 
death for the rubber band. 
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In the Merleau-Pontyan lived body there are a number of features which exhibit 
an elasticity, the absence of which would spell the death of the body-subject. These 
include the structures of consciousness (intentionality, perspectival perception), the body 
schema, practical freedom or ability (the “I can,” which effectively operates as a 
transcendental norm and therefore makes inability a secondary mode of comportment), 
and the general tendency toward convergence attributed to perception.354 Throughout 
each of its engagements with the world, others, alterity in general, the reversible body 
maintains its relative stability by championing a series of quasi-transcendent structures 
which are admittedly malleable, but not indeterminately so. If anything, their malleability 
is always seeking to return to the equilibrium point which we defined earlier as body-
world synchronization. This view of embodiment is accomplished only by quarantining 
the objective body and suspending the question of how its physiology and materiality 
interfere with, as well as support, the phenomenological world of perception. As I have 
argued, what threatens to undo or undermine the body’s elasticity is the sensory field and 
its contact with the autonomic system, along with the material composition of the body 
more generally. This is not to say that Merleau-Ponty lacks any notion of plasticity. On 
the contrary, style and habit display a marked plasticity in his thinking. And we must take 
care to situate their plasticity at the material level in addition to the phenomenal. 
Plasticity is opposed to both malleability and substantiality. It is, at bottom, 
neither stability nor instability. Remarking on current research on the brain, Catherine 
Malabou writes that “the word plasticity has two basic senses: it means at once the 
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capacity to receive form (clay is called ‘plastic’, for example) and the capacity to give 
form (as in the plastic arts or in plastic surgery). Talking about the plasticity of the brain 
thus amounts to thinking of the brain as something modifiable, ‘formable’, and formative 
as the same time.”355 This conception of plasticity is not meant to suggest that the brain is 
merely flexible, for as Malabou goes on to show, the brain is at once prone to historical 
deformations and capable to effecting historical deformations. “To be flexible is to 
receive a form or impression, to be able to fold oneself, to take the fold, not to give it. To 
be docile, to not explode. Indeed, what flexibility lacks is the resource of giving form, the 
power to create, to invent or even to erase an impression, the power to style. Flexibility is 
plasticity minus its genius.”356 The brain is docile to a degree, but this docility is at once a 
matter of tolerance and creation, taken together as a single trait: creative tolerance. Our 
brains are, to an extent, genetically determined, but it is this necessary determination that 
allows for “a possible margin of improvisation” that is at once singularly determined and 
historically singularizing.357 Every body’s experience will likewise be singular, which 
means that no two bodies will encounter the same object in identical ways. 
Plasticity describes the simultaneous determinacy and indeterminacy of 
morphogenesis. In other words, the potential of the body to transform its initial 
determination.358 Even if it is granted that the human brain displays a universal anatomy, 
or that its physical makeup is structurally invariable, learning and memory—history in 
general—will guarantee that no two brains are the same. In this history, “repetition and 
habit play a considerable role, and this reveals that the response of a nervous circuit is 
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never fixed. Plasticity thus adds the functions of artist and instructor in freedom and 
autonomy to its role as sculptor.”359 The singular identity of the individual brain will 
emerge from that gap opened up between freedom and determination, which is to say, in 
the space of history. The integrity of the individual will be determined by how the body’s 
mechanisms are transformed by the experiences it suffers. Plasticity is the “eventlike 
dimension of the mechanical,” which, 
between determinism and freedom, designates all the types of transformation 
deployed between the closed meaning of plasticity (the definitive character of 
form) and its open meaning (the malleability of form). It does this to such a 
degree that cerebral systems today appear as self-sculpted structures that, without 
being elastic or polymorphic, still tolerate constant self-reworking, differences in 
destiny, and the fashioning of a singular identity.360 
 
Our brains are machines, but machines that repair themselves and reprogram themselves 
according to information they receive from their surroundings. The identities they 
achieve strike a balance between passivity and activity, infinite possibility and finite 
determination. At the end of the day, however, their constitution will give way to the 
exigencies of the material world, leaving only the trace of their singular destiny. 
A similar line of thinking is pursued in Foucault’s work on history and 
embodiment. He employs the term “docility” to describe the body invested with power 
and disciplinary techniques, but the manner in which he is thinking docility resonates 
with the notion of plasticity under discussion. The docile bodies populating Discipline 
and Punish seem, on the one hand, merely pliable, or “flexible” in Malabou’s sense. They 
are made to take on a preprogrammed form, rendered automatic or mechanical by the 
machinations of state power. Foucault writes of how “the soldier has become something 
that can be made; out of formless clay, an inapt body, the machine required can be 
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constructed; posture is gradually corrected; a calculated constraint runs slowly through 
each part of the body, mastering it, making it pliable, ready at all times, turning silently 
into the automatism of habit.”361 But this is only half the story. The body would not take 
on this apparent automatism were it not for its capacity to take on any number of 
historically determined forms. When Foucault says that the body has to be broken down 
and rearranged, he is acknowledging that disciplinary techniques must grapple with 
corporeal determinations that offer resistance and harbor their own power. “Discipline 
increases the forces of the body…and diminishes these same forces…. In short, it 
dissociates power from the body” and transforms the body into an “aptitude” or 
“capacity.”362 Recalling James’s definition of plasticity, the disciplined body is given a 
structure strong enough to resist power, but weak enough to yield to a sufficiently 
technical and more intense power. 
The event-like structure of the body is given further expression in “Nietzsche, 
Genealogy, History,” where Foucault explicitly rejects the view that the body is an 
ahistorical, physiologically determined entity: “The body is molded by a great many 
distinct regimes; it is broken down by the rhythms of work, rest, and holidays; it is 
poisoned by food or values, through eating habits or moral laws; it constructs 
resistances.” Ultimately, its history is “without constants,” which means that it is plastic 
in the sense we have been discussing.363 
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Malabou’s investigation of plasticity is following, in the philosophical tradition, 
the naturalistic insights of James and Dewey, although she never writes of either. She 
finds plasticity prevalent in Hegel; I have been arguing that it is basic to Spinozism. What 
she says about the brain can be profitably broadened to describe the constitution of the 
body. This need not lead to a reductive physicalism, however. Phenomenology, and the 
phenomenological sympathies of the pragmatists, can help us avoid that course. For 
instance, Bernard Andrieu, following Francisco Varela and others, is undertaking a 
program which he calls “neurophenomenology,” which focuses on the genesis and 
plasticity of the cognitive body, but considers equally legitimate the phenomenological 
and neuroscientific descriptions of this process. Central to this “dynamic materialism” is 
an updated notion of Merleau-Ponty’s flesh, which Andrieu says “defines the historic 
construction of the nervous system through the interaction of the body with the world and 
the progressive embodiment of these incorporations.”364 The temporal dimension of the 
construction of the body is linked to the principle of plasticity, which says that the body 
“must first be understood as an interaction with its environment because it is itself the 
receptive matter both informed and informing.” Merleau-Ponty may not have been 
willing to subscribe to this materialist program for the flesh, but his thinking does exhibit 
sympathy for the kind of mutual formation described by Andrieu and Malabou. This is 
evident in his conception of habit. 
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Recall that for Merleau-Ponty habits are like original prostheses of the body. 
Habits offer a stability to the body without fixing it completely. They render the body 
automatic to a degree, but this automatism is never complete. The body is not born with a 
set of specific habits, but almost immediately the body adopts habits which endow it with 
a specific integrity and allow it to negotiate its situations with relative ease. Habits belong 
among the historical a priori which condition perception and action; they arrange and 
rearrange the body schema, while leaving the body open to receive new habits. Habits are 
not just passively received, however: they are projected out into the environment as 
actions whose repetition wears down the environment in specific ways. The possibilities 
for habituation are limited by the effects of habit introduced into the layout of the 
environment. Now, I think a general conception of habit is essential to understanding 
body plasticity. In fact, we might say that habit is emblematic of plasticity, but it is not 
sufficient to keep our discussion of habit at the level of perception, without serious 
consideration of its material aspects. We saw in our earlier discussion that an account of 
habit is provided by the pragmatists. I turn to them now to consider habit from a 
naturalistic perspective which is not incompatible with, but rather supplemental to, the 
phenomenological. 
In James’s account in the Principles of Psychology, habituation takes hold in the 
neural network of the brain. And it is precisely this network’s plasticity which enables the 
body’s acquisition of habits. The “physics” of plasticity, in this case, implies that the 
nervous system is susceptible to a series of sets of habits which make up its structure at a 
given historical point; each successive phase of the structure contains a specific integrity, 
 138 
which resists alteration while at the same time remaining susceptible to influence.365 The 
influence of the body’s sensory life carves pathways in its nervous system, predisposing 
it to particular patterns of behavior which correspond to these pathways.366 
Habits, then, display internal and external aspects.367 Neither of these can be 
reduced when considering the identity of the body. On the one hand, the neural pathways 
which are recorded in the material of the body physically determine the range of actions 
and passions it is capable of at any given time. On the other hand, the range of behaviors 
which the body exhibits at a specified point in its life will make up its style and will make 
it recognizable as an individual. The variability of this style—which can come from 
reflection or situational changes, for instance—introduces a degree of indeterminacy into 
the practical life of the body that can effect an alteration of its habitual set. 
Just as the neural pathway is a kind of circuit along which habits flow, the 
behavioral aspect of habits can be regarded as circuitous. Doing so allows us to see how 
the habits which each one of us adopt can come to constitute our bodily identity. Habits 
economize our actions by locking us into certain behavioral patterns, while also releasing 
our attention to explore new modes of action. James’s description of an habitual circuit of 
behavior is as mechanical as much as it is phenomenological. “In action grown habitual, 
what instigates each new muscular contraction to take place in its appointed order is not a 
thought or a perception, but the sensation occasioned by the muscular contraction just 
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finished.”368 The idea here is that habits are chains of sensations and muscular responses, 
set in motion by a single intellectual impulse. The sensations occur below the level of 
conscious attention, but this does not mean that they are not registered by the body. 
Indeed, they are situated somewhere between the physiological and phenomenological 
body: “that they are more than unconscious nerve-currents seems certain, for they catch 
our attention if they go wrong.”369 Quoting a certain Schneider, James dubs habits 
“processes of inattentive feeling.”370 
Favoring a more holistic rendering of the habitual act, the phenomenologist will 
want to downplay the inattentive and reflexive elements of this description of habit. 
Interestingly, it is the phenomenologist who would provide us with an expansive 
description of the series of sensations and muscular contractions which comprise a given 
habitual behavior. The key difference between the mechanical and phenomenological 
accounts of a circuit of behavior will rest with the latter’s insistence on the intentionality 
motivating the circuit. Now, there is no reason why we cannot regard habits as motivated 
by intentional aims, but proceeding mechanically. To do so, however, we must admit a 
certain autonomy—i.e., a degree of nonconscious activity—to the sensations propelling 
the mechanism. 
James’s account of habitual circuits leads us to see that our corporeal identities, insofar as 
they are comprised of sets of habits, are made up of a series of responses which is 
correlated to a series of sensations. In other words, our body’s integrity is at least partly 
determined by the sensory circuits to which it responds. These circuits have aesthetic, 
phenomenological, and affective elements. They constitute the substratum of our 
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everyday lives. Of course, we carve out our own circuits, but we just as often adopt them 
from the rituals and routines of culture. We may commute, dine, and shop like everyone 
else, but we might also invent, collaborate, and produce like no other. These rituals and 
routines find themselves recorded in the musculature of our bodies and driven by the 
mundane sensations of the everyday. These circuits coalesce into a system that subtracts 
from the abundance of incoming sensations and outgoing efforts required to sustain life. 
They make up what Schneider calls our “body’s attitude,”371 which is analogous to what 
we have called proprioception. As Massumi shows, the “habitual autopilot” of our daily 
navigation is linked to the body’s proprioception, and is predominantly a noncognitive 
orienting.372 Our body’s attitude, its individuality and orientation, emerges from its 
habitual economy. 
To better capture the complexity and diversity of our identities, the notion of 
circuit can be generalized and applied to all aspects of our existence. This is because 
circuits, as plastic structures, display a relative stability. This would allow us to speak of 
political and moral circuits, for example, which might include the patterns of thought, 
action, and speech typical of a particular political ideology or moral framework.373 At the 
base of any circuit would have to be a consideration of the sensory and affective content 
of that circuit, for these are what regulate and keep us attached to the circuit, even if our 
attachment results from a diminished or indifferent concern for the circuit’s value. It is 
arguable that, although we are quasi-automatically attached to our habits, we remain 
attached to them only insofar as they retain a degree of importance. Importance can come 
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from the understanding, yes, but ultimately importance can only dictate our actions if we 
are passionate about it.374 What we are passionate about is what gives our body 
incomparable pleasure and draws it near, or what infests our body with frustration and 
rage, thus repelling it. In short, our affective responses keep us locked into a circuit of 
behavior or induce us to switch to another circuit. Affects are a currency traded in the 
habitual economy. 
We can think of the totality of the circuits which orient our individual lives as 
defining our territory, while considering each individual habit as a milieu. These two 
terms bear a mutually determining relation in the work of Deleuze and Guattari; they 
likewise are conceptually specific. Territory is relatively demarcated and abides by a 
specific set of laws: it is stratified. If we are thinking about bodily habits, their fixed or 
automatic aspect would be symptomatic of the body as territorialized, or “coded.” The 
milieu, by contrast, is defined by its instability and liminal nature: a milieu occurs 
between two clearly defined spaces, like a border, and maintains only a relative or 
fleeting stability. A habit is like a milieu in that it is susceptible to deformation and 
dependent on the stability of surrounding environmental conditions; it maintains its 
integrity in virtue of these conditions, but it is not fully determined by them. This is its 
plasticity. 
Deleuze and Guattari consider milieus in terms of rhythm and haecceity. This will 
give us a means of understanding the sensory link between our body and its environment. 
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Their position can be compared with Dewey’s theories of form and growth, which focus 
on the qualitative and aesthetic dimensions of embodiment and, not unlike Levinas, offers 
us an account of the alimentary function of sensation. 
Considering the way in which they invest the bodies that populate them, 
territories, or “territorialities (habitual constellations of affects and patterns of 
movement),”375 are not very different from what we have been calling circuits. A territory 
lays down certain laws or codes which organize and are obeyed by the bodies inhabiting 
their space. Nomos becomes ethos: This act is performative.376 Territories emerge when 
the qualities of a milieu or a rhythm are forced to express the marks/coordinates of the 
territory.377 When formalized or afforded a certain propriety, this expressiveness becomes 
a signature, or style. Territorialization occurs when an otherwise nonsignifying set of 
qualities are made to signify or represent a particular style: “One puts one’s signature on 
something just as one plants one’s flag on a piece of land.” A birdsong, or refrain, works 
in this way. The birdsong delimits a territory by marking the sonic boundaries of the 
bird’s property. This is accomplished by a “little tune” or “melodic formula” whose 
performance enacts a territorialization.378 In the same way, our bodies come to function 
by innumerable cultural refrains, some of which we enact for ourselves, like the 
frightened child who, “gripped with fear, comforts himself by singing under his breath.” 
Like any body whose posture or gesture reproduces the body language of a particular 
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cultural setting, he builds a little space of comfort around him with a sound that shelters 
him from the indeterminacy that haunts his imagination.379 
Despite the fixity of territory, bodies and spaces display characteristics which 
operate against and undo territorial codes. Improvisation, for instance. Improvisation, or 
any chance encounter, is made possible by the “cracks” in territories, which Deleuze and 
Guattari call milieus. A milieu is like an unstable, but not inconsistent, qualitative 
dimension of a territory. And just as territorialization operates on milieus, milieus rely 
upon territories for expression of their style or integrity. The dialectical relation here is 
not pure, however, because milieus take ontological priority over territories. “The 
territory is the product of a territorialization of milieus and rhythms.”380 Milieus bear 
within them rhythms which produce their identities. The rhythm of a milieu is its code,381 
but it must be noted that this rhythm is never proper to a milieu, but resonates between 
two or more milieus. The rhythm is an haeceeity, an intensive threshold which is 
constantly produced and reproduced—by a movement of involution—by the difference or 
in-between that constitutes the milieu. It is this “difference that is rhythmic, not the 
repetition, which nevertheless produces it.”382 Milieus present the transactional space or 
passage between two heterogeneously coded stabilities, “the interior milieu of impulses 
and the exterior milieu of circumstances,”383 for instance. As a threshold between inside 
and outside, a body operates as a milieu and is prone to the same kind of instability and 
determination. 
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This gets a straightforward naturalistic presentation in Dewey’s work on habit, a 
process he explicitly characterizes, following James, as plastic. Dewey explicitly presents 
two phenomena that are for the most part latent in the phenomenologists: the material 
dependence and growth of the subject on its environmental circumstances. It is true that 
Levinas gets at this aspect of existence in his notion of living from, but his analysis fails 
to consider dependence from the perspective of natural life and is virtually silent, as is 
Merleau-Ponty, on the growth of the body.384 In Human Nature and Conduct, Dewey 
speaks about the “plasticity of impulse,” whereas in Democracy and Education he 
considers growth in terms of plasticity as well as dependence. In the former text, 
plasticity prima facie denotes a state of complete indeterminacy, as though our impulses 
were an unrestrained chaos of drives. But we quickly learn that plasticity signifies for 
Dewey an “original modifiability” that is initially determined by its interactions with the 
environment. Plasticity, then, signifies neither pure novelty nor pure docility, neither 
activity nor passivity: “the most precious part of plasticity consists in ability to form 
habits” which are (1) flexible and (2) modify sedimented customs and institutions.385 
Impulses are creative in that they instigate the renewal of habit, which is itself an ability 
and an art.386 Habits “are adjustments of the environment, not merely to it. At the same 
time, the environment is many, not one; hence will, disposition, is plural.”387 Our habits 
are as diverse as the environments they respond to; the latter take on the dispositions we 
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impart to them, the former are symptomatic of how we have been compelled to adapt to 
resistances. 
Much of this sounds like Merleau-Ponty, and we might be inclined to think that 
the lived body is plastic in some respects. This is correct. Especially with regard to his 
concepts of habit, style, and postural schema, there is much plasticity in Merleau-Ponty’s 
body-subject. What it leaves out, however, is an account of the growth and disintegration 
of the body. Even in “The Child’s Relations with Others,” the body is presented as 
mature and capable; its relations, habitual yet regulated by “a single global phenomenon,” 
perception. As Merleau-Ponty writes, “the internal characteristics of the subject always 
intervene in his way of establishing his relations with what is outside him. It is never 
simply the outside which molds him; it is he himself who takes a position in the face of 
the external conditions” (Child 108/17). Absent here is the physical growth of the child, 
which will determine the manner in which he or she will receive and process—or fail to 
do so—environmental relations. And while it is true to say that this physical development 
is never simply a matter of the outside “molding” the inside, it must be admitted that the 
internal relation between subject and object entails, at least initially, an asymmetrical 
relation of dependence whereby the subject (child) is deeply susceptible to outside 
influence. This dependence signifies the need for growth as well as a state of immaturity. 
Neither of these should be interpreted negatively, however. Dependence and immaturity, 
as Dewey shows, assert their own productive forces. 
The child’s body is exemplary, but all human bodies develop. After development, 
disintegration. Both of these stages can be given positive treatments, provided they are 
taken on their own terms rather than comparatively. Immaturity is not simply an absent or 
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nascent maturity: immaturity is a power, the capacity to grow. This capacity is at once a 
dependence and a plasticity, for Dewey.  Plasticity hear indicates the “specific 
adaptability of an immature creature for growth.” This is not equivalent to “a capacity to 
take on change of form in accord with external pressure,” but rather it is the “power to 
modify actions on the basis of the results of prior experiences, the power to develop 
dispositions. Without it, the acquisition of habits is impossible.”  Dewey locates the 
subject’s plasticity below the level of disposition and habit, thus giving it a transcendental 
aspect. But this aspect is nothing more than the volatility of organic processes. It is not 
that biology is prior to culture, but that structure is emergent, resilient, and susceptible. In 
other words, the condition of possibility for habit acquisition is experimentation, or the 
indeterminate determinacy of a socially embedded impulse and instinct. Growth comes 
with the acquisition of habits, which enable independence and maturity. This 
independence comes with increased control of the body, adaptation to the environment, 
as well as creation of the environment. And it is only when our habits become routine, 
when we get locked into circuits of behavior, that our plasticity is paralyzed. The 
tendency toward decreased plasticity, the dissolution of the power to grow, often 
quickens with age. 
Dewey explicitly links the habituation of the subject with his/her qualitative 
surroundings—the aesthetics of the environment. Our growth depends on the sensations 
our bodies exchange with others like and unlike our own. Like Levinas, for Dewey we 
live from our sensations. This is because we are sensitive and susceptible organisms 
whose habits serve to increase “susceptibility, sensitiveness, responsiveness.” An 
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individual’s capacity to exist, their power, is directly determined by the exchange of 
habits for new sensations: 
Thus even if we think of habits as so many grooves, the power to acquire many 
and varied grooves denotes high sensitivity, explosiveness. Thereby an old habit, 
a fixed groove if one wishes to exaggerate, gets in the way of the process of 
forming a new habit while the tendency to form a new one cuts across some old 
habit. Hence, instability, novelty, emergence of unexpected and unpredictable 
combinations. The more an organism learns—the more that is, the former terms of 
a historic process are retained and integrated in this present phase—the more it 
has to learn, in order to keep itself going; otherwise death and catastrophe.388 
 
Given that sensitivity here entails a capacity to take on and annihilate form, i.e., indicates 
a certain plasticity, increased exposure to different sensory environments can lead to the 
sedimentation or explosion of an individual’s ethos (understood here as habituated 
identity). It is important to note that Dewey regards death here as the inability of an 
organism to continue learning. In other words, death is the extinguishing of growth, or 
the slackening of plasticity. Life is the force which enables novelty by replacing old 
habits with new ones. 
In The Meaning of the Body, Johnson shows how important the aesthetic 
dimension is for the body to make sense of its environment. He notes that the aesthetic is 
usually downplayed in our discussions of experience, precisely because we mistakenly 
take a conceptual limitation to be a limitation on meaningful experience. Put otherwise, 
we disregard the qualitative dimension because it belongs to the affective realm, rather 
than the cognitive or perceptual. Even phenomenology, Johnson notes, “has a hard time 
with the qualitative dimension, for it is easier to describe the structural aspects of 
experience than it is to describe felt qualities. The tendency is thus always to look for the 
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constituting structures of experience, at the expense of the actual experience of qualities.” 
Following Dewey, Johnson shows that qualities—which occur between bodies,  and are 
thereby liminal events—are felt, and as such allow the sentience of the body to 
immanently discriminate the meaning of events and objects. “Once we are struck, caught 
up, seized,” writes Johnson, “only then can we discriminate elements within our present 
situation.” Sensations instigate the dialogue between subject and object. 
What discriminates? Our bodies, whose sensorimotor and neural makeup, both the 
products of material growth, “determine what stands out, for us, from a situation or scene. 
Therefore, how we ‘take’ objects would change if our bodies, brains, or environments 
changed in some radical way.”389 Rarely radical, our bodies are constantly adapting to the 
aesthetic provocations of their surroundings. Only upon this instigation are they moved to 
adapt and make sense of things. As Johnson concludes, “we are living in and through a 
growing, changing situation that opens up toward new possibilities and that is 
transformed as it develops. That is the way human meaning works, and none of this 
happens without our bodies, or without our embodied interactions within environments 
that we inhabit and that change along with us.”390 Our bodies take on the qualitative 
meaning of their environments, and thus their integrity depends on these environments. 
The body’s sensibility is just this capacity to be formed and deformed, charged with 
affects and sensations which it encounters in the qualitative realm. 
It must be noted that a similar idea is available in Edward Casey’s work on place. 
Casey’s phenomenological perspective runs up against the same limitation that we find in 
Merleau-Ponty, but it helpfully explicates this limitation. Understanding this shortcoming 
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allows us to see that the reversible (phenomenological, lived) body must be supplemented 
with an account of the irreversible and excessive dimension of embodiment. Casey writes 
of the disorienting effect of wild places or wilderness on the body. Built places, by 
contrast, serve to orient and sustain the properly human dimensions of the body.391 
Disorientation in wild or natural places is, he writes, “often radically independent of 
human corporeal intentionality, to the point of challenging and undermining this 
intentionality.”392 This point is precisely what we indicated (in terms of violence) as 
deficient in Merleau-Ponty’s analyses. What we realize in the wilderness, for Casey, is 
that body and world are only reversible in familiar, manageable places. Everyday places. 
And yet, the radical independence that wild places present to us is only radical as an 
excess of intentional content. That is, their independence is only relative to the reach of 
intentional experience, which means that the source of their disorienting effect can only 
be inferred. Wild places tell us that the intentional arc of our bodies does not constitute 
the world. The phenomenology of wild place stops here, however. It cannot tell us what 
the excess of intentionality is made of.393 
Places are liable to orient as much as disorient us. This is just as true of built 
places as wild ones, contrary to what Casey says. This is precisely what makes 
architectural design so important, and why specialists are needed to carry out this design 
work. Otherwise, disorienting places are more likely to be constructed. My claim at this 
point is that disorientation as well as orientation spring from the sensory environment, not 
just the perceptual or intentional realms. On this view, our bodies respond to directives 
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imparted to them below the level of structured perception. These directives cannot 
become the object of intentionality, or if they can it is only from the perspective of 
reflection, because they contact the body’s sensibility directly—they animate us, 
sometimes to the point of disorientation. It is in this sense that they exceed the 
phenomena of perception. These directives, what Lingis calls imperatives, are thus 
ambivalent. This is their volatility. Every place, I would argue, harbors this volatile 
dimension because every place is constituted by an aesthetic dimension that affects us in 
diversifying as well as stultifying ways. 
In the previous chapter, I introduced the idea that sensations operate on our bodies 
as imperatives. Following Kant’s distinction, we could say that sensuous imperatives 
command either hypothetically or categorically.394 As we pursue our practical aims, the 
aesthetics of our environment offer numerous dimensions and pathways, each with its 
own sensory atmosphere. In many case I am able to choose from a finite set of routes the 
one I wish to take. I leave my house for groceries. There is a busy street with cars, buses, 
and pedestrians that leads to the market; there is a quieter residential street that also leads 
to my destination. I must take a street, but the specific one I choose is up to me. This is 
the hypothetical dimension. Now, once I am committed to a single route I find myself 
inserted in a sensory milieu that makes unique claims on my body’s sensory apparatus. 
My body is commanded categorically by the sensations comprising the milieu; it cannot 
but receive and respond to these sensations, which are “not reactions to physical causality 
nor adjustments to physical pressures, nor free and spontaneous impositions of order on 
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amorphous data, but responses to directives.”395 Our carnal sensibility obeys 
environmental commands, but not necessarily as a form of subjection. Sensibility, 
because it is of the same environment it responds to, is what precisely enables the body to 
get along in the environment. Sensibility is the body’s freedom.396 
To flesh out the sensuous form of the imperative, Lingis takes up Merleau-
Ponty’s notion of the levels of perception. Lingis writes of “the level of light which our 
gaze adjusts to and see with as it looks at the illuminated contours that surface and 
intensify, the level of the sonority our hearing attunes to as it harkens to sounds and 
noises that rise out of it, the level of the tangible our posture finds as our limbs move 
across the contours and textures of tangible substances….”397 What makes the levels 
different from the objects of perception is that the former are decidedly ungraspable. 
Their adumbrations cannot be explored and enumerated. Our bodies cannot pursue a 
better hold on them, cannot enter into a dialectical relation which will slowly converge on 
their essence. To engage a level, the body “adjusts to it, is sustained by it, moves with it 
and according to it.”398 In a word, the body is animated by the sensoriality of the levels. A 
place—the world as a whole—is composed of a nexus of levels. Its style is determined by 
this nexus, and it is a style we cannot “survey from above.” The style of a place is 
something our bodies “catch on to by moving with it;” it is not given to us in perception, 
but engaged as an imperative whose force comes from the “sensorial patterns” which 
order intentionality.399 
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From an aesthetic perspective, we can think of the identity of places as defined by 
the sensations they harbor, the nexus of levels they contain, and the circuits of behavioral 
responses they elicit. The body is susceptible to the imperative force of each of these 
environmental aspects. And insofar as these elements are perpetually shifting and prone 
to variation, we could say that a place’s sensory identity is never fixed in its form, but 
maintains an integrity which is that of an haecceity—a relatively stable and coherent, yet 
precarious, aggregate of sensory qualities. Of course we can say that this aggregate points 
us toward a thing, but does that not unnecessarily reduce the complexity of the sensory 
content to a simple substance? Now, given that the bodies which populate a place are 
partly responsible for the sensory content of the place, and the sensory directives of the 
place command bodies to respond in particular ways, the identity of the bodies situated 
within a place will have the character of an haecceity. Consequently, the range of 
sensation and affects the body will be capable of will be determined by the range of 
sensations and affects it will be subjected to by its environment. This constitution is made 
possible by the body’s plasticity. The critical point I am driving at here can be illustrated 
with an appeal to the biological conception of metabolism. 
In our consideration of the aesthetics of place, the identity of bodies, and the 
alimentary aspect of sensation, we have worked toward a philosophical encounter with 
metabolism. Biologically, metabolism is a fact. Ontologically, it describes the genesis of 
form and exemplifies the plastic nature of bodies, both organic and inorganic. Organic 
bodies are aggregates of matter and void, “void mostly, crisscrossed by the geometry of 
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force,” as Jonas puts it.400 Through the metabolic process, the organic body trades its 
matter with the matter of its surroundings. This exchange gives rise to a “living form” 
whose matter is never the same. No identical core persists through the metabolic process, 
which means that an organism is not the same as a machine understood in the typical 
sense. As Jonas says, “Metabolism thus is the constant becoming of the machine itself—
and this becoming itself is a performance of the machine: but for such performance there 
is no analogue in the world of machines.”401 Writing of the body-world interface, 
Andrieu strikes a similar note about the nonmechanical individuating effect of 
metabolism: 
As an interface, the body doesn’t remain passive: it doesn’t obey the orders of the 
nervous system in a servile manner, neither is it an objective reflection of the 
world. Failing to be this recording chamber, according to the mechanical 
metaphor, the human body is the way in and out, through which the inside 
communicates with the outside (and vice-versa). This crossing is subjectifying in 
the sense that the matter of the body is the result of this building up interaction. 
By ‘subjectifying’ I mean the movement which singularizes each human body by 
successive incorporations. Subjectivity is a result, in continuous movement, of 
adaptation and regulation.402 
 
From the perspective of biological metabolism, the organism is a material event, a 
function of metabolism, not the converse.403 From the ontological perspective, 
metabolism offers us a conception of identity as active self-integration and renewal, as 
the integrity of a fluctuating multiplicity. On the one hand, the material exchange our 
bodies conduct with the world replenishes our form. On the other hand, our perceptual 
dialogue enables us to maintain a balance on the phenomenal world; it helps to keep the 
world intact, manageable. The individual on this view—which Andrieu calls “dynamic 
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materialism”—develops a certain degree of freedom in its form, but it remains bound to 
the environment by and for its matter. In Jonas’s words, the individual is “needfully 
free.”404 Freedom is our ability to unpack the determinate indeterminacy offered by the 
world. 
The biological concept of metabolism applies only to organic, living beings. It 
need not be limited to this application, however. The concept can be profitably co-opted 
by the carnal ontology we are developing here, and extended so as to describe inorganic 
relations. To best illustrate this we can turn to Yukio Mishima’s autobiographical 
meditation on identity, Sun and Steel. In this text Mishima recounts his turn away from 
words and toward the body, in particular his initiation into the world of bodybuilding. 
Mishima recognizes the human tendency toward automatism of mind and body. 
But he also sees that habits are not destinies: they can be molded and redirected, not just 
intentionally but also materially. We are not automata. As Bergson has also shown, 
following Ravaisson, habits link us into the mechanisms of nature and often act as 
efficient responses to the directives contained in nature.405 The sun provides such a 
directive for Mishima.406 Its rays are absorbed into the body and incorporated onto the 
surface of the skin. Similarly, the steel of the weights he lifts is incorporated into his 
musculature. Mishima writes: “Little by little…the properties of my muscles came 
increasingly to resemble those of the steel. This slow development, I found, was 
remarkably similar to the process of education, which remodels the brain intellectually by 
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feeding it with progressively more difficult matter.”407 Mishima does not literally ingest 
steel, although his body does certainly take in the vitamins provided by the sunlight. 
Nevertheless, Mishima’s body lives from, metabolizes the sun and the steel. His body 
engages organic and inorganic matter and converts both into muscle. Deleuze and 
Guattari would call this a “double becoming.”408 According to Lingis’s description, 
In the coupling of organism with steel, the vital substance with the extreme 
condensation of night and death, there was not competent intentional force 
shaping inert substance into implements, but transference of properties. The 
properties that came to compose the excess musculature came from the steel and 
were its own properties. In the contact with the substance of steel, Mishima found 
a body become ferric substance.409 
 
This muscle does not only give him strength, it gives him form as well. The form 
emerges from the circuitous relation which obtains between organic body and 
organic/inorganic world.410 
The idea that Mishima metabolizes the sun and the steel is more than a metaphor. 
His body is sculpted and polished by a repetitive exposure to steel and sun, respectively. 
He exchanges for these his sweat, energy, calories, pallor. In his words, he transforms 
“the silence of death into the eloquence of life.”411 His writer’s body, with its distinctive 
habits and traits, is molded into the body of a weightlifter and begins to signify 
differently. This signification is transmitted through a new set of sensations. The 
bodybuilder’s circuit of training lends Mishima’s body its stability, its integrity—its 
power. His circuit enables him to cut into certain material flows and generate a new form. 
Mishima is a machine, not in the sense invoked by Jonas, but in Deleuze and Guattari’s. 
                                                     
407
 Mishima, Sun and Steel, 25-26. 
408
 See Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, chapter 10. 
409
 Lingis, Foreign Bodies, 82. 
410
 Mishima, Sun and Steel, 28, 32. “Just as muscles slowly increase their resemblance to steel, so we are 
gradually fashioned by the world….” 
411
 Mishima, Sun and Steel, 26. 
 156 
The organic/inorganic metabolism of Mishima exemplifies the machinic process, and 
allows us to see that insofar as each one of us metabolizes materials from the natural and 
social environment—I mean affects and sensations, signs and gestures, rituals and 
mannerisms—our corporeal identity is literally formed by what we live from. Metabolism 
demonstrates plasticity just as well as any other process. 
Some architecture theorists think about body-building relations in a similar way. 
They consider the sensory design of a building to be fundamental to the experience of a 
space precisely because the body’s sensibility is susceptible to the qualities endemic to a 
particular built space. There is both an aesthetics and an ethics of design at work in this 
sentiment. Peter Zumthor writes about how the “atmosphere” of a building is its rhythm, 
which we pick up “through our emotional sensibility.”412 He elaborates a series of points 
on how to generate atmosphere, which include sensory and material considerations: “It’s 
like our own bodies with their anatomy and things we can’t see and skin covering us—
that’s what architecture means to me and that’s how I try to think about it. As a bodily 
mass, a membrane, a fabric, a kind of covering, cloth, velvet, silk, all around me. The 
body! Not the idea of the body—the body itself! A body that can touch me.”413 He 
considers temperature: “It is well-known that materials more or less extract the warmth 
from our bodies.”414 In his meditation on atmosphere, he exhibits a distinct sense of how 
the body is immediately affected by the building it inhabits, and how the body demands 
certain architectural qualities for its well-being. 
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Juhani Pallasmaa writes, in “An Architecture of the Seven Senses,” about how our 
bodies adopt the structure of buildings in their skeletal structure and bodily sensations.415 
He says that “Every touching experience of architecture is multi-sensory; qualities of 
matter, space, and scale are measured equally by the eye, ear, nose, skin, tongue, skeleton 
and muscle. Architecture involves seven realms of sensory experience which interact and 
infuse each other.”416 The identity of a space is distinct and can be apprehended by the 
senses. Hollow spaces resonate with emptiness, whereas furnished spaces will have an 
aural identity specific to the arrangement, quantity, and quality of the furnishings.417 He 
summarizes how the identity of architect and building merge through interaction, and 
how this identity is passed on to the building’s users: 
…an architect internalizes a building in his body; movement, balance, distance 
and scale are felt unconsciously through the body as tension in the muscular 
system and in the positions of the skeleton and inner organs. As the work interacts 
with the body of the observer the experience mirrors these bodily sensations of 
the maker. Consequently, architecture is communication from the body of the 
architect directly to the body of the inhabitant.418 
 
Pallasmaa’s phenomenological convictions win the day, however, and he concludes that 
while sensations engage the physical body, “the generative force lies in the intentions.”419 
I would contend that while our intentions do indeed propel our engagement with places, it 
is the directives embedded in places—built and natural—that initially strike us. It is 
strange that Pallasmaa does not concede this point, for his analysis emphasizes the role of 
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the skin in the experience of architecture. The skin, it seems to me, only takes on an 
intentional aspect when it directly touches some object. And even then it is questionable 
whether or not it is intentional in the sense that vision or imagination is. I would claim, 
following Levinas, that the skin is precisely that sense organ which testifies to the 
primacy of sensation over perception because it is constantly processing environmental 
information that never rises to the level of consciousness. 
Our bodies are of the environment, but not identical to it. Merleau-Ponty says the 
same thing about the flesh, but his exposition leaves us wanting a fuller account of how 
bodies are individuated from and annihilated by the flesh’s general element. The concepts 
of metabolism and growth offer us a picture of the individual as at once attached to and 
independent from its environment. This is not a relation of reversibility, but one of 
volatile transaction. The transaction can go off well; it can go badly. The individual is not 
fully determined by its situation, although it is fundamentally enabled by it. Who is this 
individual? It is this body which refers to itself as “I” and understands itself as a singular 
locus of sensations, passions, and actions, and which feels itself to be limited by a 
particular set of material, cultural, and linguistic circumstances. 
Following up this view of individuation, we can conceive a body as a singular 
locus of sensations (an haecceity), or as a specific confluence of environmental 
impressions which define an exact position, a longitude and latitude (Deleuze and 
Guattari).420  On this reading, sensations are neither mere epiphenomena produced in the 
mind nor merely inferred content. They are productive of clearly demarcated bodily 
responses, what we might call, with Dewey, “experiences.” “An experience has a unity 
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that gives it its name, that meal, that storm, that rupture of friendship. The existence of 
this unity is constituted by a single quality that pervades the entire experience in spite of 
variation of its constituent parts.”421 This quality need not be simple. Indeed, most 
experiences are differentiated by a singular complex of qualities. That bodies undergo or 
suffer experiences implies that experiences are objectively given and generate their own 
form. That we metabolize the qualities which pervade experiences—that experiences 
shape who we are and what we can do—means that we become who we are along with 
our experience. Subjectivity is produced as this becoming.422 
Qualities are neither atomistic nor indeterminate. They do not derive their form 
from a thing or lose their autonomy just because they are “attached” to a thing, but rather 
they give rise to the formal identity of the thing as an aggregate of potential sensations.423 
They do the same thing for a space, as well as the bodies that populate that space. As 
James writes, “Space means but the aggregate of all our possible sensations.”424 
Consequently, the body is the site of these sensations, each and every one of which leaves 
a trace that makes it impossible for the body to undergo the same impression twice.425 In 
this sense, bodies are individual aesthetic events whose power to produce sensible effects 
is constituted by the aesthetic experiences they suffer. Power, then, is a plastic 
disposition—autonomous in effect but relational in constitution. Death, on this view, is 
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simply the exhaustion of the individual’s power, or the transgression of the threshold that 
defines it as this particular event. When your body ceases to produce the sensations that 
defines you, you have become something else. You begin to produce new sensations, 
engender a new power, however enfeebled. Your matter continues, reincarnated, in an 
infinite succession of new metabolisms. This is your immortality. 
There is no reductionism involved here. What I have attempted is to render life 
and individuality in aesthetic terms, and to do so according to an ontology of embodiment 
that avoids, as much as possible, transcendent appeals and an anthropocentric worldview. 
This is not in the interest of homogenizing the diversity of life, but in affirming the 
singular complexity if each individual. Toward this end I have adduced a theory of 
corporeal plasticity which is both phenomenological and materialist, and derived from 
this theory an immanent form of the imperative as well as a principle for valuing the 
diversity of aesthetic experiences. We can call this the principle of aesthetic 
individuation, which reads: since a body’s sensory identity is determined by the sensory 
blueprint of its environment, that body’s power to affect and be affected will only be as 
complex as the totality of its aesthetic experiences. Since this principle has relied on a 
certain conception of sensation (which I have developed piecemeal in each of my 
chapters), I would like to summarize the several aspects of this conception here.426 
First, sensations are objective. An object, for instance, is recognizable as an 
aggregate of qualities which our senses apprehend. We imagine that even when we are 
not there to apprehend it the object retains a real power (or disposition) to produce 
roughly the same aggregate of sensations. In some cases, pain, for instance, we feel 
ourselves attacked from outside by sensations. Levinas says that sensation breaks up 
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every system. The objective aspect to is needed to explain where disruptive and violent 
sensations come from. 
Second, sensations are relational. They only affect, or make sense, when they 
come into contact with bodies. Their effects are a matter of contrast, as James notes.427 
Put otherwise, we could say that the meaning of a sensation is diacritical; it depends on 
the field of sensations it is embedded in. As diacritical, a sensation’s effect will be neither 
intrinsically nor extrinsically determined. Its effect will be determined between subject 
and object, or object and object. This leads us to a more democratic view of bodies which 
maintains that sensations are traded, liminally, between any and all bodies (inanimate as 
well as animate). The strange idea that two inanimate bodies can exchange sensations is 
found in Hippocrates, who “has the verb aisthanesthai characterize the effects of the 
wind on lifeless things.”428 
Third, since sensations harbor the potential to enable or disable bodies, they are 
said to be ambivalent. This aspect has particular import for the ethics of embodiment. The 
volatility of sensations must be taken into consideration when designing buildings and 
public spaces, or when considering the preservation or destruction of a natural 
environment, for example. We live from our sensations, but we also die by them. This is 
the fourth aspect: sensations are alimentary. But since they are also ambivalent, they need 
to be regarded as both nourishment and poison. Their quality will determine whether they 
enable or disable our bodies. Our corporeal plasticity remains needfully vulnerable to 
them. 
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Finally, sensations belong to no one: their liminality, objectivity, and ambivalence 
entail a certain anonymity. When we say that we “have” sensations, what we are 
describing is a certain bodily response to a sensation. The response operates below the 
perceptual level which would determine it as “mine,” as personal. Once we have noticed 
it, the sensation has already seized us. When we project sensations from our bodies, they 
can be attributed to us only to a degree. But insofar as our bodies are a composite of 
sensations, and we are nothing more than our bodies, there is no substantial person to 
which the sensations attach as properties. Sensations affect a body; they produce this 
body. Never is this body properly “mine.” 
I have here presented an image of the body as plastic, which I believe to be 
superior to both the reversible body of Merleau-Ponty and the susceptible body of 
Levinas. This image could not have taken shape without certain insights into embodiment 
ascertained by the phenomenologists. I take my efforts to have balanced their perspective 
with supplemental evidence from nonphenomenological theorists, and to have 
rehabilitated the concept of sensation. If my notion of plasticity or the several 
characteristics of sensation I have gathered and advocated here have already been 
collected in an earlier theory, then I favor a return to that theory. 
 163 
CONCLUSION 
 
THE INTEGRITY OF AESTHETICS: TOWARD AN ETHICS OF EMBODIMENT 
 
 
The palace is the body of the king. Your body sends you mysterious messages, which you 
receive with fear, with anxiety. In an unknown part of this body, a menace is lurking, your 
death is already stationed there; the signals that reach you warn you perhaps of a danger 
buried in your own interior. The body seated askew on the throne is no longer yours, you 
have been deprived of its use ever since the crown encircled your head; now your person 
is spread out through this dark, alien residence that speaks to you in riddles. But has 
anything really changed? Even before, you knew little or nothing about what you were. 
And you were afraid of it, as you are now. 
– Calvino, “A King Listens” 
 
 
To conclude, I want to briefly consider some of the ethical consequences of conceiving 
the body as plastic, and to sketch how these consequences unfold in a few competing 
theoretical frameworks. Directives for further study will be suggested. 
 An ethics based on the plasticity of the body as I have described it will necessarily 
be a kind of environmental ethics. It will pay specific attention to the aesthetics of the 
environment and the ways in which aesthetics foster and diminish our body’s power to 
exist. Generally, it will be concerned with the sensory aspect of places, but a theory of art 
could likewise be envisaged. Above all, given that the body’s composition relies on the 
composition of its environment, the concept of integrity—taken in its structural and 
moral senses—will be central. What I called the “principle of aesthetic individuation” in 
the last chapter dictates this. 
One of the primary benefits of shifting the discourse of embodiment to the 
aesthetic level is that it allows us to displace the problematics of environmental 
philosophy—in particular the animality/humanity, artificial/natural, and nature/culture 
debates—onto a different plane. This opens new, non-anthropocentric avenues for 
interrogation and new possibilities for solving old problems. It might be objected that 
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such a shift of emphasis leads to a reduction of the complexities of our experience and is 
an attempt to translate the myriad qualitative aspects of life into quantities of stimuli. The 
preceding analyses, I would maintain, have sought to establish a concept of sensation 
whose richness and complexity resists such a reduction. 
I have used the Kantian language of imperatives to describe the kinaesthetics of 
embodiment and how it informs bodily integrity. A Kantian or deontological approach to 
plasticity seems possible. Kant holds that our practical maxims must conform to the 
categorical imperative which tells us whether or not our maxims can be universalized as 
moral laws. Maxims that are inconsistent or contradictory cannot be so universalized; 
maxims that can be universalized may be designated as duties.429 It could be argued that 
since the integrity of the body is necessarily tied to the environment, any maxim that 
wills a disabling environment would contradict the rational desire to have one’s bodily 
integrity maintained. Only practical laws which support enabling environments would be 
possible on this model. 
The Kantian route seems to get around the naturalistic fallacy, which forbids 
deriving an “ought” from an “is.”430 And thinking about imperatives as grounded in the 
body relieves us from appealing to a transcendent form of reason. In order to test our 
maxims, however, we need such a conception of reason. Only a transcendent reason 
whose laws are a priori and absolute can forbid us from consistently maintaining 
contradictory principles of action. Absent this, there is nothing categorically wrong with 
willing, say, environmental conditions which will lead to bodily harm. 
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Naturally, a utilitarian option presents itself. This perspective asks us to consider 
the consequences of our actions on the environment, with special attention paid to how 
these consequences end up affecting our well-being and our capacities for action. I favor 
a form of utilitarian ethics that is grounded in our affective and aesthetic life because it 
requires no appeal to transcendent law. It is naturalistic, and perhaps commits Moore’s 
fallacy, but it does so with appeal to an image of community which is not arbitrary. 
Before saying more about this I want to indicate how the virtue ethicist might construct 
an environmental ethics of the type under consideration here. 
An ethics interested in sustaining the environment and the bodies that populate it 
will assuredly make a virtue out of preserving places that promote bodily integrity. And 
insofar as our body’s develop their capacities for action or enhance their well-being 
through intercourse with a  diversity of enabling environments, the proliferation of such 
environments would be considered virtuous as well. Practical wisdom on this model 
would entail a set of virtues which promote sustainable living from the point of view of 
aesthetic experience. This view seems to make a tacit appeal to consequentialist ethics, 
however. Namely, it says that we should be virtuous because it leads to pleasant 
consequences and engenders a diversity of pleasurable experiences.431 
Even if it is not refuted by the utilitarian argument, virtue ethics remains open to 
the objection that, like deontology, all of our ethical decisions are compelled by our 
desire for pleasure. A further advantage of the utilitarian position is that it is grounded in 
our affects and is “sanctioned,” in Mill’s language, by our cultivated desire for a 
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generalized well-being.432 Now, we may doubt whether our good will towards others is 
founded upon a natural sociality, but there is something compelling about the view that 
once we see that our integrity, and the pleasures it enjoys, is necessarily linked to the 
integrity of the sensory environment writ large, we will be more inclined to preserve and 
proliferate the diversity of that environment. Our plasticity entails this possibility, as 
Malabou insists: “It is precisely because—contrary to what we normally think—the brain 
is not already made that we must ask what we should do with it, what we should do with 
this plasticity that makes us, precisely in the sense of a work: sculpture, modeling, 
architecture.”433 The inclination toward aesthetic creation will be enhanced when the 
affects derived from proliferation induce further proliferation. That is, when we become 
passionate about our passions. 
The sensory environment, as noted earlier, is characterized by its volatility. 
Ethically, this dimension is quite significant, as evoked in Diane Ackerman’s A Natural 
History of the Senses: “It is both our panic and our privilege to be mortal and sense-full. 
We live on the leash of our senses. Although they enlarge us, they also limit and restrain 
us, but how beautifully.”434 If aesthetic volatility is the hinge upon which the ethics of 
embodiment swings, then we require an ethics which cultivates diverse and enabling 
aesthetic environments. Environments which threaten bodily integrity should be avoided. 
The objection will arise at this point that nature harbors countless disabling aspects from 
the perspective of human bodily integrity. Does this mean we should work to eradicate 
these aspects? No, because these aspects contribute to the diversity of nature’s aesthetics. 
There are ways to experience dangerous natural places without being disabled by or 
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degrading them. In general, we have to consider natural and built places as unique 
sensory milieus contained within the general system of aesthetics. One of the difficulties 
of the ethics I am advocating here bears on the criteria for deciding if and how disabling 
environments can be sacrificed without compromising the integrity of the aesthetic world. 
The exigency of disabling aesthetics is greater in the built environment. 
Presumably, we want to avoid painful engagements and habitations. Above all, we want 
to avoid predicaments which compromise our integrity by pushing the tolerance of our 
plasticity beyond its breaking point. This is death. We want to multiply the possibilities 
of pleasure by increasing our capacity to affect and be affected, that is, by increasing our 
power. The sentiment is at once Nietzschean and Spinozan, but here again we can turn to 
the guidance of architects and designers. 
Architect Michael Benedikt offers a useful definition of value that resonates with 
the ethics being sketched here: “‘positive value’ is what we attribute to that which 
intensifies and/or prolongs life. (Conversely, ‘negative value’ is what we attribute to that 
which dilutes and/or shortens life.”435 Benedikt acknowledges the anthropocentrism at 
work in his definition, but nothing prevents us from applying it to life generally. The 
point is to increase pleasure and extend its possibilities wherever we can, whether we are 
constructing or building or restoring or conserving. Whose pleasure? Any sentient 
creature’s. Does this exclude inanimate objects? Not necessarily, for they too belong to 
the aesthetic economy and participate in the intensification and prolongation of life 
understood as an integral system. The obvious obstacle here is adjudicating situations 
where pleasure needs to be sacrificed in the name of some other end. 
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Perhaps the basic ethical principle guiding us here is the following: avoid and 
accommodate disability. That is, design built places that conform to and, when possible, 
enhance the bodies inhabiting them. The principle is drawn from the specialized field of 
ergonomics, but what we are moving toward here is something like a generalized 
ergonomics. Ergonomic designers aim to improve human well-being by creating 
workspaces and devices that minimize or eliminate the stress caused by human-world 
interaction. It is the science which studies the interface between humans and the systems 
in which they operate, and then attempts to make this interface as accommodating as 
possible.436 In our language, ergonomics designs aesthetic interfaces which maintain the 
integrity of tool and user, machine and machinist, space and occupant. 
The posture and movement of bodies are susceptible to deformation by prolonged 
contact with unaccommodating environments.437 Their plastic structure allows them to 
take on forms that over time decrease their capacities for action, quite apart from the 
typical effects of ageing. Ergonomics attempts to avoid premature and unnecessary 
deformation; it takes its cue from the plasticity of bodies. Ergonomics is a great example 
of something that is both natural and artificial, or something that blurs the distinction 
between animate and inanimate life. Its ethical framework, if we were to identify it, is 
basically utilitarian. That is to say: its motivation is to maximize pleasure and minimize 
pain, and not just for humans, but for the totality of bodies.438 But the scope of this ethics 
must extend beyond any extent form of utilitarianism to encompass all of the bodies that 
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participate in the corporeal community without feeling pain or pleasure, namely, 
inanimate objects and events. These things do not “feel” in the ordinary sense, although it 
would be wrong to exclude them from the affective community as we have defined it 
here, following Spinoza.439 
It seems to me that the architecture of Frank Lloyd Wright displays an ergonomic 
motivation. This does not mean that his buildings aim above all to conform themselves to 
the human form, but rather that his design pays particular attention to the interface of site 
and building, and tries to preserve the integrity of both while at the same time introducing 
a new aesthetic dimension. As a result, the building site is intensified, not degraded or 
diluted. Wright’s essay “Integrity” draws the moral conclusion: 
What is needed most in architecture today is the very thing that is most needed in 
life—Integrity. Just as it is in a human being, so integrity is the deepest quality in 
a building…If we succeed, we will have done a great service to our moral 
nature—the psyche—of our democratic society…Stand up for integrity in your 
building and you stand for integrity not only in the life of those who did the 
building but socially a reciprocal relationship is inevitable.440 
 
If we take Wright’s idea of integrity in the structural sense (not in the moralizing sense 
connoted in the quotation), the ergonomic ethic comes through and indicates a means by 
which we can think ergonomics as both a constructive and preservative practice, and not 
just a tool for optimizing human work. If there is to be an ethics of embodiment which 
takes its clue from the plasticity of bodies, and whose principle is the intensification of 
pleasure and the preservation of integrities, then it must focus its energy on the volatile 
interface between bodies. Or, as Irigaray nicely puts it: “Architects are needed. Architects 
of beauty who fashion jouissance—a very subtle material. Letting it be and building with 
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it, while respecting the approach, the threshold, the intensity.”441 What is this beauty but 
the fragile alliance of composite bodies, working actively together to form a singular 
joyful body that desires to maintain its ratio of motion and rest, speed and slowness—that 
is, its integrity. 
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